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ABSTRACT
It has become a truism that the speed of technological progress leaves law and
policy scrambling to keep up. But in addition to creating new challenges, techno-
logical advances also enable new improvements to issues at the intersection of law
and technology. In this thesis, I develop new cryptographic tools for informing and
improving our law and policy, including specific technical innovations and analysis
of the limits of possible interventions. First, I present a cryptographic analysis of
a legal question concerning the limits of the Fifth Amendment: can courts legally
compel people to decrypt their devices? Our cryptographic analysis is useful not only
for answering this specific question about encrypted devices, but also for analyzing
questions about the wider legal doctrine. The second part of this thesis turns to
algorithmic fairness. With the rise of automated decision-making, greater attention
has been paid to statistical notions of fairness and equity. In this part of the work,
I demonstrate technical limits of those notions and examine a relaxation of those
notions; these analyses should inform legal or policy interventions. Finally, the third
section of this thesis describes several methods for improving zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge, which allow a prover to convince a verifier of some property without
revealing anything beyond the fact of the prover’s knowledge. The methods in this
work yield a concrete proof size reduction of two plausibly post-quantum styles of
x
proof with transparent setup that can be made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir
transform: “MPC-in-the-head,” which is a linear-size proof that is fast, low-memory,
and has few assumptions, and “Ligero,” a sublinear-size proof achieving a balance
between proof size and prover runtime. We will describe areas where zero-knowledge
proofs in general can provide new, currently-untapped functionalities for resolving
legal disputes, proving adherence to a policy, executing contracts, and enabling the




1.1 Protecting information and computation in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Our results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Cryptography and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Fairly post-processing calibrated non-binary classifiers to bi-
nary decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 Improvements to zero-knowledge argument systems . . . . . . 19
1.3 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2 Cryptography and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1.3 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Overview of the foregone conclusion doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Rigorous definition for a foregone conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Informal walkthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.2 Formal definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.3 Adherence to Fifth Amendment principles . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.4 Choice of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
xii
2.3.5 Sequential composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.6 Additional comments on the Foregone Conclusion Definition . 56
2.4 Legal analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.1 Legal scholarship context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.2 U.S. Supreme Court cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4.3 Circuit Court cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.4 Compelled decryption cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5 Compellability of cryptographic systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.1 One way functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.5.2 Commitment schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5.3 Zero knowledge proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.4 Pseudorandom functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.5.5 Symmetric encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.6 Resilience against compelled requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.6.1 Defining FC-resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.6.2 FC-resilient two-party computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.6.3 FC-resilient multi-party computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3 Fairly post-processing calibrated non-binary classifiers to binary de-
cisions 101
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.1.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.1.2 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.2.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.2.2 Accuracy Profiles (APs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
xiii
3.2.3 Group fairness measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3 The limits of post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3.1 Fairness conditions for post-processors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.3.2 General impossibility of equalizing Positive and Negative Pre-
dictive Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.3 A niceness condition for APs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.4 Equalizing Positive and Negative Predictive Value by thresholding115
3.3.5 Equalizing APs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.4 Results for Negative Predictive Value and continuous, full support APs 129
3.4.1 Results for Negative Predictive Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.4.2 Results for continuous, full support APs . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.5 Post-processing calibrated classifiers with deferrals . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.5.1 Thresholding with deferrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.5.2 Equalizing APs with deferrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.6 Experiments on COMPAS data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.6.1 Thresholding with deferrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.6.2 Converting one AP into another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.6.3 Equalizing APs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.7 Models of deferring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.7.1 Technical implications of deferral model . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4 Improvements to zero-knowledge argument systems 153
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.2 Introduction to TurboIKOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.2.1 The MPC-in-the-head paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.2.2 Overview of our construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.3 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
xiv
4.3.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.3.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.4 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
4.4.1 Starting point: SPDZ and Baum-Nof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
4.4.2 Introducing Turbospeedz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.4.3 Adapting Turbospeedz into sacrificing-based MPC-in-the-head 171
4.4.4 Constructing smaller consistency tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.5 Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.6 Performance and prototype implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.6.1 Performance analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.6.2 Prototype implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.7 Introduction to BooLigero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.7.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.8 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.9 Ligero background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.9.1 Proof size of Ligero. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.10 BooLigero techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.10.1 Test procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.10.2 Testing linear operations that yield zero over bits . . . . . . . 202
4.10.3 New constraint tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
4.10.4 Range tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
4.11 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
4.11.1 Concrete results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
5 Interdisciplinary cryptographic and legal research: challenges, op-
portunities, and future work 219
5.1 In favor of joint research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
xv
5.1.1 Laws, policies, ethical codes, or societal goals? . . . . . . . . . 224
5.2 Examples of cryptography in the legal regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
5.2.1 Examples of subsumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
5.2.2 Examples of innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
5.2.3 Examples of gradual adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.2.4 Interdisciplinary research accelerates the process of improving
the law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
5.3 A path forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237





2.1 The evidence check E in Fisher v. U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.2 Evidence shown in Greenfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3 Self-garbled tables for the garbler in the authenticated-garbling-based
2PC protocol FC-resilient for the garbler. w is the wire index, x is the
true wire value, x̂ is the masked wire value, and λ = r⊕ s is the mask
on the wire. r was held by the garbler during pre-processing but was
securely deleted; s is held by the evaluator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.4 Performance times (ms) for our test implementation of FC-resilient au-
thenticated garbling, computing N iterations of SHA-256. The average
time over 10 runs is shown with the standard deviation in parentheses.
Pre-processing and online times are combined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.1 Proof size (in # of field elements) and soundness error (for large fields)
for several MPC-in-the-head protocols. Some lower-order terms are
omitted for legibility. N is the number of parties, M is the circuit size
(number of multiplication gates), I and O are the number of input
and output wires for the circuit, respectively, and R is the number of
times the protocol is repeated. Note that ZKBoo and ZKB++ are only
constructed for N = 3. P is a parameter specific to [188] indicating
how many Beaver triples are committed to in advance. U is a new
parameter introduced in §4.4 of this work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
xvii
4.2 Valid parameter settings for F28 . The body of the table shows the
number of repetitions R based on the soundness parameter κ, number
of parties N , and number of tests per repetition U . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.3 Signature size comparison for the Picnic signature scheme at differ-
ent security levels for different systems. All signature sizes are shown
in kilobytes (KB). AES-128 has (M, I) = (200, 128), AES-192x2 has
(M, I) = (416, 192), and AES-256x2 has (M, I) = (500, 256). . . . . . 190
xviii
List of Figures
2·1 Real (solid) and ideal (dashed) foregone conclusion games. Steps with-
out a box are common to both games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2·2 Ideal functionality for Fpbkdf, a possible version of F , which assumes
P will not be compelled while computing a PBKDF of her password . 85
2·3 2PC protocol Π that securely computes f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
among garbler G and evaluator V with malicious security for both
parties, and with FC-resilience for the garbler. (Continued in Fig. 2·3b) 99
2·3 2PC protocol Π that securely computes f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
among garbler G and evaluator V with malicious security for both
parties, and with FC-resilience for the garbler. (Continued from Fig.
2·3a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3·1 We call a classifier that returns results in [0, 1] a soft classifier to
differentiate it from those which return results in {0, 1}, which we call
hard classifiers. We refer to classifiers that take as input the output of
a soft classifier as post-processors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3·2 Accuracy Profiles (APs, definition 3.2.2.1) yield useful geometric intu-
itions, which come from the calibration property (definition 3.2.1.1).
With a threshold, the expected PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR can be seen
visually. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
xix
3·3 Accompanying Example 3.3.4.8, the PPV for both groups is 0.77. How-
ever, the threshold for g1 (dark blue) is higher than the threshold for
g2 (orange), even though g2 is the more problematic group. . . . . . . 123
3·4 For threshold post-processors with deferrals, defer between the thresh-
olds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3·5 This threshold post-processor equalizes PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR as
described in Example 3.5.1.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3·6 Choosing deferrals cleverly allows transforming one AP into another
(conditional) AP. In this example, the solid orange line is the original
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Like all previous years, 2021 is the year of the greatest technological change in Ameri-
can history, and I have every reason to expect that the pace will continue accelerating
in the future. Each new technology brings with it a host of new social questions.
Broadly, we can ask how the technology can improve the lives of individuals in a
society, as well as the society itself? What aspects of the technology have problem-
atic aspects that must be discouraged or prohibited, by individuals, companies and
organizations, or governments? These broad questions can be broken down into more
specific targeted puzzles: How can law enforcement use the technology constitution-
ally, or corporations use it statutorily? What statistical properties do we want from
the new technology, in terms of usage, performance, or fairness? Can we make any
targeted changes to existing technologies to make them more efficient, easier to use,
or better quality? The converse of the questions is often meaningful as well: What
legal or societal conditions could this technology improve or worsen? Can we design
tools that meet a specific societal niche?
These are questions one could ask of any technology, but they become essential
challenges in technologies that are very powerful, widely adopted, or both. In the
last decade, cryptography has become ubiquitous on the Internet. Cryptography adds
both enforceability and anonymity to electronic transactions. Consumer devices now
offer options for encryption, in many cases by default. Encrypted communication is
not only the norm for government employees, but also increasingly for average people
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in the U.S. More advanced forms of cryptography have been adopted by the U.S.
military to secure communications and operations in the field, and by government
agencies to store and compute on sensitive information.
This growth in the adoption, scale, and power of cryptography has forced more and
more legal and societal questions about how to deal with it. Cryptography is involved
not only in laws involving privacy, but also those that govern identity, accountabil-
ity, or the enforcement of requirements. Even in laws that seem technology-agnostic
on their face, cryptography often introduces new wrinkles and previously untested
edge cases. Specific laws and policies involving fundamental internet infrastructure,
surveillance, census, and commerce, are all increasingly intertwined with cryptog-
raphy. New norms brought about by cryptography and anonymity are leading to
increased scrutiny on what general people, governments, and corporations, should be
allowed – or required – to do with cryptography.
The problems posed by these legal dilemmas compound over time if they are not
dealt with. We are only just now beginning to inspect the legal dilemmas posed
by the new technologies of cryptocurrencies and blockchain. At the same time we
are also finally addressing the legal nuances of full disk encryption, a technology
that has been mature for several decades, but has only seen mass adoption within
the last several years. By the time a technology becomes ubiquitous, regulating it
becomes a challenge because the business interests of the technology’s owner become
a factor when weighing the societal benefits and costs – and the legality – of limiting
or requiring its use. Changes become much harder to make.
Deciding when to address these problems is challenging. Far-reaching questions
are often challenged by the legal community because they are only hypotheticals. And
it is difficult to predict in advance which predicted consequences of a new system will
be the most important. But if we always wait for those hypotheticals to become
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reality, we will have ensured that we will always be playing a perpetual game of
catch-up.
A good example is how algorithms have brought to the forefront a new examination
of statistical “fairness” in our decision-making processes. Algorithmic fairness seeks to
analyze decision-making methods under various formal definitions of fairness. There is
nothing special about analyzing an algorithm with these methods – human decision-
makers are subject to the same constraints. Indeed, in most algorithmic fairness
research the algorithm is treated as a black-box, and there is literally no difference
between measuring the fairness of an algorithm, and of a human judge. We could
have formulated these concepts decades, or even centuries earlier. In fact, as we will
discuss further in §3.1.1, we did formulate some of the concepts decades earlier in
the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of standardized testing, however, these methods
did not stand the test of time [87]. These mathematical ideas of “fairness” did not
rise to public prominence because technology had not yet forced the issue. Unlike
human decision-makers who can each make only so many decisions per day, the rise
of computing allowed a single algorithm to determine the fates of millions of people.
This called attention to the underlying problem that had always been there.
Extending this example, we believe the general principle is clear: research that
examines the intersection of technology and law can unearth important questions
that would otherwise go unquestioned, and in the best cases, can even begin to
answer those challenging questions. There is nothing particularly special about this
moment in time with regard to this principle. But the object-level topics change from
year to year. This work seeks to conduct interdisciplinary research in cryptography,
algorithmic fairness, law, and policy that is relevant in 2021. Without succumbing to
techno-solutionism, we believe that our interdisciplinary work provides useful tools
for policymakers in three different areas.
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1.1 Protecting information and computation in 2021
The specific technology questions we face in the U.S. today are largely to do with
the consequences of companies holding many large datasets about individuals, and
the appropriate limitations on the government’s power to collect, store, and analyze
information. These questions are intertwined with both old and new advancements
in cryptography and machine learning that are now coming into general use. These
advancements are somewhat new, but not cutting-edge – it is only their wide adoption
that is now forcing the legal issues.
Questions of data collection were amplified first in the mid 1990s-2000s with the
advent of the consumer Internet, and amplified further by the proliferation of cell
phones and then smartphones. Computing was just starting to become cheap enough
that large companies and government entities had the resources to analyze the new
“Big Data” that was being generated automatically from so many sensors and moni-
tors. Now, two decades later, even small companies have access to a wealth of data
about their users, and some challenges to government use of this information have
arisen, in part in response to first the PATRIOT Act and later the Snowden revela-
tions.
Now, we are pushing hard to understand the tools available to protect informa-
tion and computations on this data. This protection can take the form of a legal
restriction, such as Constitutional or statutory restrictions on data use or the collec-
tion of information. We will discuss a Fifth Amendment Constitutional limitation
to government information collection in §2. The protection might also take the form
of a fairness requirement, an obligation to ensure that data analysis treats different
demographic groups equally, especially by requiring the equalization of the analysis’
accuracy across demographic groups. In §3 we will examine the kind of protection that
is available for this analysis, and propose new methods for such protection. Finally,
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the protection might be a simple privacy requirement – though the implementation of
these requirements is never simple. A key invention that allows computing with sensi-
tive data without compromising privacy is the zero-knowledge proof. Zero-knowledge
proofs have risen from theoretical proposal to practicality within only a few decades,
and in §4 we will present two concrete improvements for zero-knowledge proofs to
further enhance this form of data protection.
In the remainder of this introduction, we will describe our results in each of these
three areas, which will be presented in greater detail in later chapters.
1.2 Our results
This thesis contains three main results that advance socio-technical interdisciplinary
research. In the context of the “crypto wars” and compelled decryption, we conduct
a cryptographic analysis of the foregone conclusion doctrine as an exception to the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We then investigate a problem
that arises when seeking fair decision-making: how can the result of a calibrated
nonbinary classifier be post-processed into a binary decision that meets a statistical
fairness requirement? And last, in more traditional cryptography work, we improve
the tradeoff between privacy and functionality in zero-knowledge arguments.
1.2.1 Cryptography and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination
Two fundamental human rights in free and democratic societies are the right to remain
silent and the right to avoid self-incrimination. More than 100 countries around the
world have enshrined some version of these rights [284], which collectively protect
people from being forced by their own governments to provide the evidence needed to
convict themselves of a crime. Jewish law included a right against self-incrimination
at least as far back as the fifth century [219] and the privilege appears in Islamic law
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as well [231].
In the United States, these rights stem from the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution, which states in part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled [by the gov-
ernment] in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” [300]. The rise of
ubiquitous, strong cryptography has forced courts to consider how all aspects of the
law apply to cryptography, including the right to silence. To date, the most promi-
nent question surrounding cryptography and the right to silence is the following: if
the government seeks as evidence a computer file that is encrypted using a key derived
from a password, can the government compel the device’s owner to use her password
in order to decrypt the file?
Taken at face value, it seems that the answer to this question should be “no”:
the device’s owner can invoke her rights in order to refuse the government’s request.
However, the answer to this question is more subtle because the rights to silence and
to avoid self-incrimination are not absolute: they only protect actions that depend
non-trivially on the contents of one’s mind. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the government can compel people to state their own name [165], provide
a handwriting exemplar [139], or provide a blood sample [263] despite the right to
avoid self-incrimination.
The question then arises: how significantly does decryption depend on the contents
of one’s mind? Both the court system (e.g., [175, 302] among U.S. circuit courts and
several cases at the state and U.S. district levels) and scholars with expertise in law
and technology [85,193,198,222,256,282,317] have divided on this question, and they
all provide different non-technical arguments about how to extend existing norms and
principles surrounding the right to silence so that they apply to cryptography. In §2,
we provide a technical framework for the relevant legal doctrine, which we then use
to reason that the answer to the compelled decryption question should often be “no.”
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We believe compelled decryption is an especially fruitful target for interdisci-
plinary cryptographic and law research for two reasons: First, existing legal research
on compelled decryption almost exclusively relies on analogies to various physical
objects like safes or shredders. Although analogies are helpful in many other areas of
the law, in the compelled decryption context the different choices of analogy lead to
different legal outcomes. Being able to reason about a cryptosystem directly allows
us to avoid negotiating this edge case between analogies. Second, as we will discuss
further, the underlying principles of the particular relevant legal doctrine happen to
align quite nicely with the cryptographic conception of knowledge.
We stress that this question about compelled assistance is different than the more
prominent part of the crypto wars, in which governments wish to mandate use of
cryptosystems that they can decrypt on their own. The main thrust of the crypto wars
has to do with different areas of the law. It especially involves the Fourth Amendment,
such as whether encryption provides a reasonable expectation of privacy [74,206,297],
and the First Amendment, e.g. whether free speech extends to the right to develop
encryption software or conduct encryption research [40,119].
When dealing with the Fifth Amendment, things are different: the Fifth Amend-
ment describes what the government may order you to do, in contrast with what it
may find out about you without your involvement. In §2, we will show that it is pos-
sible to design encryption schemes that are “strong” in the sense that they preclude
governments from decrypting files on their own, but are nevertheless vulnerable to
the government compelling you to decrypt files for them.
Toward a rigorous definition of the foregone conclusion doctrine
Rather than simply viewing cryptography as a technology that introduces new legal
questions, in this work we leverage the ideas of cryptography to codify legal principles
and then formally prove whether they apply to any given cryptosystem. Concretely,
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this work examines a small yet crucial part of the right to silence called the foregone
conclusion doctrine that is the source of all government cases involving compelled
decryption in the United States (we will describe it in detail in §2.2).
Interestingly enough, this doctrine has a style that is similar to the way that cryp-
tographic definitions are typically written: informally, it states that the government
may compel a specific “implicit” type of self-incriminating testimony if (and only if)
it already knows the testimony involved. This may seem tautological, but its purpose
becomes clearer in the context of compelling production of documents. The docu-
ments themselves may not be protected under the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, but the act of producing those documents might be; the foregone
conclusion doctrine originated with this setting in mind. We formalize the doctrine
under a cryptographic lens, providing a rigorous simulation-based cryptographic def-
inition and formally proving whether various cryptographic protocols are susceptible
to it.
At a high level, the goal of our definition is intuitive: the government can only
compel a query if it can be answered without relying heavily on the contents of your
mind, and that is the case if the government can simulate the response to the query
based upon its prior evidence about the case and access to everything in the world
except the contents of your mind. We also prove that the definition satisfies sequential
composition, which means that compelling one action cannot change the status about
whether any other action is compellable.
To justify our definition, we demonstrate that it correctly adjudicates all non-
encryption-related foregone conclusion cases argued in the U.S. Supreme Court since
the modern interpretation of the Fifth Amendment arose in 1976 [123] and the five
most important cases at the circuit court level (i.e., the next level of the court hi-
erarchy) as identified by legal scholars [96, 193, 198, 317]. We purposely ignore cases
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involving encryption since the Supreme Court has never ruled on them to date and
lower courts have split on them, leaving no reliable benchmark to use.
Determining if crypto can be compelled
We reason about the government’s ability to compel disclosure of cryptographic se-
crets. To answer the question raised above: we prove that under our definition,
decryption under a password-derived key is typically not compellable. However, if
the encryption scheme is extended with certain features (including those that are
often used to bolster security overall) then it may become compellable. Additionally,
we show that compelled disclosure composes with other parts of the crypto wars in
a debilitating way: if there exists a reliable method for the government to decrypt
data without you (even one that is somewhat costly, e.g. [319], though not one that
would require superpolynomial expected time), then the government can compel you
to perform the decryption instead. This makes various proposals for “exceptional”
law enforcement access to devices worrisome for Fifth Amendment reasons in addition
to Fourth Amendment concerns.
We also consider the government’s ability to compel a person to reveal preimages
to one-way functions, open messages protected within cryptographic commitments,
and prove statements in zero-knowledge. We find that the government is unable to
compel preimages, cannot compel the opening of commitments, and may only compel
a respondent to prove a statement already known to be true to the government, and
even then, it must be proven in zero knowledge. On the other hand, the government
generally can compel a respondent to encrypt or commit to a secret under fresh
randomness. While we are unaware of any court challenges to date that compel
use of these cryptographic primitives, they may come someday, and our definition
enables us to be forward-looking to determine whether cryptosystems can withstand
these threats.
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Bolstering cryptosystems against compelled disclosure
We consider how voluntary use of cryptographic systems exposes parties to higher
risk of compelled actions in the future. We find that secure multi-party computa-
tion (MPC) is vulnerable to this threat: engaging in MPC protocols may increase
the compellability of a party’s sensitive input data. Then, we design and implement
countermeasures that provably render secure computation protocols resilient to com-
pelled requests. Our countermeasures apply to 2-party computation via Yao’s garbled
circuits [325], with extensions to malicious security via cut-and-choose [213, 238] or
authenticated garbling [313]. We implement the latter and show that it adds a small
additive factor to the runtime that is independent of the circuit size. We also show
how to extend the construction to a multi-party protocol where several parties re-
ceive output while maintaining resilience against compelled requests, by incorporating
techniques from differential privacy.
1.2.2 Fairly post-processing calibrated non-binary classifiers to binary
decisions
The second main portion of this work concerns algorithmic fairness. Algorithmic fair-
ness is roughly divided into works that write statistical definitions of “fairness” – a
challenging task to begin with – and works that apply those definitions to decision-
making systems in society. Its broad goal is to ensure fairness, equity, and account-
ability in algorithmic decision-making, especially high-impact decision making such
as loan offerings, education and testing, employment, incarceration, and health care.
Many ideas in algorithmic fairness predate machine learning and had been previ-
ously discussed in the context of standardized testing, as we will discuss further in
§3.1.1. The increasing use of machine learning and algorithmic decision-making in
contexts where data points correspond to individual people caused a renewed interest
in the analysis of these systems for bias, especially along legally-relevant demographic
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characteristics such as race and gender.
Most recent algorithmic fairness research falls under the group fairness paradigm.
In this paradigm, inputs to the classifier belong to one or more protected groups (often,
individuals are assumed to belong to exactly one protected group, as will be true in
our work as well). For the most part, the goal in the group fairness paradigm is to
equalize some error metric between the output of a classifier when run on individuals
from the different groups. For a binary classifier, this could mean equalizing the False
Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), Positive Predictive Value (PPV), or
Negative Predictive Value (NPV), or a combination thereof. For nonbinary classifiers,
this generally involves groupwise calibration (an extension of PPV and NPV to the
non-binary setting), or “balance” of errors (an extension of FPR and FNR). Two key
works [81, 200] found slightly different variants of the same finding: equalizing all of
these metrics simultaneously is impossible unless one of two conditions is met: either
the groups have equal underlying base rates (an equal fraction of members in each
group are in the positive class as opposed to the negative class) or the classifier is
perfectly correct (and therefore PPV = NPV = 1 for both groups, and FPR = FNR = 0
for both groups).
This impossibility result has shaped the tone of the modern field of algorithmic
fairness: researchers are aware that there will be no mathematical panacea that will
cure our social ills. Some parts of the field attempted to set guidelines for when each
fairness metric should be chosen, and what value each of those encoded. This runs
into problems quickly, as we often wish to meet multiple criteria simultaneously and
feel uncomfortable with the tradeoff between them. The example of the COMPAS
recidivism prediction algorithm is well-known in the algorithmic fairness community.
Much modern interest in algorithmic fairness was spurred by a ProPublica article
decrying COMPAS for having unequal false positive rates and false negative rates
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between Caucasian and African-American defendants (African-Americans were more
likely to be labeled higher risk but not re-offend, an unequal false positive rate;
Caucasians were more likely to be labeled lower risk yet did re-offend, an unequal
false negative rate) [11]. Yet COMPAS satisfied a different metric of (approximate)
groupwise calibration and, with thresholding, equalized positive predictive value [81].
Neither metric is obviously superior to the other: The existing system which equalizes
PPV but leaves FPR and FNR unequal feels intuitively unfair – if an African-American
and a Caucasian defendant were each scored, the chance of an incorrect result would
be higher for the African-American than for the Caucasian. But a system which
equalized FPR and FNR at the cost of PPV would essentially mean that a score of
“high risk” would represent a different probability of re-offense for a Caucasian and
an African-American defendant. Lest this seem less catastrophic, notice that a judge
who learned only the “high-risk” label choosing whether to release the defendant or
not, and whose goal is to release those below a certain probabilistic threshold of re-
offense, would have to treat the two differently (see more in [229]). This also feels
unfair. Unfortunately, the underlying logical constraints force us to choose between
the above two scenarios, a perfect classifier, or equalizing the measured base rates of
recidivism between the two groups.
One final note on this topic: Although the base rates of the input dataset were
unequal between races, there are any number of biased processes that could have
led to this input state. The data itself may have been collected in a biased fashion.
Reducing unfair discrimination in all parts of this process is important. This work
focuses on the classifier only: we assume our data are the most accurate available
(the WYSIWYG assumption of [327]), and focus on the question of how to do the
best we can with what we have.
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The task of fairly post-processing groupwise-calibrated classifiers
In §3, we concentrate on the task of post-processing a groupwise-calibrated, non-binary
classifier under group fairness constraints. We suppose that individuals belong to one
of two or more disjoint protected groups. Our overall task is to decide whether a given
individual has some hidden binary property B in a way that ensures “fair balancing
of errors” across the groups.
For that purpose, we consider the following two-stage mechanism. The first stage
consists of constructing a classifier Ŝ that outputs for each individual x a “soft”
nonbinary score between 0 and 1, s ∈ [0, 1], representing the classifier’s guess at the
probability that x has property B. The only requirement we make of Ŝ is groupwise
calibration: within each group, and for each s ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of individuals in
the group that get score s and have the property, out of all individuals in the group
that get score s, is s. The second stage takes as input the output s = Ŝ(x) of the
first stage and the group to which x belongs, and outputs a “hard” binary decision:
its best guess at whether x has property B.
An attractive aspect of this two-stage mechanism is that each stage can be viewed
as aimed at a different goal: The first stage is aimed at gathering information and
providing the best accuracy possible, with only minimal regard to fairness (i.e. only
groupwise calibration). The second stage is aimed to extract a decision from the in-
formation collected in the first stage, while making sure that the errors are distributed
“fairly.”
To further focus our study, we take the first stage as a given and concentrate on
the second. That is, we consider the problem of post-processing the scores given by the
calibrated soft classifier Ŝ into binary predictions. A representative example is a judge
making a bail decision based on a score provided by a software package. Following
[81,162] we consider the following four performance measures for the resulting binary
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classifier: the positive predictive value (PPV), namely the fraction of individuals that
have the property among all individuals that the classifier predicted to have the
property; The false positive rate (FPR), namely the fraction of individuals that were
predicted to have the property among all individuals that don’t have the property;
The negative predictive value (NPV) and false negative rate (FNR), which are defined
analogously. Ideally, we would like to equalize each one of the four measures across the
groups, i.e. the measure will have the same value when restricted to samples from each
group. Unfortunately, however, we know that this is impossible in general [81, 200].
This leads us to a broad question that motivates our work:
Under what conditions can we post-process a calibrated soft classi-
fier’s outputs so that the resulting hard classifier equates a subset of
{PPV,NPV, FNR, FPR} across a set of protected groups? How can we
balance these conflicting goals?
Post-Processing with thresholds
In a first set of results we consider the properties obtained by post-processing via
a “threshold” mechanism. Naively, a threshold post-processing mechanism would
return 1 for individual x whenever the calibrated score s = Ŝ(x) is above some fixed
threshold, and return 0 otherwise. We somewhat extend this mechanism by allowing
the post-processor to “fine-tune” its decision by choosing the output probabilistically
whenever the result of the soft classifier is exactly the threshold.
We first observe that the popular and natural post-processing method of using a
single threshold across all groups has an inherent deficiency: No such mechanism can
in general guarantee equality of either PPV or NPV across the protected groups.
We then show that, when using different thresholds for the different groups, one
can equalize either PPV or NPV (but not both) across the two groups, assuming the
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profile of Ŝ has some non-degeneracy property.
The combination of the impossibility of single threshold and the possibility of
per-group threshold also stands in contrast to the belief that a soft classifier that
is calibrated across both groups allows “ignoring” group-membership information in
any post-processing decision [229]. Indeed, the conversion to a binary decision “loses
information” in different ways for the two groups, and so group membership becomes
relevant again after post-processing.
Deferrals as a post-processing tool
For the second set of results we consider post-processing strategies that do not always
output a decision. Rather, with some probability the output is ⊥, or “I don’t know,”
which means that the decision is deferred to another (hopefully higher quality, even
if more expensive) process. Let us first present our technical results and then discuss
potential interpretations and context.
The first strategy is a natural extension of the per-group threshold: we use two
thresholds per group, returning 1 above the right threshold, 0 below the left threshold,
and ⊥ between the thresholds. We show that there always exists a way to choose
the thresholds such that, conditioned on the decision not being ⊥, both the PPV and
NPV are equal across groups.
Next we show a family of post-processing strategies where, conditioned on the
decision not being ⊥, all four quantities (PPV, NPV, FPR, FNR) are equal across
groups.
All strategies in this family have the following structure: Given an individual
x, the strategy first makes a randomized decision whether to defer on x, where the
probability depends on Ŝ(x) and the group membership of x. If not deferred, then
the decision is made via another post-processing technique.
One method for determining the probabilities of deferrals is to make sure that,
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the distribution of scores returned by the calibrated soft classifier conditioned on not
deferring, is equal for the two groups (That is, let ps,g denote the probability, restricted
to group g, that an element gets score s conditioned on not deferring. Then for any s,
we choose deferral probabilities so that ps,g1 = ps,g2 .) The resulting classifier can then
be post-processed in any group blind way (say, via a single threshold mechanism as
described above).
Of course, the fact that all four quantities are equalized conditioned on not defer-
ring does not, in and of itself, provide any guarantees regarding the fairness properties
of the overall decision process — which includes also the downstream decision mech-
anism. For one, it would be naive to simply assume that fairness “composes” [112].
Furthermore, the impossibility of [81, 200] says that the overall decision-making pro-
cess cannot possibly equalize all four measures.
However, in some cases one can provide alternative (non-statistical) justification
for the fairness of the overall process: For instance, if the downstream decision process
never errs, the overall process might be considered “procedurally fair.” We present
more detailed reflections on our deferral-based approach in Section 3.7.
We note that deferring was considered in machine learning in a number of contexts,
including the context of fairness-preservation [217]. In these works, the classifier
typically punts only when its confidence regarding some decision is low. By contrast,
we use deferrals in order to “equalize” the probability mass functions of the soft
classifier over the two groups, which may involve deferring on individuals for whom
there is higher confidence. Indeed, deferring on some higher-confidence individuals
seems inherent to our goal of equalizing PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR while keeping the
deferral rate low. Furthermore, our framework allows for a wide range of deferral
strategies which might be used to promote additional goals.
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Experimental results
We test our methodology on the Broward county dataset with COMPAS scores made
public by ProPublica [11] in order to better understand its strengths and limitations.
Indeed, it has been shown that the COMPAS scoring mechanism is an approximately
calibrated soft classifier [81,124]. We first ran our two-threshold post-processing mech-
anism and obtained a binary decision algorithm which equalizes both PPV and NPV
across Caucasians and African-Americans. In addition to minimizing PPV and NPV,
this method also resulted in the desirable property of deferring when the classifier’s
output is close to uniformly random, i.e. the classifier did not have much confidence
in its result.
We then ran our post-processing mechanism with deferrals to equalize all four
of PPV, NPV, FPR, FNR across the two groups, with three different methods for
deciding how to defer: In the first method, decisions are deferred only for Caucasians;
in the second, decisions are deferred only for African Americans; in the third method,
decisions are deferred for an equal fraction of Caucasians and of African Americans.
This fraction is precisely equal to the statistical (total variation) distance between
the distributions of scores produced by the soft classifier on the two groups. For all of
these methods, any group-blind classifier would achieve all fairness guarantees on the
un-deferred outputs. The shape of the deferrals themselves was very different across
these three methods. Due to the shapes of the input distributions, the last method
resulted in deferring only on low-risk Caucasians and high-risk African-Americans,
which creates a challenge for designing an appropriate deferral mechanism. More
details about the results along with figures are given in Section 3.6.
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Algorithmic fairness is inherently interdisciplinary
Algorithmic fairness shares several qualities with cryptography: much of its purpose
is to accomplish some goal (run a classifier, transmit a message) while ensuring some
additional property on that goal is met (statistical fairness notions, ensuring the
message is not read or tampered with). It shares a need to capture a wide set of
“adversaries” and limit their abilities – although this notion is more widespread in
cryptography than in fairness, fairness has enough overlap with data analysis that
many fairness papers adopt similar practices of treating the “analyst” as an “adver-
sary” who, instead of trying to learn as much as possible about the individuals in a
dataset, will try to justify a biased decision on the output of a classifier. It addition-
ally shares a need to model actual humans’ behavior in a formalized way that can
be mathematically analyzed, and both occasionally draw on relevant concepts from
economics or game theory.
And, like cryptography, a portion of the field tests existing systems for flaws,
for example analyzing deployed algorithms for bias or finding ways to “remove” bias
from a decision at the cost of destroying information. Recently, there has been a
positive push toward using algorithmic fairness methods to detect discrepancies in
training data rather than using it to post-process a classifier (e.g. [75, 166,257]). For
example, if facial recognition algorithms have significantly lower accuracy on one
group than another, this tells the designer of that algorithm that they must train
their algorithm on more faces in that group [66]. (Other works in the space object
to facial recognition for purely normative, ethical, or governance reasons unrelated to
the accuracy discrepancy.)
Algorithmic fairness is a field that by design interacts heavily with law, policy,
and ethics. Governments providing anti-discrimination laws, or companies justifying
their actions, are in great need of this research to inform the limits of what is pos-
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sible, and how to approach those limits as closely as possible. As mentioned before,
although the statistical analyses of algorithmic fairness are not limited to algorithms,
the increasingly widespread use of homogeneous algorithms brings new urgency to
the need for formalized analysis of these questions, which interdisciplinary research
is in a good position to provide.
1.2.3 Improvements to zero-knowledge argument systems
Chapter §4 of this thesis is not inherently interdisciplinary work; instead it de-
scribes improvements to a standard cryptographic primitive (zero-knowledge proofs)
by a standard cryptographic performance metric (proof size). At a high level, zero-
knowledge proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier of the truth of a statement
without revealing the witness that shows why that statement is true.
Interest in zero-knowledge proofs has grown in the legal sphere, between cryp-
tocurrency, smart contracts, and deployments in commercial settings. They have
been used in areas spanning from digital watermarking [2] to nuclear armament ver-
ification [141]. We describe these areas of legal interest in much greater detail in
§4.1.
Our work in §4 lessens the tradeoff between privacy and utility: by making these
proofs better, we improve their chance to be used in legal and societal settings.
TurboIKOS: improved MPC-in-the-head
The focus of the work in §4.2-§4.6 is when both public verifiability and low RAM
utilization are required and a linear proof size is acceptable. In this setting, the best
available constructions are based on the “MPC-in-the-head” paradigm developed by
Ishai et al. [177]. These proofs are constructed by executing a secure multiparty
computation (MPC) protocol, which only requires fast symmetric key crypto opera-
tions and is amenable to the Fiat-Shamir transform [120]. As a result, proofs in the
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MPC-in-the-head paradigm form the basis of the Picnic digital signature scheme that
is currently an “alternate candidate” in round 3 of the NIST post-quantum crypto
competition [5, 76, 188,224].
These sections contribute a new zero knowledge proof in the MPC-in-the-head
paradigm that provides concretely smaller proof sizes than prior work for some pa-
rameters settings. Our construction, called TurboIKOS, retains the benefits of all
constructions in the MPC-in-the-head paradigm: low RAM utilization, public verifi-
ability, avoiding structured setup, prover and verifier runtime that are linear in the
circuit size |C|, and the ability to make the proof non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir
transform.
We describe two variants of TurboIKOS, both of which operate over an NP rela-
tion encoded as an arithmetic circuit C over a large field F. The first version is an
improvement over Baum-Nof [25] that reduces the number of field elements sent per
gate from 4 to 3, and is intended for circuits with large field size (Section 4.4.3). The
second version further reduces the number of field elements sent per MUL gate from
3 to 2, and uses a modified batched consistency check that allows the technique to be
used in smaller fields (Section 4.4.4).
BooLigero: improved sublinear zero-knowledge proofs for Boolean circuits
In §4.7-§4.11, we present BooLigero, an improvement to the sublinear (but not log-
size) ZK proof Ligero [10] tailored for Boolean circuits. Our method allows us to
utilize the “full” field element and store log |F| bits of the witness per element, rather
than storing only a single bit per (larger) field element and enforcing an additional
constraint as is required in Ligero. We can utilize the full field for XOR and NOT
operations; for AND we can use
√
log |F| bits of the field element. This buys us an
improvement in the proof size between O((log |F|)1/4) and O((log |F|)1/2) compared
to original Ligero, depending on the proportion of ANDs in the circuit. The prover
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and verifier runtime should not change much compared to original Ligero. We do this
while maintaining Ligero’s properties of being public coin, perfect honest-verifier zero
knowledge, amenability to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, being plausibly post-quantum
secure in the standard model, and requiring no trusted setup.
Our primary tool is efficient zero-checking and tests for constraints such as if the
bits follow a certain well-defined pattern. In Ligero, the witness is encoded, and
constraints are checked by ensuring that the prover’s claims are consistent with parts
of the encoded witness that were randomly chosen by the verifier. We add the ability
to reveal masked elements of the witness directly, in such a way that the verifier may
check properties on the masked elements that will enable them to test properties of
other hidden witness elements. Tests with a certain kind of linearity are extremely
efficient, requiring only a constant overhead in the number of witness elements to test
arbitrarily many instances of the property on existing variables. This enables us to
test properties that would normally be difficult to test while representing many bits
per word, such as testing whether certain bits are zero, or testing bit “patterns” such
as masking and shifting. We can also use these to build range tests. These tests may
be helpful in frameworks outside BooLigero as well.
We evaluate our performance on the hash functions SHA-3 and SHA-2, which are
common benchmarks and have particular appeal to the cryptocurrency community.
We achieve a 1.7-2.8× improvement over Ligero for Merkle trees of SHA-3 from 21
to 215 leaves. Our circuit for SHA-3 utilizes one of our specialized tests to perform
the bit-rotation step of the SHA-3 main loop. For SHA-2, we achieve a 1.1-1.6×
improvement over Ligero for Merkle trees from 21 to 215 leaves. Note that this is in
spite of the fact that SHA-2 uses some addition modulo 232 operations, which Ligero
supports directly and BooLigero does not.
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1.3 Organization
§2 contains a cryptographic and legal analysis of compelled decryption under the
Fifth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination. Our modeling allows
analysis of a variety of cases under the foregone conclusion doctrine, not only encryp-
tion cases. We additionally provide a new security definition for cryptographers who
are seeking to create protocols that do not leave one vulnerable to the threat of being
compelled by the government to reveal something about the protocol.
§3 is an algorithmic fairness analysis of a common problem in which a non-binary
classifier must be post-processed into a binary decision. Our analysis has two major
impacts on policy. First, we present impossibility results that show when certain goals
are inherently in conflict with each other and cannot be achieved together. Second,
we present a “deferral” mechanism that, while it does not (indeed, cannot) achieve
our statistical fairness criterion on the entire set of inputs, it allows achieving it on
a subset of inputs and uses a different societally-acceptable method to decide on the
remaining inputs.
In §4, we turn to a more traditional-cryptographic presentation of two improve-
ments to zero-knowledge proofs. In §4.1, we motivate the improvement of zero-
knowledge proofs by discussing legal tasks that zero-knowledge proofs are well-suited
for, and in §4 we dive into the improvements themselves. Both improvements are
focused on reducing the concrete proof size, an important consideration if long-
standing records are to be kept. One improvement focuses on MPC-in-the-head style
proofs [177], one on Ligero [10].
Finally, we conclude in §5 by providing background and motivation for the growing
field of interdisciplinary law-computer science (especially law-cryptography) research
in general, and by describing some areas of cryptography-law research we believe will
be especially fruitful in the coming years.
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Chapter 2
Cryptography and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination
This chapter is based on joint work with Mayank Varia [261].
2.1 Introduction
As we described in §1.2, this work uses cryptography to address the legal question
of what actions the government may compel a respondent to perform while abiding
by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Fifth Amendment enshrines
the right to avoid self-incrimination in the U.S.; it states in part that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled [by the government] in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself” [300]. Over the last decade, a number of cases have risen through the courts
which ask the following question: if the government seeks as evidence a computer file
that is encrypted using a key derived from a password, can the government compel
the device’s owner to use her password in order to decrypt the file?
If the analysis ended there, it would seem that the answer should be “no”: asking a
respondent to decrypt the file would force the respondent to incriminate herself, which
the respondent could refuse to do under the Fifth Amendment privilege. However,
over the years a number of limitations have been applied to the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Most importantly, the Fifth Amendment only applies to testimonial actions,
which depend non-trivially on the contents of the respondent’s mind. For example,
writing one’s own name [165], providing a handwriting exemplar [139], or providing a
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blood sample [263] are all examples of actions which may be compelled as an exception
to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Courts and legal scholars are split as to how to treat compelled requests to enter or
state passwords under the Fifth Amendment (e.g. [85,175,193,198,222,256,282,302,
317]). In this work, we cryptographically model the relevant legal doctrine, which we
then use to reason that the answer to the compelled decryption question should often
be “no.” We test our model by ensuring that it has the same outcome on all non-
encryption-related cases regarding this legal doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court, and
five key Circuit Court cases. Additionally, we write a security definition capturing
the conditions under which the secrets used in a cryptographic protocol avoid the
threat of compelled disclosure in our modeling, and we construct and implement a
2-party protocol secure under this definition based on Yao’s garbled circuits [325]
using authenticated garbling [313] or cut-and-choose [213, 238] to achieve malicious
security.
2.1.1 Related work
Here, we focus on law-focused related work, encryption schemes that enable govern-
ments to execute search warrants in the presence of encryption, and cryptography
to prevent government overreach outside the specific context of the crypto wars. We
will discuss work on other forms of legal-cryptographic modeling in §5.3.
Legal analyses of compelled decryption. To our knowledge, Cohen and
Park [85] is the only legal analysis of the foregone conclusion doctrine by authors with
cryptographic expertise; their expository work describes several legal concepts and
how they fare against technological advances such as widespread use of deniable en-
cryption or hardware kill switches. Additionally, there exist several normative works
by law scholars whose reasonings (which often analogize encryption to other security
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mechanisms like safes or shredders) lead to very different conclusions. Winkler [317]
argues that the right against self-incrimination prevents the government from com-
pelling a respondent to use her passwords in any way. Kerr [193], McGregor [222],
and Terzian [282] make distinct yet related arguments that the government should
have the power to compel decryption in order to restore balance between government
powers and civil liberties in light of modern encryption’s strong confidentiality guar-
antees. Kiok [198] and Sacharoff [256] settle somewhere in the middle, only allowing
the government to compel decryption if they already know certain aspects of the tar-
geted files with “reasonable particularity.” Unlike all of these works, our definition
is rigorous, composable, applies directly to encryption rather than using an analogy,
and is easier for the scientific community to analyze when evaluating the security of
a new system.
Existing case law. Analyses of compelled decryption are timely because courts in
the United States are currently divided on the issue. Some courts say people can be
compelled to disclose passwords themselves (e.g. [273]), some say they can be com-
pelled only to enter the password but not reveal it (e.g. [90,91]), and others say that
only specific files already known to the government can be compelled (e.g. [266]). See
§2.4.1 for a summary of these rulings. Also in that section, we provide a description of
previous cases the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected concerning compelled decryption
via the foregone conclusion doctrine, and our prediction for future such cases.
Cryptography for search warrants. Several prior works consider using cryp-
tography to enable governments to execute search warrants where encryption is in-
volved. Smith et al. [271] and Feigenbaum et al. [117] discuss broad principles for
this topic. Specific encryption schemes with key escrow have been proposed since the
1990s [107], and more recent proposals combine cryptography with trusted hardware
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so that a device manufacturer can assist law enforcement in decryption [62,258,278].
There also exist MPC-based constructions that provide more fine-grained functional-
ities like auditable threshold decryption [77, 204] and private set intersection across
private companies [265]. Bellovin et al. [29,30] sidestep cryptography altogether and
look to lawful hacking as a resolution to the Crypto Wars.
Cryptography to prevent government overreach. Conversely, several prior
works use cryptography to limit government overreach technologically. Tyagi et
al. [291] provide “self-revocable” encryption in which a user can temporarily revoke
her own ability to access her secret data for the purpose of defending against tem-
porary compelled decryption threats such as border crossings. Traffic unlinkability
tools like Tor [110] protect against traffic analysis by governments, and encrypted
search techniques can be used to limit collection of metadata stored at rest [186,320].
There are works that protect against subversion by the government (or anyone else)
for encryption schemes [170], digital signatures [15], and hash functions [20]. None
of these works consider compelling the respondent to perform the decryption in a
court setting, and as we show in §2.5.5 security against that threat is reliant upon
the government’s inability to get the data some other way.
2.1.2 Remarks
We hope this work provides worthwhile designs of cryptosystems that withstand gov-
ernment compelled requests, inspires the community to include this threat when de-
signing secure systems, and casts new light on the value of passwords as a useful
protection against this threat. That having been said, we make several remarks to
clarify the context of this work.
First, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of any legal definition in a common law
system. We show the best possible evidence: that our definition is consistent with
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established precedents by the Supreme Court and the appellate courts (§2.4) and
that it adheres to the core principles of the Fifth Amendment (§2.3.3). Nevertheless,
subsequent decisions by the courts might strengthen or restrict government power in
a way that renders our definition moot. Even if this should happen, we believe that
our paper provides enduring value by showing a methodology to reverse-engineer a
formal definition from common law.
Second, this work only captures a subset of legal cases, albeit a subset that we
believe is useful. We presume that the government tells the truth when interact-
ing with the court system, although we do not presume that the government tells
the whole truth. This work only considers the right to silence as interpreted in the
United States. Additionally, this work considers self-composition of compelled re-
quests (§2.3.5) and reasons how compelled requests compose with the government’s
own decryption capabilities (§2.5.5), but we do not consider how the Fifth Amend-
ment itself composes with other aspects of the law. We acknowledge that this gap can
introduce two-sided error: actions that are permissible under the Fifth Amendment
might be refuted on other grounds, and conversely, information protected under the
right to silence might be accessible to the government via other means.
Third, we stress that this work only focuses on security against one specific threat:
that of compelled action by the government. Therefore, the threat model in this work
is necessarily incomplete and potentially counterproductive if protections against gov-
ernment compelled requests conflict with protections for other threats. For this rea-
son, we prove the constructions in this work secure under their traditional definitions
in addition to analyzing their resilience to foregone conclusion requests (§2.6). We
hope that this work inspires the information security community to consider govern-
ment compelled actions within scope in their threat models.
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2.1.3 Organization
This section is structured as follows. In §2.2, we describe the body of law known
as the foregone conclusion doctrine, which is the deciding factor in most decryption
cases. In §2.3, we provide our formal definition of a foregone conclusion and analyze
its properties, including sequential composition. In §2.4, we compare our approach
to legal scholarship and justify our definition by showing that it comes to the same
outcome as U.S. Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions. In §2.5, we analyze
the compellability of common cryptographic primitives under the foregone conclusion
doctrine. In §2.6, we explore the extent to which voluntarily participating in a cryp-
tographic protocol leaves one more vulnerable to future compelled requests; we call
a protocol resilient if any compellable action after running the protocol was already
compellable before running the protocol.
2.2 Overview of the foregone conclusion doctrine
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution (abbreviated “5A”). We emphasize one aspect of 5A law called
the foregone conclusion (FC) doctrine, which is the crux of all compelled decryption
cases.
The right to silence as an interactive protocol. The right to silence in the
United States involves three parties: a government actor G such as a prosecutor or
law enforcement officer, an individual respondent R of the compelled request, and
a neutral court. We use the term respondent rather than “suspect” or “defendant”
because people can be compelled to perform government actions even without being
accused of a crime, and we consider individuals because companies do not have Fifth
Amendment rights. Also, we stress that this work focuses on G’s compelled requests
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to R, not G’s powers or restrictions to search for information on its own.
Compelled requests follow a 3-round interactive protocol: first G issues a subpoena
asking R to respond to a query, then R responds by asserting her right to silence, and
finally G requests that a court compels R to answer the query anyway. For the court
to approve the government’s request to “override” the respondent’s right to silence,
the burden of proof falls on the government to demonstrate that the compelled request
is not covered under the respondent’s rights [172].
The Fifth Amendment’s protections are broad but not absolute: they only apply
to government requests that are compelled, incriminating, and testimonial [123]. The
first two properties are relatively simple to describe. First, 5A cannot retroactively
protect statements that R has previously provided voluntarily to the government, the
statement must have been compelled by the government in the first place. Second,
5A can only be invoked if the compelled statement would “furnish a link in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime” [168]. Many cases
involve compelled actions that are non-incriminating because the government has
granted R immunity from prosecution [292]; 5A does not apply in these cases since
the respondent cannot be prosecuted for the crime at hand. Some other specific
actions, like being compelled to state one’s own name, have also been decided to
be non-incriminating [165]. Because these two criteria are usually simple to verify,
throughout this work we assume that all parties agree that G’s request is compelled
and potentially incriminating.
Testimony. We focus in this work on the final requirement: the government is
only restricted from compelling people to perform acts that are testimonial, meaning
that they “disclose the contents of [the respondent’s] own mind” [98]. Based on
this principle, speaking your password to the government is testimonial [296], but
providing a blood sample [263] does not rely on any mental state of R, so it is non-
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testimonial and therefore compellable under 5A.
The law protects pure testimony in which the written or spoken output of a
compelled request directly reveals information about R’s mind, and implicit testimony
in which the government can infer something within R’s mind by “relying on the
truthtelling” [123] of the respondent when performing an action C and producing
the result. In implicit testimony, the act of production is the testimonial object in
question, not the contents produced. For instance, G cannot compel R to provide
written documents (whose contents are not 5A-protected) if G must rely upon “the
respondent’s truthful reply [to receive] the incriminating documents” [295]. If R
provides the documents upon request, then R’s act of producing them testifies to (at
least) the existence of the documents, as well as R’s possession of them and her belief
that they are authentic [123]. Pure testimony is always forbidden within compelled
requests, although implicit testimony need not be; for this reason, we focus on implicit
testimony in this work.
We emphasize that only the testimonial aspects of a compelled request C are
covered under 5A. The output of C might reveal more or less information than the
implicit testimony implied by it, but only the latter is protected. For example, sup-
pose that G compels R to provide all documents sitting in plain sight within her
locked office. Whether the documents themselves are incriminating is irrelevant; R
only has the right to withhold from G the implicit testimony revealed by executing
C, i.e., the knowledge in R’s mind implied by her truthful response. In this example,
the only implicit testimony from the compelled action is that R has the ability to
access her own office. There is no ambiguity as to the choice of documents themselves,
and thus no testimonial aspect – the government could have sent someone to break
into her office and collect the documents themselves, without relying on R. So the
only testimonial aspect of this compelled request is R’s ability to access her office. If
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G already has evidence that R knows the location of her office key, then executing
C would not reveal any new implicit testimony to G. This begs the question: does
it violate R’s rights for G to compel R to implicitly testify to a statement that G
already knows to be true?
The foregone conclusion doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court case Fisher v.
United States answers the above question in the negative, thereby providing a power
to the government that can counter R’s invocation of the right to silence. The Fisher
case says that the courts can compel R to execute an action C if its implicit testimony
is a foregone conclusion to the government, in the sense that it “adds little or nothing
to the sum total of the Government’s information” [123]. Concretely, the law enu-
merates several blacklisted predicates: if G would learn about the existence, location,
or authenticity of any new evidence from its interaction with the respondent, then
the compelled action is not a foregone conclusion.
This work starts from the premise that simulation-based cryptographic definitions
can dovetail with the concepts within the foregone conclusion doctrine for 3 reasons.
First, simulatability formalizes the concept of “not learning new evidence” [146,212].
Second, simulation sidesteps entirely the task of enumerating sources of implicit tes-
timony; instead, it holistically determines whether all implicit testimony present in
a compelled action C is a foregone conclusion. Third, whereas predicate blacklist-
based definitions often allow a series of individual requests that might be deemed to
be invasive in totality, we will demonstrate security under composition.
2.3 Rigorous definition for a foregone conclusion
The crux of the foregone conclusion question is how to know when the government is
“relying” on the contents of the respondent’s mind, when compelling her to perform
an action? This work uses the cryptographic concept of simulation to codify the idea
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that running a foregone compelled action “reveals nothing” to the government about
the respondent’s mind, above and beyond what the government can learn from the
rest of the world.
In this section, we provide both informal and then rigorous descriptions of our
security game that encapsulates the foregone conclusion doctrine. Additionally, we
prove that our definition remains secure under sequential composition.
2.3.1 Informal walkthrough
In this section, we provide an informal description of our game-based definition of
the foregone conclusion doctrine. Our game proceeds interactively between the gov-
ernment and respondent to determine whether an action is (or is not) a foregone
conclusion. We abstractly represent all of the information in the rest of the world
(outside of the respondent’s mind) as “Nature.” We also assume as a pre-condition
that the government and the respondent have already agreed on the evidence E of
the case.
The government acts first in our game. It declares a compelled action C that it
wants the respondent to perform; this action may make use of both the respondent’s
mind and Nature. (For interactive protocols, the government must also output a
second machine G codifying the government’s response to each message from C.) We
stress that C represents the act of production, i.e., the process of obtaining the result
rather than the result itself. The government has the burden of proof to demonstrate
that its compelled request is a foregone conclusion, as required by the courts [193].
The government submits this proof in the form of a simulator S that tries to output
the same result as C without access to the respondent’s mind but with the significant
power to view anything else in the world.
Second, the respondent has an opportunity to demonstrate that the compelled ac-
tion depends non-trivially on her own mind. To do this, she must equivocate: specify
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a “world,” comprising Nature N and the contents of her own mind R, where the
simulation disagrees to match the compelled action with non-negligible probability.
This world must be consistent with the evidence, or else the respondent loses our
game.
Third, we run a thought experiment to test whether the government’s uncertainty
about the state of the world is too high for the compelled action to be deemed a
foregone conclusion. Concretely, we run the compelled action and the simulation,
and we ask a distinguisher to attempt to tell the two results apart. If the results are
indistinguishable, then we declare that any implicit testimony in the compelled action
is a foregone conclusion on top of the existing knowledge already available to the
simulator (i.e., everything in the rest of the world). If the results are different, then we
declare that the government is relying too much on the truthtelling of the respondent
for the compelled action to be deemed a foregone conclusion. The government could
try again with a different compelled action, an improved simulation strategy, or more
evidence; any of these options would cause the game to begin anew.
2.3.2 Formal definition
In this section, we formally define a foregone conclusion. We emphasize that the
evidence should be sufficient so that a single government simulator S can simulate
the response of any respondent R that acts consistently with the evidence; that is,
the choice of S cannot depend on the contents of any specific respondent’s mind.
Summary of participants. We describe below several components in our model:
a string representing nature, and several interactive Turing machines (ITMs) in the
manner formalized by Canetti [69].
The runtime and behavior of all machines are affected by a parameter λ. Usually
this parameter refers to “the amount of evidence”; we will explain this further both
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in this section and in §2.3.4. Machine M has a time bound of tM(λ) (for example,
the simulator S has a time bound of tS). For machines that can query N , they have
a query bound of qM(λ).
In a typical court setting, defining the machines’ time and query bounds on only
the singular setting of λ that is relevant to the case at hand (i.e. using concrete
bounds) is sufficient. For many sequential court rulings that must compose with
each other, or for security researchers attempting to design FC-resilient systems, an
asymptotic treatment of these bounds (where the machines are poly-time and have a
polynomial number of queries in λ) is likely to be more useful. For further discussion
of how to set these bounds, see §2.3.4.
We will additionally augment this model with a few special symbols and random
tapes that are specific to this work.
First, we list the machines and strings we will use:
• Nature N represents the entire world except the contents of the respondent’s
mind. It is a string that is exponentially long in λ. with characters from
alphabet Σ, where most of the time we expect Σ = {0, 1}.
• Respondent R represents the contents of the respondent’s mind. It is called
by the compelled action C via methods. (For example, the evidence might
enforce the existence of method R.pw, and the output of this method will be
used in the execution of the compelled action.) R also has a special method
called R.Equivocate that can make at most qR(λ) changes to Nature at the
beginning of the security game. It has a time bound of tR(λ).
• Evidence EN(R) restricts R’s allowed changes to Nature. E always returns
either true or false within tE(λ) time. In effect, the respondent will automat-
ically lose the security game if the Evidence returns false with greater than
probability α (which will be 0 in a typical case). The Evidence is the main
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power the government has to limit the degree to which R may equivocate. E
will return false unless N and R meet specific properties.
For example, if the evidence is that R has a valid driver’s license in her house,
E would contain an authentication function for the driver’s license, and would
return true if the portion of N corresponding to R’s house contains a chunk
that the authentication function recognizes as a valid driver’s license. (Note
that although naively we might expect E to need to be unbounded in order
to check all of N , in reality it only needs to have enough time to check R’s
Equivocate method.)
We recommend a typical setting of λ to be the sum of the queries E makes to
N plus the size of the circuit(s) it uses to check R. In the event that λ is set
separately, we cap the time bound of E at tE(λ) and the query bound of E to
qE(λ). For more on the typical setting of λ as well as other settings, see §2.3.4.
• Compelled request CN,R is the action the government wishes the respondent to
perform. C has oracle access to both nature and the respondent (via method
calls), and for some compelled actions it is interactive with an additional ma-
chine GN which has access only to Nature. C has time bound tC(λ) and query
bound qC(λ), and G has time bound tG(λ) and query bound qG(λ). We denote
the transcript of the interaction between C and G as t(GN , CN,R).
• Simulator SN attempts to reconstruct a transcript t′ that is indistinguishable
from the real interaction. It has oracle access to N , but it cannot access the re-
spondent’s mind R. It has time and query bounds tS(λ) and qS(λ) respectively.
These bounds are arguably the most important settings in the entire definition;
we discuss proper settings in §2.3.4.
• A distinguisher DN receives either the “real” execution t(GN , CN,R) or the
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“ideal” execution SN , and attempts to distinguish between the two. If no
D can distinguish between these, the result is a foregone conclusion. D has
time bound tD(λ) and query bound qD(λ). The advantage (the probability with
which the distinguisher must succeed past an even chance) is ǫ(λ), ideally a
negligible function as described in §2.3.4.
We discuss how to set time and query bounds in §2.3.4.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the general properties of all partici-
pating Turing machines and then any extra properties of each individual machine in
more detail.
General Turing machine model. For our purposes, all interactive Turing ma-
chines contain the following:
• Oracle access to one or two oracles (C, G, S, E, and R during the reading phase
all have access to N , which is queried on indices, and C also has oracle access
to R).
• A read-only random tape (except for E, which is deterministic).
• An internal read/write working tape.
Respondent. R is a Turing machine that represents the subpoena respondent’s
actions. It has time bound tR and may access Nature qR times. R has an internal
working tape, a write-only output tape, and a read-only randomness tape. Because R
often acts as an oracle, we presume that it has methods whose existence and interface
may be specified in the evidence. It receives these method calls on a read-only oracle-
input tape and writes the results to a write-only oracle-output tape. R always has one
special method called Equivocate, which is used near the beginning of the security
game. When R.Equivocate is called, R outputs a set of locations and values ∆; N
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will be modified at these locations to be these values; i.e. setting N [i] = x for each
pair in ∆. E may mandate the existence of additional methods, or verify that the
code of specific methods acts in a certain way (e.g. that an internal variable was
generated from the correct distribution using the randomness tape).
Evidence. E is a Turing machine that restricts the ways in which R can modify
N . It has oracle access to the modified N and takes the source code of R as input.
It may require R to place certain values within N : for example, if the government
knows that a certain document is in R’s house, it requires R to place that document
in a location in N corresponding to R’s house. Furthermore, it may require R to
have methods with certain behavior, for example requiring the existence of a method
R.SafeCombo that outputs the combination that will open a safe in N . E might
require only the existence of the method, or it might require the method to have
certain behavior. As such, E has oracle access to N , and may inspect the code of
R to check the method behavior. E is poly-time bounded. Although that prevents
detecting elements “anywhere” in Nature, it still allows E to check any simulatable
existence claim, since the simulator itself is bounded. It is deterministic so that the
chance that R and N are “allowed” by the evidence (defined formally in Definition
2.3.2.1) depends only on R and N themselves, and not on E’s coins. E can also
force a concrete time bound T on R: It can automatically return false if R has not
completed within time T . We will require two properties of the evidence, as described
further in Def. 2.3.2.2: First, the evidence must be satisfiable (contrary to the usual
computer science meaning of this term, we simply mean that there must exist at least
one “allowed” respondent for which E returns true with sufficient probability). This
prevents an action from being vacuously foregone. Second, E must be non-censoring
– E must not prohibit R from modifying additional locations in N it has not checked.
(For example, the evidence may check that the documents exist in R’s house, but
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it may not check that nothing else exists in her house, except in extreme cases and
when all parties in the court agree to this far-reaching evidence.)
Compelled request and government responder. C is the interactive Turing
machine representing the action compelled by the subpoena, in the form of an inter-
action with a government agent G. The compelled request C has oracle access to N
and R, whereas G only has oracle access to N . While a simple request could be done
in a single round in which C outputs a message to G, this formalism also permits
more complex requests which take multiple rounds.
Both C and G have the following tapes:
• A read-only identity tape
• A one-bit activation tape (determining whether it is currently in the process of
“executing”
• A read-only (but externally-writable) input communication tape on which it
receives messages
• A write-only output communication tape on which it sends messages
We denote the transcript between GN and CN,R as t(GN , CN,R).
At all times, the input tape of C should match the output tape ofG, and vice versa,
and their switch bits should always be opposed. When finishing sending a message,
the machine always sends a special end of line character “//”. We refer to t(GN , CN,R)
as the transcript of GN and CN,R, consisting of a “log” of the messages sent between
the two machines. This is formatted as an alternating string of messages between
each machine’s output tape, alternating to the other machine at each // character.
This transcript is formatted as a concatenation of “id:message//” for each alternating
message where id is either C or G, message is the message written on the output tape
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by id (received on the input tape of the opposite machine), and // is a reserved end-
of-line character. At the end of the transcript (sent by whichever machine sends the
last message) is a special symbol, reserved at the beginning of the computation.
After receiving or sending this symbol, both machines halt. (A computation that
consists of two separate computations concatenated together may use a different 
symbol to denote the end of the separate computations.) As an example, if G sends
a and then C sends b, completing the computation, the transcript t is “G:a// C:b//
”.
Finally, one should consider individual instances of C and G to be completely
unrelated; in other words, they fully securely erase all of their state after the compu-
tation.
Government simulator. S is the government simulator. Its goal is to generate a
result that is indistinguishable from the exchange between C and G. It runs in time
tS and may access N as an oracle qS times (and has no ability to query R). S has
a single output tape in which it will attempt to simulate the transcript of a paired
set of machines, but is not itself interactive. S is prohibited from returning ⊥ to this
output tape.
Composing Turing machines. In §2.3.5 we will also consider machines composed
with each other. Let M1 and M2 be Turing machines that, upon completion, use the
computation-end symbol . Then let M1‖M2 denote a machine with computation-
end symbol that begins by running M1, exchanging messages as normal and ending
with . Then it starts computingM2, exchanging messages as normal and also ending
with . Then, since its computation has ended, it outputs . In short, M1‖M2
denotes the sequential composition of M1 and M2.
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Allowed respondents. When checking for a foregone conclusion, the respondent
is automatically “caught” if it does something that violates the evidence E. We say
that R is allowed by the evidence if E (R) returns true with overwhelming probability
over the initial random initialization of N .






for (i, x) ∈ ∆ : N [i] = x
; EN(R) = true
]
> 1− α.
Because all allowed Turing machines could represent the real state of the respon-
dent’s mind as far as the government is aware, our foregone conclusion definition will
require that the government can simulate all allowed R. Conversely, the simulator is
only required to succeed on allowed respondents. To avoid degeneracy, the definition
will require the existence of at least one allowed respondent.
Security game
GameE,C,G,S,R(λ)
1 : N ←$ Σ2
λ
// initialize N randomly
2 : ∆← R.Equivocate // ∆ is a set of index-value pairs
3 : // ∆ is a set of changes to N
4 : for (i, x) in ∆ : N [i] = x
5 : // check evidence and return ⊥ if false
6 : if EN (R) = false : return ⊥
7 : // return either real or simulated transcript
8 : return N, t(GN , CN,R) , SN
Figure 2·1: Real (solid) and ideal (dashed) foregone conclusion games. Steps
without a box are common to both games.
We specify the real and ideal versions of our security game in Figure 2·1. In
the real game, the government interacts (possibly over multiple rounds) with the
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respondent who executes the compelled algorithm C. In the ideal game, the gov-
ernment’s simulator S forges a transcript using only its access to Nature (which has
previously been prepared by the respondent). The two games are identical except
for the final step. In the last step, the real game (solid box) returns the transcript
t(GN , CN,R) of all communications between the government and respondent, whereas
the ideal game (dashed box) returns the simulated transcript SN . Both games also
offer oracle access to N .
Next, we provide our formal definition of the foregone conclusion principle in
Def. 2.3.2.2. It requires that the government’s simulator S faithfully emulates real-
world transcripts. Moreover, it limits the respondent R’s ability to equivocate and
the evidence E’s ability to censor R’s use of nature.
Definition 2.3.2.2 (Foregone conclusion (FCλ)). Let λ be a security parameter.
The exchange between G and C is a foregone conclusion with respect to E and S if
the following four conditions are met:
1. Efficiency: C has time bound tC(λ) and query bound qC(λ), G has time bound
tG(λ) and query bound tG(λ), and S has has time bound tS(λ) and query bound
qS(λ).














where N , t(GN , CN,R), and SN are the results of the real and ideal security
games defined in Fig. 2·1, and ǫ is the advantage of the distinguisher.
3. Satisfiability of evidence: There exists at least one allowed R. Hence, simulata-
bility cannot be vacuously true.
4. Non-censorship of evidence: For any allowed R where R.Equivocate→ ∆, all
R′ where R′.Equivocate → ∆′ such that ∆ ⊆ ∆′ are also allowed. That is, E
does not prevent R from making additional changes to N beyond the locations
it checks.
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Notice that the probability in the satisfiability requirement is taken over the ran-
domness of R and the random choice of N (modified by R), whereas the probability
in the simulatability requirement is taken over R, N , D, C, and S.
Remarks. First, notice that the definition puts the burden of proof on the govern-
ment as is true in the legal regime [193] by requiring that it construct the simulator
S rather than merely asserting that one exists, and by requiring that S is chosen
before the respondent R chooses its equivocation strategy. Second, observe that due
to the order of quantifiers and R’s equivocation ability, if the compelled action C is
deterministic then the simulator must match this action exactly. This is explained
further in the proof of Lemma 2.5.1.1.
We make several more observations which are expanded upon in §2.3.6. First, the
code of R represents the respondent’s current actions and limitations in the present
(based upon the government’s evidence) even if this doesn’t correspond to the exact
code that the respondent originally executed in the past. Second, because the sim-
ulator S can access nature, it doesn’t need to forge the contents of any documents;
rather, it must only forge the process of producing them. And third, we presume that
the government tells the truth about its evidence.
For more information on how to choose time and query bounds, and how to set
λ, see §2.3.4.
2.3.3 Adherence to Fifth Amendment principles
The other parts of this work aim to model what the foregone conclusion doctrine is.
In this subsection, I describe why this model adheres to what the foregone conclusion
doctrine should be by the principles of the Fifth Amendment in historical context.
The general attitude against self-incrimination was brought to America from the
English common law. The English common law itself developed that attitude as a
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response to other courts: First, especially early on, the development of English legal
norms stood in contrast to the courts of the Inquisition governed by the canon law
of the Roman Catholic Church in continental Europe [210, p. 23]. And later, the
attitude about self-incrimination further evolved in the late 1500s due to the struggle
between Anglican and Calvinist Protestants, both in English ecclesiastical courts and
in the Privy Council and Star Chamber which dealt with matters of high political im-
portance to the Crown [191, p. 247]. Inquisitorial courts used a certain oath known as
the oath ex officio, which required the suspect to respond truthfully to all interroga-
tion. The ecclesiastical court and Council also used similar oaths [210, p. 23]. In the
late 1500s and early 1600s, the oath was wielded against Puritan (Calvinist) clergy in
England to force them to state their religious conviction to Anglicanism or else face
imprisonment, fine, or capital punishment [191, p. 263]. In response, a concentrated
campaign against the oath ex officio was launched by an alliance of Puritans, com-
mon law judges (who resented the expansion of ecclesiastical courts into more secular
territories), and members of the House of Commons (especially Sir Edward Coke, who
opposed it not on religious grounds but as a matter of governance believed that such
an oath could only be used if approved by Parliament) [191, 210]. In 1641, the first
formal version of the right against self-incrimination entered English law [191, p. 285],
and in 1677 this was imported into law in the colony of Virginia [210, p. 406], from
which it was eventually smithed into the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
In all three courts that used some version of the oath, a central common thread
is that the oath was used to compel people to share their private thoughts, especially
religious beliefs. Puritans were interrogated about their adherence to Anglican doc-
trine [191, p. 263], and heretics of various kinds were interrogated about their secret
writings or secret meetings with other potential heretics in a way that incriminated
them both [210, p. 34-35]. Especially in Inquisitorial courts in earlier years, a high
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requirement of proof (intended to help the innocent) created a perverse incentive
to obtain the suspect’s full confession at any cost: since most heresies would not
have multiple witnesses or documentary evidence, the only acceptable evidence in
many cases was confession [210, p. 26-27]. The debates at the time centered around
whether direct interrogation for self-incriminating testimony was morally permissible.
Debates about the more subtle “indirect” self-incriminating testimony resulting from
subpoena for compelled documents or actions did not arise until this first principle
was firmly established in both England and America.
In modern American interpretations, we think of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments as acting separately. As discussed earlier in this work, the Fourth Amendment
governs what the government can do to you, and the Fifth governs what the govern-
ment can make you do. This interpretation was not always the case, and there was
in fact a large period of American case law in which the opposite assumption was
held: the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were meant to be understood in conjunction
with each other, defending all of a person’s “private papers” from subpoena or gov-
ernment search and seizure [59, 203]. This interpretation formally began with Boyd
v. U.S. [59] in 1886. This protection was eroded in subsequent cases for corporations
and organizations [159,299], and for papers which the respondent was legally required
to hold [269]. The biggest turning point occurred in 1966 in Schmerber v. California,
in which the Fifth Amendment’s coverage was restricted to “testimonial or commu-
nicative” information [263, l. 761], allowing the collection of a blood sample under the
Fifth Amendment. This set the stage for Fisher [123] in 1976, which found that acts
of production had “implicit” testimonial aspects, but which allowed compelling that
production anyway if that implicit testimony was already known to the government
and “the question was not of testimony but of surrender” [123, 220]. Thus, the fore-
gone conclusion doctrine was born, and Boyd became essentially defunct [123,203].
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With this context in hand, what is the “right” interpretation of the foregone
conclusion doctrine? Consider a choice between three main alternatives: First, a
strict Boyd -like interpretation that a defendant may be compelled to bring nothing
at all, not even documents that the government knows the defendant must possess
in a known location, and can authenticate. Second, the existing foregone conclusion
doctrine which we believe is accurately modeled by our simulation-based definition:
the Government must demonstrate that it knows all testimonial information implicit
in the act of production – that is, the act “adds little or nothing to the sum total
of the Government’s information” [123, l. 411] – and if this is the case, then the
respondent may be compelled to perform the action. Third, a weaker interpretation
of the respondent’s protections under the foregone conclusion doctrine that focuses on
the “verifiability” of the action: if the government does not “rely on the truthtelling”
[123, l. 411] of the respondent in performing the action, then it may be compelled.
(This last interpretation, unlike our simulation-based definition, might for instance
allow a compelling a hash preimage, since the veracity of a computationally-bounded
respondent could be tested using the hash function. For more discussion on the
differences between these two models, see [86].)
The first option (the respondent cannot be compelled to any action) has been
soundly rejected by the cases that over time rejected the Boyd interpretation. As
the courts in these cases noted [123,263,269], the principles of the Fifth Amendment,
once extricated from those of the Fourth Amendment, protect testimony, not every
single thing about the person. This reasoning is in keeping with the objections to
the oath ex officio and the other arguments against self-incrimination even back into
the English common law: the problem is “confession” of beliefs or facts that the
government would not otherwise know.
At the same time, though it has not been much discussed in the literature (old or
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new), the third option (verification rather than simulation) also goes against those
core principles. In interrogatories for secret meetings, or compelled confessions to
locations of secret texts, there were surely cases in which the government could check
the veracity of the respondent’s claims – but only after the respondent made those
claims. The first-principles approach to the Fifth Amendment would seem to reject
this approach for implicit testimony as well as explicit testimony, for this approach
forces the respondent to provide information that the government could not get any
other way. This remains true even if the government can independently authenticate
the truth of the respondent’s response after it is given.
As an aside, we furthermore reject a fourth option in which only explicit testimony
(e.g. oral or written) is covered by the Fifth Amendment and any implicit testimony
can be compelled. We expect this is uncontroversial – although the question does not
arise in the early period of the Fifth Amendment’s formation, we expect that legal
scholars of both ages would agree that the distinction between “explicit” and “im-
plicit” testimony would be meaningless if any implicit testimony could be compelled.
An order to “raise your hand if you committed the crime” is implicit but clearly may
as well be explicit, and in the same way, an order to “produce any incriminating
papers if you have them” puts the respondent at the same dilemma of perjury or
self-incrimination as an oral question. The foregone conclusion doctrine avoids this
problem purely because the implicit testimonial information is already known to the
government; the respondent does not provide any new power or evidence that the
government did not demonstrate that it already could have had.
With this in mind, the foregone conclusion doctrine is best seen as a necessary
concession to the reality that the government is not all-powerful. An all-powerful
government that could costlessly retrieve any papers from the respondent would have
no reason to subpoena the respondent to produce them herself. As described, the
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compelled action of producing the papers adds nothing to the sum total of the gov-
ernment’s information. The question “is not of testimony but of surrender” [123,220].
One could object that forcing the respondent to bring those known papers anyway is
an act against the respondent’s dignity, even if the act is non-testimonial. To any de-
gree which this is true, this does not even approach the loss of dignity of being forced
into a confession without which the government would have had no case. And since
the testimonial aspects are not at issue, the foregone conclusion doctrine remains
adherent to the principles of the Fifth Amendment. We concede that the need to
have a moderately functional justice system supercedes the minuscule loss of dignity
that the respondent faces by responding to subpoenas, while the Fifth Amendment
remains intact to prevent the much larger loss of dignity that would from giving up
testimonial information.
In this view, the fact that a whole class of compelled decryption cases seem to
hinge on the foregone conclusion doctrine being interpreted in a manner that is less
beneficial to the respondent should be a red flag for that interpretation. In contrast,
our simulation-based definition forces the government to demonstrate its knowledge
of any testimony implicit in the action before the action can be compelled, thus en-
suring that “no Constitutional rights are touched” [220] while making the concession
that the government is not all-powerful and should be able to compel the respondent
to take actions as long as those rights are not touched. It finds that, in the absence
of other evidence, there is testimonial information being given up by the respondent
in compelled decryption (see §2.5), since the government is not capable of simulating
that action even given access to everything in the entire world except the respon-
dent’s mind. We preserve the government’s ability to compel actions when they can
be simulated using only non-testimonial information outside the respondent’s mind,
while ensuring that no testimonial information is compelled.
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We conclude that our simulation-based definition of the foregone conclusion doc-
trine adheres to the Fifth Amendment principle which holds testimony in the highest
regard and prevents defendants from “confessing” new testimonial information that
would incriminate themselves. We reject alternative formulations for not adhering to
that principle, or for taking it too far and rejecting non-testimonial information as
well. Happily, it seems that the definition that we believe is the one in place happens
to also be the definition that is most in keeping with Fifth Amendment principles.
2.3.4 Choice of parameters
In this section we describe how one might choose the time and query bounds t and q
for all the components of the definition.
Choosing the parameter λ
We allow courts to pick their own choice of λ. This should be the value by which
all machines (especially S, but also D, C, G, E, and R) scale their time and query
bounds. As a recommendation, we set our λ as a measure of the amount of evidence
for the remainder of this paper. That is, λ is a sum of the amount of bits of N queried
by E, plus the size of the circuits it uses to test R.
Consider the following example: R.key() contains the respondent’s 128-bit key.
R.message() reveals a 1000-bit message, and N [1] stores a 1000-bit ciphertext which
is the encryption of R.message() under R.key() using some encryption scheme. First,
observe that if λ is set based on the amount of evidence as we suggest, then λ is at
least as big as the security parameter of the encryption scheme (since the key is at
least as big as the security parameter of the scheme). Second, note that until we
approach a 2128-bit message size, λ will not artificially allow brute forcing of the
scheme.
We expect that this setting will work for the vast majority of cases. However,
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there are three scenarios which prevent us from declaring this to always be the case;
for these reasons we allow courts to set their own settings of λ.
First, if there is only a small amount of evidence, we may encounter pathologies
in which the runtimes of other machines (especially R and S) are artificially short.
Thus we additionally set a minimum for λ, say λ ≥ 80, to ensure that all parties
still get a reasonable amount of computing power even with minimal evidence. (80
is a typical medium-low setting of a security parameter for a symmetric encryption
scheme.)
Second, in some cases an extremely high amount of evidence may be a valid model.
For example, a security researcher may wish to model a nation-state adversary as
having λ = 2128 pieces of evidence, a number so high that tS(λ) = tS(2
128) would allow
time for brute-force decrypting 128-bit cryptosystems. We believe this is unrealistic,
but we wish to allow this alternate model as an option. Note that with this setting of
λ, since Nature is exponentially long in λ, it will be doubly exponential in whatever
parameter λ itself is exponential in. This has the effect that cryptography can be
brute-forced, but arbitrary elements of Nature still cannot be.
The third reason we allow alternate choices of λ is that setting this parameter
as “the amount of evidence” encourages the government to present an inflated E
machine with many useless queries, since this will allow it to use a more powerful
simulator. This is another way in which our definition is brittle against maliciously-
crafted evidence. All parties should be in agreement on the Evidence machine E
before getting to the point of running this definition.
As a final note, the setting of λ does not matter as much in the concrete setting,
where the time and query bounds of each machine can be set individually for a single
arbitrary value of λ.
50
Choosing a simulator bound
Arguably the most important choice of parameter in this system is the choice of the
time and query bound on the simulator (tS and qS respectively). The general effect
of setting tS and qS is to quantify the work the government must do without the
contents of the respondent’s mind in order to replicate an action that the respondent
can do with the contents of their mind.
To use a toy example, in order to determine whether the respondent’s glove fits
her hand, the government likely only must query two locations in Nature (the glove
and the hand), and perform the computational work of checking whether they are the
same size. Perhaps if the respondent is particularly coy about putting on the glove,
the government at worst has to do some extra work to make a plaster cast of her hand
and fit the glove to that. All this is nontrivial work, but it seems reaonably attainable
within the budget of a police department – a simulator should be fairly easy to build
for this action. If the evidence contains information about 1000 hands, each of which
is paired to a potential glove (λ is at least 2000: the sum of the 1000 hands in N and
the 1000 gloves in N) then this may take roughly 1000x more work than checking
one glove – both qS and tS are linear functions in λ (assuming λ is chosen as the
amount of evidence as described in the previous section). If it is not known which
glove corresponds to which hand, then we may have a matching problem between the
hands and the gloves: λ and qS are unchanged at 2000, but tS is now about 1000
2:
each of 1000 gloves must be matched against 1000 hands, a quadratic function in λ.
Increase the complexity of this example a little more and it is not clear that the
government could plausibly achieve the cost in question. A poly-time runtime and
query bound plausibly represents a stronger government than the real one. In many
cases a court might want to pick a more fine-grained option.
Furthermore, observe that all of this does not even make a scratch in the problem
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of the government needing to break or brute force cryptography, generally a problem
that requires exponential work in the cryptosystem’s security parameter. (Note that
as discussed in the choice of λ this parameter should always be at least the size of the
security parameter of a cryptosystem used where a key is stored in either R’s mind
or N .)
An unbounded simulator may be a good choice in an extreme setting where (for
example) a very paranoid security researcher wishes to create a scheme that is FC-
resilient even if the government is exceedingly powerful and has no bound on its
simulator. However, we expect most courts (and indeed most security researchers) to
be satisfied with the poly-time and poly-query bounded simulator, which as we said
is still giving the government more power than it likely actually possesses.
Choosing a distinguisher bound and advantage
The distinguisher bound may again be either concrete, asymptotic (fine-grained or
just “polynomial”) or unbounded. For the main section of this paper we focus on
computational indistinguishability, that is, the distinguisher time bound tD(1
n) is
polynomial.
The reasoning here is similar to the discussion of the simulator time bound. The
choice of computational indistinguishability is a concession to the fact that the gov-
ernment is not all-powerful, as we discussed in 2.3.3. It is hard to see how one would
operationalize an unbounded distinguisher, since in real life no party would be able to
serve as the distinguisher. A more limited distinguisher is also possible, but we find
that the standard poly-time bound is useful for analyzing cryptosystems. We see the
choice of an asymptotic polynomial time and query bound as the most useful setting
since it enables easier analysis while still being fairly realistic.
We also primarily choose to set the maximum allowed advantage of the distin-
guisher, ǫ(λ), to a (positive) negligible function, This means that for any polynomial
52
p(λ), there exists some number n such that ∀λ > n, ǫ(λ) < 1
p(λ)
. One could choose to
set ǫ to a constant function instead of a negligible one, e.g. the distinguisher must be
able to discern the simulated from the real version with at most a 1% advantage to
be a foregone conclusion. This would favor the respondent; many more things would
be foregone than with a negligible advantage. However, this does not scale with the
security parameter, and generally makes analysis more difficult. We see the negligible
setting of ǫ as the natural choice.
When to pick asymptotic versus concrete bounds
As described in the previous section, for the most part courts may wish to set a
concrete bound for each machine based on the realistic resources that could be applied
to the case.
On the other hand, asymptotic time and query bounds make analysing the com-
position of several actions easier without making the simulator too unreasonably
powerful (though still more powerful than it would likely be in real life). As we will
discuss further in §2.3.5, we make the normative claim that foregone compositions
should compose: one should not be able to “split up” one large non-foregone action
into multiple actions which are each individually foregone, and one should not be
able to combine non-foregone actions into one larger foregone action. We show in
§2.3.5 that this holds in the asymptotic setting. In the concrete setting, one can still
consider composition, but one must take careful account of the total time and queries
used so far, rather than considering each action individually. In our opinion, the
asymptotic definition is easier to analyze for composition and it does not lose much,
and so we will use it for the remainder of the paper.
One other side effect of choosing a concrete or a fine-grained bound rather than
the recommended poly-time bound is that compelling fine-grained cryptography may
become not foregone. Fine-grained cryptography aims to provide security only up to
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a specific polynomial runtime adversary (e.g. quadratic), rather than all polynomial-
time adversaries, e.g. [106, 115, 207, 223]. Compelling decryption with a fine-grained
cryptosystem would likely be foregone under the standard poly-time simulator, but
not under a more limited simulator.
2.3.5 Sequential composition
In this section, we prove that Definition 2.3.2.2 remains secure under sequential com-
position. Essentially, our theorem states that the information disclosed by a govern-
ment compelled action cannot immediately open up new actions that the government
can subsequently compel.
Theorem 2.3.5.1 (Sequential composition). Suppose C1, G1 is a foregone conclusion
with respect to E and S1. Then C2, G2 is a foregone conclusion with respect to E and
S2 if and only if there exists a simulator S1‖2 such that (C1‖C2), (G1‖G2) is a foregone
conclusion with respect to E and S1‖2.
While composition generally follows naturally in simulation-based definitions, the
proof in our setting is somewhat non-standard. For instance, proving composition
for zero-knowledge proofs requires an auxiliary input so that later instances store the
results of simulated versions of earlier instances, but our definition doesn’t have a
direct concept of auxiliary input. We proceed in the other direction: we can proac-
tively store simulated versions of later instances in nature in order to test the limits
of whether earlier instances are truly foregone conclusions.
We prove the two directions of Theorem 2.3.5.1 separately. Beforehand though,
we find it useful to make a simple observation: the transcript of a composed machine
is equivalent to the composition of the transcripts of the individual machines.
Lemma 2.3.5.2 (Concatenation of composed transcripts). If M1a and M1b are paired
interactive Turing machines with identities a and b respectively, and M2a′ and M2b′
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are paired interactive Turing machines with identities a′ and b′, then
t(M1a,M1b)‖t(M2a′ ,M2b′) = t(M1a‖M2a′ ,M1b‖M2b′).
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of the sequential (i.e., non-parallelized)
nature of a Turing machine and the way we defined Turing machine composition in
§2.3.2.
The first direction of the theorem states that compelling two foregone conclusions
in a row is still a foregone conclusion.
Lemma 2.3.5.3. If C1, G1 is a foregone conclusion with respect to E, S1, and C2, G2
is a foregone conclusion with respect to E, S2, then C1‖C2 is a foregone conclusion
with respect to E, S1‖2, where S1‖2 first runs S1 and then S2.
Proof. Since C1, G1 is a foregone conclusion with respect to S1, E, we know that
t(GN1 , C
N,R
1 ) ≈c SN1 ∀R, ∀DN even with oracle access to N . This must include R
that sent NEnc(t(GN2 , C
N,R
2 )). (R can generate this value by running the code of
G2 and C2, reading from N and responding from its own code when appropriate.)
Thus, t(GN1 , C
N,R
1 )‖t(GN2 , CN,R2 ) ≈c SN1 ‖t(GN2 , CN,R2 )∀R, ∀DN . By Lemma 2.3.5.2 we
therefore also have
t((G1‖G2)N , (C1‖C2)N,R) ≈c SN1 ‖t(GN2 , CN,R2 ) (2.1)
∀R, ∀DN .
Separately, we know that since C2, G2 is a foregone conclusion with respect to




2 ) ≈c SN2 ∀R, ∀D even with oracle access to N . Since
D can run the code of S1, it must also be true that
SN1 ‖t(GN2 , CN,R2 ) ≈c SN1‖2 (2.2)
∀R, ∀D.
Thus, combining equations 2.1 and 2.2, we have
t((G1‖G2)N , (C1‖C2)N,R) ≈c SN1 ‖t(GN2 , CN,R2 ) ≈c SN1‖2
Thus, t((G1‖G2)N , (C1‖C2)N,R) ≈c SN1‖2, fulfilling the simulatability property of
a foregone conclusion. In order to show that the composed version is a foregone
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conclusion, we must also show efficiency and satisfiability of evidence.
Clearly, if all of the component machines are efficient (guaranteed by the efficiency
of machines in foregone conclusions), their concatenation must also be efficient. The
evidence is the same for the composed and non-composed versions, so it maintains
the satisfiability and non-censorship properties. This completes the argument.
The second direction of the theorem states that if the composed request is a
foregone conclusion, then each individual request must also be a foregone conclusion.
Lemma 2.3.5.4. Suppose C1, G1 is a foregone conclusion with respect to E, S1. Sup-
pose also C1‖C2, G1‖G2 is a foregone conclusion with regard to E, S1‖2, where S1‖2 is
S1 concatenated with some S2. Then C2, G2 is a foregone conclusion relative to E, S2.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction ∃R,D such that D is capable of distinguishing
t(GN2 , C
N,R
2 ) from S
N
2 .
Then we can easily construct D′ that can distinguish t((G1‖G2)N , (C1‖C2)N,R)
from SN1‖2 for the same R. D′ simply removes the first set of messages (before the 
symbol of the interaction between G1 and C1) as well as the final symbol ending the
composed interaction. The result is simply either t(GN2 , C
N,R
2 ) or S
N
2 . D′ then calls D
on this input and returns the same result. It is easy to see that D′ can distinguish the
composed computation with the same advantage as D can distinguish only the second
interaction. (Notice also that by renaming the arguments, this proof also applies to
the first compelled argument.) Thus, we have a contradiction; such a distinguisher
cannot exist.
The other properties of a foregone conclusion also continue to hold: If the com-
posed machines are efficient, then the decomposed machines must also be efficient.
Furthermore, the same evidence is used in all the iterations, so the satisfiability and
non-censorship properties of the evidence remain unaltered.
This completes the proof. If C1‖C2, G1‖G2 is a foregone conclusion with regard
to E, S1‖2, then it must also be true that C2, G2 is a foregone conclusion relative to
E, S2.
Combining Lemmas 2.3.5.3 and 2.3.5.4 proves Theorem 2.3.5.1 and demonstrates
that the government gains no advantage by waiting for the result of one foregone
conclusion request before beginning the next.
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This theorem demonstrates that our foregone conclusion doctrine satisfies two
intuitively-appealing goals. First, if a compelled action C would not be a foregone
conclusion given the government’s existing evidence, then it should not be possible to
split C into smaller actions (compelled in sequence) that collectively perform C and
that are each individually deemed foregone conclusions. Second, there should not be
a way for the government to compel beforehand a different foregone conclusion C’ in
order to change the status of C into a foregone conclusion.
We emphasize that the composition theorem only applies to government requests
made in sequence without changes to Nature or the Evidence in between; it is possible
that the government could compel an action, use the response to guide its police
investigation to gather more evidence, and then compel a second action based on this
additional evidence.
2.3.6 Additional comments on the Foregone Conclusion Definition
This section describes some additional detail to the foregone conclusion definition.
Universal simulator and constructive definition
Recall that our definition (informally) states that the interaction between C and G
is a foregone conclusion with respect to S if ∀R, the exchange between GN and CN,R
is indistinguishable from SN .
First, notice that our definition uses a universal simulator: it is defined first,
before the other party (in this case, before the respondent’s equivocation strategy).
This is similar to black box zero knowledge, where the simulator is defined before
the cheating verifier. The reason we require a universal simulator can be seen by
imagining the opposite: If a different simulator was required to respond to different
equivocation strategies, then this amounts to the respondent “testifying” as to which
world state (Nature and the Respondent’s mind) is true. Instead, for an action to be
57
a foregone conclusion, we insist that the government be able to simulate the action
for all equivocations that are consistent with the evidence.
Furthermore, this definition is constructive – it forces the government to submit
a construction of S as an input, rather than relying on the mere existence of such a
simulator. This puts the burden of proof on the government to present a simulator
that demonstrates that something is a foregone conclusion. This is consistent with
the legal literature in that the burden of proof is on the government [193]. Although
the caselaw has not definitely determined how high the government’s burden of proof
is [193], we argue in §2.3.3 that our high-but-achievable standard of simulation is
appropriate.
The simulator represents a process, not the contents
The foregone conclusion literature is clear that only the act of production of most
subpoenas may be protected as testimonial under the 5th Amendment, not the con-
tents of the documents themselves [123, l. 410]. (This is often because the contents of
the documents were not themselves “compelled,” but the act of production of those
documents is compelled.) Our model is in keeping with this principle – although the
items returned by the interaction or simulator do correspond to “contents” (often
elements of N), the object that the government must present in order to demonstrate
a foregone conclusion is S: a simulator for the process of getting those contents.
Our abstract encoding of “Nature” is abstract specifically to allow the government
to demonstrate its ability to simulate the process of retrieving documents from it.
If the government can simulate this process without access to the contents of the
respondent’s mind (R), then that act of production was a foregone conclusion.
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Weak to malicious evidence
One weakness of our definition is that it is brittle to a maliciously-chosen E. This can
occur in multiple ways – the most obvious is for the evidence to be chosen such that
there is only one computable result for either S or the real interaction, but it could
also restrict R’s computation time to 1, preventing it from doing its own computation.
However, we point out that in the legal system, the standards for existing evidence
are high. In particular, the “due process of law” guaranteed to all persons by the
Fourteenth Amendment [301] demands that State prosecutors may not knowingly
present false evidence or perjured testimony [228], or allow evidence or testimony
they know to be false to stand [7]. Thus, we expect that all parties in a court will
agree on the truthfulness of existing evidence before reaching the question of whether
a compelled action is a foregone conclusion; the main issue we are trying to prevent
is that the compelled action may overreach in a “fishing expedition” (as it did in, for
example, U.S. v. Hubbell [295, l. 32]).
Respondent’s previously-rolled randomness cannot necessarily be com-
pelled
A subtlety arises when compelling the result of random coins that the respondent
rolled in the past (e.g. an encryption key). Generally, this type of action is not a
foregone conclusion without additional information. However, the government could
compel a respondent to make a fresh sample from the same original distribution (i.e.
randomly pick a new encryption key).
The following example is illustrative: Suppose the compelled action is to encrypt
a fixed message using the same key the respondent uses to encrypt her hard drive
(or any key that was randomly rolled in the past, but is now fixed and known only
to the respondent at the time of the compelled action) and return the ciphertext.
This is not deterministic since presumably the encryption scheme is randomized. Yet
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as we shall see, there exists a distinguisher which will always distinguish the real
compelled action from the simulated compelled action with high probability. Because
the respondent essentially has the key hardcoded, there exists a distinguisher that
knows the same key. (Equivalently, the respondent can communicate the key to
the distinguisher via the covert channel described in §2.3.6.) That distinguisher can
always successfully decrypt the real ciphertext to recover the fixed message. On the
other hand, the simulator attempting to replicate this ciphertext does not know the
key in the respondent’s mind, and so has a minuscule chance of providing a ciphertext
that successfully decrypts under the same key to that message. This provides a reliable
means of distinguishing.
On the other hand, compelling the respondent to create a fresh key and then
encrypt the message under that key is a foregone conclusion – the respondent does
not execute the compelled action, and therefore does not roll the key, until after it
has already set Nature, and there no longer exists a single distinguisher that can
reliably reproduce the freshly-random key. So compelled encryption under a fresh
key is compellable.
As a side effect, it may be the case that the “true” way in which the respondent
acted in the past no longer corresponds to an α-allowed R. For example, if the
distribution of R’s symmetric key is known, but so is the ciphertext and nonce for
an unknown plaintext, this effectively “collapses” R’s randomness by conditioning on
the result, and forces R to sample twice in a way that would lead to the same result.
In effect, we consider this a reasonable way to describe the choices R may have
made in the past, but is now committed to. Perhaps R could have generated any
ciphertext, but in the end, we know exactly which ciphertext it generated, and so any
future interaction with R must take this into account.
If for some reason a random distribution must be described in R rather than in
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the compelled action C, this is also possible under this framework. Since the evidence
has the power to inspect R’s source code, it has the ability to verify that R chooses a
random variable correctly according to a known distribution, using randomness from
its randomness tape.
These distinctions are also relevant to the compelled encryption scenario described
formally in Theorem 2.5.5.1.
Covert channel between R and D
The adversarial respondent will equivocate and try to provide the distinguisher with
information that will allow it to distinguish the real execution from the simulated
execution. It can do this by setting a value in N to something that will help the
distinguisher realize which is correct. We define a useful functionality:
Definition 2.3.6.1 (Encoding within nature (NEncℓ, NDecℓ)). (NEnc, NDec) is an
encoding scheme within nature for R and D over messages of length capped by ℓ
defined by the syntax:
• ∆′ ← R.NEnc(z), such that ∆′ ⊆ R.Equivocate and z ∈ Σℓ
• z’ = NDecN , making queries only to indices in ∆’
where z′ = z∀z ∈ Σℓ.
This functionality represents the ability of R to hide information in N that the
distinguisher may use. There are many possible instantiations of this functionality.
As an example for messages z of length bounded by ℓ, consider R, D with a hardcoded
index i and mask m ∈ Σℓ:
NEnci,m,ℓ(z) = {(j, z[j]⊕m[j])}j=i..(i+ℓ)
NDecNi,m,ℓ = N [i]⊕m[0]‖N [i+ 1]
⊕m[1]‖ · · · ‖N [i+ (ℓ− 1)]⊕m[ℓ− 1]
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This works because the “∀D” is defined after the “∀R.” This means that some
R will have such a code, and some D for that R will know of it. This also depends
crucially on the non-censorship property of the evidence – if E had the ability to
prohibit R from modifying cells that it did not inspect, this functionality would not
work.
This functionality is most relevant in the case of samples from a known distribu-
tion. Suppose R has a secret s sampled from a known distribution S that is specified
in the evidence. The simulator will be able to sample a fresh s′ from the same dis-
tribution S. If C compels R to reveal the specific s it sampled, however, R can use
NEnc(s) and D may run NDecN to recover s, allowing it to distinguish the real output
of the interaction between C and R (which will always return s) from the simulator
(which will return a fresh sample from S).
However, notice that no randomized action during the actual C can be recorded
in N in this way, only actions that depend on the randomness of R alone.
As a consequence, the only way for S to simulate a deterministic compelled request
is for the output of S to exactly equal the transcript of C’s interaction with G.
2.4 Legal analysis
In this section, we justify Def. 2.3.2.2 by demonstrating its consistency with prior
court cases that involve the foregone conclusion doctrine. We begin by comparing
our definition with existing legal scholarship in §2.4.1. Then, we apply our definition
to all relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases in §2.4.2 and all circuit court cases in §2.4.3
that were identified by the legal scholarship, and we demonstrate how our definition
reaches the same conclusions as the courts. We discuss encryption-related cases [88–
91,176,264,266,273,274,296,298,303,304,306] in §2.4.4 however we do not use them
in our analysis of our definition. We believe these cases are actually less illustrative
62
than their non-encryption counterparts because these rulings are quite varied and
subject to being overturned by higher courts. We end the section with a discussion of
prior and potential future Supreme Court cases involving compelled decryption and
the foregone conclusion doctrine.
2.4.1 Legal scholarship context
This section provides a thorough description about how our approach compares to
prior legal scholarship on the foregone conclusion doctrine.
Other legal analyses of compelled decryption [85, 193, 198, 222, 256, 282, 317] rely
upon analogies between encryption and physical security mechanisms like safes or
shredders. Kerr recently stated “whether [the Fifth Amendment] privilege bars com-
pelled entry of the password. . . depends on a choice of analogy” [195]. These analogies
are further muddled by ambiguous language in court cases: In a now-infamous dissent,
Justice Stevens said that he “do[es] not believe [a defendant] can be compelled to re-
veal the combination to his wall safe – by word or deed” [111]. Does “reveal by deed”
mean to be forced to enter the combination without the government seeing it? We as-
sume so, but this is not the only interpretation; for example, Orin Kerr interprets the
hypothetical to mean that a person cannot be compelled to reveal their combination
to the government by opening the safe in plain sight of an investigator [193].
We wrote this paper to move the compelled decryption debate beyond the choice
of analogy. We recognize the prevalence and value of analogies in the development
of common law, but because their use leads to such differing results in this case, we
believe this situation warrants rejecting analogies. Under our model, we can reason
directly about the principle that for a compelled action to be a foregone conclusion,
it should not “rely on the contents of the mind.” This also suggests a change to the
three-prong test of existence, location/possession, and authenticity for determining
whether an action is a foregone conclusion. Rather than reasoning only about these
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(which happened to be the implicit testimony in Fisher , as we will show in §2.4.2)
we can reason in a thought experiment about the government’s ability to recreate the
act of production without using the contents of the respondent’s mind.
Because we can avoid the use of analogies, our reasoning is different than all prior
work. The closest legal landmark to our model is Sacharoff’s authentication-based
interpretation of “reasonable particularity” [256], but there are some important dif-
ferences between the two approaches. Sacharoff’s envisioned test, like our method, is
based on the idea that information entered into evidence from non-respondent sources
can be used to demonstrate a non-reliance on the contents of the respondent’s mind.
Indeed, one could argue that the simulator in our scheme must produce “reasonably
similar” output to that of the true compelled action. However, the methods are not
the same. First, addressing an issue brought up by Kerr [193], our method applies
to any compelled action even if there are no produced documents at the end that
could be described with “reasonable particularity.” Second, and more importantly,
our method highlights the fact that the action taken, not the objects produced, con-
tains the implicit testimony. For better or worse, the reasonable particularity method
makes it harder to distinguish between the “door-opening” and the “treasure,” as Kerr
would put it [193]. Our model makes it clear that the government must not learn
the new implicit testimony involved in the process of complying with the request (as
opposed to the results).
Our interpretation is very different from other prior work. As mentioned, Kerr
[193] distinguishes between “door-opening” and “treasure.” This analogy, reasonably,
tries to separate the act of production from the contents produced. In the same paper,
Kerr proceeds to claim that “‘I know the password’ is the only assertion implicit in
unlocking the device” [193, p. 779] We disagree; we described the “reliance” on the
respondent’s mind in §2.5.5. Our objection is solely in the compelled action, not the
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contents revealed.
Kiok [198] bemoans the fact that the cryptography analogies have, thus far,
“missed the metaphor.” McGregor [222] also notes that the choice of analogy greatly
impacts the outcome, and proposes the analogy of piecing together shredded papers
without knowing which order they go in. This analogy is an improvement over the
safe/combination dichotomy, but we believe our approach avoids the issue entirely.
In his discussion on foregone-conclusion-based compelled decryption, Terzian [283]
describes a split between courts that compel decryption of an entire device and de-
cryption of specific files, and places the burden of proof on those who argue for specific
files. Our analysis does not fit neatly into either of these categories, but it is closer to
the files interpretation. We do not require the government to specify “every scrap of
paper” that must be produced, but we do require the government to avoid compelling
files for which the contents of the mind are demonstrably necessary to access (since
they did not demonstrate an alternative method of production).
Finally, our conclusion does not go as far as Winkler [317], who claims that the
foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply to non-physical evidence and thus com-
pelled decryption is never a foregone conclusion.
2.4.2 U.S. Supreme Court cases
This section contains our analysis of all federal Supreme Court cases involving the
foregone conclusion doctrine. In §2.4.3, we also analyze several key foregone conclu-
sion Circuit Court cases.
The foregone conclusion doctrine dates back to Fisher v. United States [123]. We
checked all citations of Fisher in Google Scholar’s database of case law and found only
two subsequent Supreme Court cases that deal with the foregone conclusion doctrine:
United States v. Doe (1984) [294] and United States v. Hubbell [295]. In this section,
we show that our definition agrees with the result of all three cases.
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Evidence in Fisher [123] Translation into our framework
The papers... ∃k, p such that:
are in the possession of the taxpayer
[123, line 409]
k ∈ locations (where locations is a
small set of indices in ∆)
were prepared by the accountant [123,
line 411]
implies that ∃(k, p) ∈ N
are the kind usually prepared [in this
situation] [123, line 411]
∆ contains code in a small known set
of indices acc that creates p
can be authenticated by the accoun-
tant [123, note 13]
∃Auth : Authacc(x) = 1 iff x = p
Table 2.1: The evidence check E in Fisher v. U.S.
Fisher v. U.S. [123]. The Fisher case examined a hypothetical in which a taxpayer
R was compelled to produce an accountant’s papers in R’s possession (similar to the
motivating example in §2.2). As a note, although hypothetical scenarios described in
a court opinion typically do not contribute to the ruling, in the case of Fisher the
entire foregone conclusion doctrine has arisen from the basis of this hypothetical.
The court in Fisher determined that the act of producing the papers communicates
potentially testimonial and incriminating evidence to the government; “[c]ompliance
with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their
possession or control by the taxpayer. It would also indicate the taxpayer’s belief
that the papers are those described in the subpoena.”
Recall that Fisher determined a three-prong test for whether or not an act of
production was a foregone conclusion: the government must have knowledge of the
papers’ existence, location, and authenticity. Table 2.1 translates the circumstances
of Fisher into an evidence test within our framework. The evidence includes the
facts that the government knows that the papers p exist, they reside in one of a small
set of possible locations, the taxpayer R can produce them, and the papers can be
authenticated using only the accountant’s testimony (without the taxpayer’s help).
With the evidence described above, the compelled action is simulatable using only
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information within nature: S can search through locations and use the accountant to
test which papers are the desired ones. This simulation is perfect no matter how the
taxpayer R equivocates, as long as R puts the papers p ∈ locations as required by the
evidence check E. Moreover, E does not censor R, it allows the true taxpayer code,
and all procedures are efficient. Thus, the taxpayer R must produce the legitimate
papers p. This analysis matches the Supreme Court ruling that compelling the papers
is a foregone conclusion.
Note that in the Supreme Court’s analysis, the fact that the papers “are the kind
usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client” [123, line
411] was used as evidence toward the papers’ existence and their possession. However,
later, in U.S. v. Hubbell, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument, saying that
the government cannot rely on the “overbroad argument that a businessman such as
respondent will always possess general business and tax records that fall within the
broad categories described in this subpoena” [295, line 45]. We have chosen to take
the evidence presented by the court in each individual case; our framework remains
the same whether such a statement is put into evidence (and therefore part of the
government’s existing knowledge) or not.
We emphasize that all facts contained within the evidence E in Table 2.1 are nec-
essary for the simulator to succeed. The remaining two cases show how the foregone
conclusion decision changes when the government cannot pin down the location of,
or independently authenticate, the papers.
U.S. v. Doe [294] (1984). The Doe case also required the respondent R to produce
documents, but unlike in Fisher , in this case the government did not have much prior
information about the documents. As a consequence, the non-censorship requirement
states that E cannot restrict where the respondent R places the documents in nature,
or indeed whether she writes the documents anywhere at all. The wide variety of
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possible respondent equivocations defeats the simulator S from above (and indeed
any other simulator), so Definition 2.3.2.2 is not satisfied. Our definition again agrees
with the result of the case, in which the Court found that “nothing in the record that
would indicate that the United States knows . . . that each of the myriad documents
demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee’s possession or subject to
his control” [294, note 12] and thus the act of production is not a foregone conclusion.
U.S. v. Hubbell [295]. The Hubbell case is complicated by a grant of immunity
that is outside of our model; we describe here a subset of the facts that remain rel-
evant in our setting. The government compelled Hubbell to provide “documents fit-
ting within . . . 11 broadly worded subpoena categories.” [295, line 42] In this case, the
government not only sought the documents themselves, but also the “respondent’s as-
sistance . . . to identify potential sources of information” [295, line 41] and to “testif[y]
that those were all of the documents in his custody or control that were responsive
to the commands in the subpoena” [295, line 31]. Our definition is unsatisfiable for
compelled actions that are subject to either one of these considerations: given any
simulator S, we can construct an equivocating respondent R that decides differently
from S which documents are relevant. Once again, our definition aligns with the
Supreme Court’s decision that it was “unquestionably necessary for respondent to
make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of
documents responsive to the requests of the subpoena” [295, line 43].
An additional case: Doe v. United States (1988) [111]. A fourth case, Doe v.
United States (1988) [111] is often brought up in discussions of the Fifth Amendment
as relevant to compelled decryption. However, the decision in that case found that the
compelled action was not testimonial at all, and thus the justices never reached the
point of asking whether it was a foregone conclusion. The case itself concerned forcing
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Doe to sign 12 consent forms authorizing various foreign banks to “disclos[e] any bank
records” Doe had at the banks under specific account numbers [111, line 203]. The
Supreme Court found that the consent directive Doe was forced to sign had been
“carefully drafted not to make reference to a specific account, but only to speak in the
hypothetical” and thus “neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual
assertions, implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government” [111,
line 215]. I agree with the court on its specific ruling: since the papers had been
written so as not to state any claims, the compelled action was not testimonial and
therefore not privileged against self-incrimination. However, I find the outcome of this
case distasteful for a different reason. It seems natural to me that the government
should not be able to claim to external entities that you consent to an action that
you do not, in fact, consent to. So although I agree that the statement was not
incriminating, I believe there ought to be a law prohibiting the government form
compelling you to sign a consent form against your will.
2.4.3 Circuit Court cases
In addition to Supreme Court foregone conclusion cases, there are also several im-
portant foregone conclusion cases in the circuit courts. Rather than check all ap-
proximately 1200 circuit court cases citing Fisher, we rely on prior law review arti-
cles [96,181,193,198,247,282,317,318] to identify the most relevant circuit court cases.
Five circuit court cases are mentioned or cited that involve the foregone conclusion
doctrine but do not involve encryption. For a brief summary of the encryption cases,
see §2.4.4.
U.S. v. Greenfield (2nd circuit) [305]. Greenfield , a 2016 case from the 2nd
Circuit Court of Appeals, is a good example of a case that came close to being a
foregone conclusion, but needed slightly stronger evidence to prevent the recipient
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Greenfield from equivocating. Greenfield had been accused of tax evasion and, af-
ter some back-and-forth, had been compelled to produce three categories of bank
records for accounts already known to the government, some non-bank documents
including “ownership records”, “professional services documents”, and “communica-
tion documents”, plus his expired passport and other documentation for trips in his
passport [305, line 114]. The court found that, had the government requested the doc-
uments in 2001, production of the passport and travel documents would have been
a foregone conclusion, authenticating by using the Department of State or airlines.
However, while the government showed knowledge of the existence and control of the
other documents, it would have relied on Greenfield’s testimony to authenticate them
and therefore they were not compellable. However, in 2013, when the summons oc-
curred, even the passport and travel documents were no longer a foregone conclusion,
because the government could not show that Greenfield had retained control over
them through the 12-year gap. For our purposes, the 2001 analysis is more interest-
ing than the 2013 analysis, since the categories of documents compelled were very
similar, but came to different outcomes nonetheless.
Let br or, psd, cd and td be unknown strings, and exists Auth such that Authtd(x) =
1 if x = td. Let possess be a small set of indices. The evidence established the
information shown in Table 2.2.
We first examine what would have occurred in Greenfield if the production had
been compelled in 2001. The 2nd Circuit determined that compelling the travel
documents td was a foregone conclusion, since the existence, control, and authenticity
of the documents were established. We can see that a S that reads each location in
possess and checks its authenticity with Authtd(·) will always return the same td as is
returned by R.M’.
The existence of the communication documents cd was not proven, thus, R can
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Knowledge of government Formalization in E
In 2001, the travel documents... ∃k, td such that:
existed [305, line 123] (k, td) ∈ ∆
were in Greenfield’s possession [305, line 123] k ∈ possess (possess is a small set of indices)
were under Greenfield’s control [305, line 123] ∃M : R.M = td
could be authenticated [305, line 123] ∃Auth : AuthN(x) = 1 iff x = td
In 2001, the communication documents...
would be in Greenfield’s possession [305, line 123] (∃i : N [i] = cd)→ i ∈ possess
In 2001, the ownership records...
existed [305, line 122] (j, or) ∈ ∆
In 2001, the bank records...
existed [305, line 119] (i, br) ∈ ∆
were in Greenfield’s possession [305, line 119] i ∈ possess
were under Greenfield’s control [305, line 120] ∃M’ : R.M’ = br
Table 2.2: Evidence shown in Greenfield
choose not to place them in N at all, making the chance of their recovery by SN
exponentially small. Similarly, the ownership records existed somewhere in N , but
since no knowledge is known about their whereabouts or control, SN ’s chance of
recovering them is still exponentially small.
However, the bank records br could not be authenticated. Supposing the govern-
ment has some idea of what the documents should look like (i.e. their distribution,
which we assume is not overwhelmingly in favor of one outcome; else authentication
would be trivial), S has the power to search possess (a small subset of N) and return
the document there most likely to be the correct record. However, R has the ability to
forge an alternate br’ (e.g. by resampling) and also put that in possess in addition to
the true br’. In this case, C (calling R.M and returning the result, without interacting
with G) would return the true br consistently, but S would mistake the false br’ for
the real br a non-negligible amount of the time. This allows D which has the correct
br hardcoded into it to distinguish between the two possible distributions.
As an added note, the non-foregone decision for the bank records seems to rest
on the inability of the government to authenticate them, and in fact some other
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court cases seem to be more lenient in their standards for authentication. If such an
authentication mechanism were known, the bank records would have been a foregone
conclusion by the same rationale as the travel documents.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (8th circuit) [172]. In this 8th circuit case, the
Bayirds were served with a subpoena for several categories of documents, primarily
business documents related to their income. The circuit court found that the sub-
poena was insufficiently well-defined – the Bayirds’ choice of which documents were
covered and which were not could be testimonial [172, line 381]. In short, R could
return different distributions of documents while still complying with the evidence.
As long as it returns a different distribution than S (which must work for all choices
of R), the results will be distinguishable and therefore not a foregone conclusion.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (9th circuit) [173]. In this case, respondent John
Doe was an employee of a corporation accused of price fixing DRAM chips. Two
subpoenas were issued: the first to John Doe, compelling the production of all doc-
uments he had related to DRAM sales, including calendars, diaries, and notes; the
second to the corporation [173, line 911]. The government had reasonably extensive
knowledge of Doe’s actions through interviews and other documents. Nonetheless,
the subpoena served to Doe was overbroad and asked for categories of documents
that the government did not know existed until the results of the second subpoena
(to the corporation) was responded to. Furthermore, the government never provided
a means to authenticate the personal documents (e.g. diaries) without Doe’s testi-
mony. S would have no means of simulating these categories of documents, and as
such, the result is not foregone.
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U.S. v. Ponds (D.C. circuit) [307]. In Ponds , a defense attorney Ponds was
accused of tax evasion and fraud with regard to a previous case, and was asked to
produce documents in several categories. For our purposes, we will consider only
two of these categories: documents referencing a white Mercedes Benz (suspected by
the government to have been illegally held by Ponds) and copies of correspondence
between the Law Offices of Navron Ponds and courts and prosecutors having to do
with the prior case. For the first category, while the government suspected Ponds had
the car, the only information in E was that the car was “normally parked at Ponds’
apartment and was registered to his sister.” [307, line 325] For the second category,
since the government was party to the correspondence [307, line 325] and Ponds was
expected to have retained a copy, E may require the value in N representing the
documents to be the exact string that the government saw before, allowing S to
duplicate it exactly. Compelling the first category was not a foregone conclusion;
compelling the second category was.
In re grand jury subpoena (2nd circuit) [174]. In this 2nd circuit case, the
government subpoenaed John Doe to produce “[t]he original version of any diary or
calendar for the year 1988, a copy of which has been produced to the SEC” [174,
line 88], and this act of production was determined to be a foregone conclusion.
Ultimately, this case is fairly straightforward in our model; the evidence demands
that a copy of the documents be in Nature in a set of indices corresponding to the
SEC, and the simulator could produce the documents by obtaining them from there.
2.4.4 Compelled decryption cases
As stated at the beginning of this section, we do not fully analyze prior encryption
cases under our model. This is because, to our knowledge, only two encryption cases
concerning the foregone conclusion doctrine have risen to the level of the circuit
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courts, and they were decided quite differently. The 11th Circuit found in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum [175] that compelled decryption of a hard drive
with unknown contents was not a foregone conclusion, since the government had
not shown that the drives contained any files. That is, they impose a requirement
that the government must know what they will find on the encrypted drive with
“reasonable particularity” [96, 173, 175, 307]. However, the 3rd Circuit has rejected
this requirement [302]. They found in U.S. v. Apple MacPro Comput. [302] that
decryption of a particular hard drive was a foregone conclusion, in part because they
had verbal testimony from the defendant’s sister as to the contents of the drives.
There are also many cases in lower courts involving encryption and passwords.
Most of these courts agree that compelling the disclosure of the password (instead
of compelling the defendant to enter the password into the device to unlock it) is
not permissible even under the foregone conclusion exception to the fifth amendment
[89, 264, 306]. Only one state supreme court found that disclosure of the password
itself is allowable, stating that passwords are “of minimal testimonial value” [273].
Several states found that compelling entry of passwords (rather than disclosure) is
allowed, but cite different reasons. In Massachusetts, the standard is either that the
government must show that the defendant knows the password [91] or that she knows
the password/key, knows that the device is encrypted, and has been shown to be the
owner of the device and its contents [90]. In North Carolina, a recent case allowed
compelling entry of the password, but the defendant had already admitted to using
the device to store illegal material [303], leaving the alternative undecided. The U.S.
district court for the northern district of California decided that since biometrics are
compellable, so too passwords must be compellable [298]. On the other hand, when
denying an application for a search warrant, the same court decided a year later that
since biometrics often serve the same purpose as passwords, perhaps both biometrics
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and passwords are not compellable [221]! Finally, Indiana’s state Supreme Court ruled
that even entry of the password is not compellable unless the government can show
that it knows the existence of specific files, and that they belong to the defendant [266].
We refer readers to [234] for additional details on several of these cases.
U.S. Supreme Court cases on compelled decryption Thus far, the federal
Supreme Court has had two potential compelled decryption cases come before it,
however it has rejected both. In both cases, although the reasons for denying the
petition are not given by the Court, we suspect that the reasoning seems to be largely
independent from the question at hand. The first case, Davis v. Pennsylvania [89],
did not represent a true circuit split for its specific question at the time of its petition;
as described by Orin Kerr [194], there is therefore no reason for the Supreme Court
to get involved.
There is a split now, with Andrews v. New Jersey [273]. Orin Kerr describes [196]
that Andrews was likely rejected by the Supreme Court due to the “final judgement”
rule – the final judgement for Andrews has not been decided by the state yet, so the
Supreme Court is likely unable to claim jurisdiction.
It is not yet clear which case the Supreme Court will take to resolve the compelled
decryption debate, but we still believe it is likely to happen in the next year or two.
2.5 Compellability of cryptographic systems
In this section, we analyze whether it is a foregone conclusion for the government to
compel the respondent to use some common cryptographic constructs: one way func-
tions, commitment schemes, encryption schemes, and non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs. We show that compelling the use of these cryptographic primitives is typically
not a foregone conclusion under our definition, although there exist fact patterns for
which it is foregone.
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For consistency, throughout this section we presume that the respondent contains
a method R.s that, if called, deterministically reveals a secret within the respondent’s
mind like a password, encryption key, or value inside a commitment. This models the
common scenario where the government has evidence that R “knows a secret.” Note
that we generally place no restrictions on the behavior of R.s, i.e., the government
does not know anything about the nature of R’s secret itself aside from the fact that
R knows it.
2.5.1 One way functions
Let f : X → Y be a one-way function. In this section, we show that compelling a
preimage of y ∈ Y is typically not a foregone conclusion. Specifically, this compelled
action is only foregone if the government can demonstrate that R knows exactly
one preimage and the government knows an alternative method to produce the same
preimage.
Lemma 2.5.1.1. Let EN(R) := ∃R.s ∈ X ∧ f(R.s) = y ∧ E ′ be the evidence that
the method R.s exists, it produces an element in X that is a preimage to y, and
any additional evidence E ′ that the government knows. Then, the compelled action
CN,R := R.s is a foregone conclusion with respect to evidence E if and only if this
evidence suffices for the government to provide a simulator S that reliably produces
R.s.
Proof. This compelled action C is deterministic, so the government must simulate it
perfectly to evade detection by the distinguisher that has the real R.s hardcoded into
it.
Whether the government can build S depends on the additional evidence E ′ at
its disposal. If E ′ = ∅ and y ← Y is sampled uniformly, then simulation is impossible
by the one-wayness of f . However, there exists evidence that permits government
simulation, such as if E shows that the respondent wrote down R.s somewhere in
Nature.
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This question has immediate relevance to existing court cases – in the most famous
example, the 3rd Circuit ruled that a device owner can be compelled to decrypt
the contents if the Government can show its knowledge (via hash values) of files on
the device, and that the owner is capable of accessing them [302, line 248]. Our
definition would arrive at a similar conclusion but via different means. By Lemma
2.5.1.1, compelling the preimage of a hash is not a foregone conclusion on its own.
Nevertheless, in the facts of the case [302], digital forensic examiners were able to
identify encrypted files with specific hash values that were known to contain child
pornography. We believe the Government could have shown that it was able to
produce testimony or evidence that would describe the files (preimages) – the forensic
examiners could likely fill such a role. This would allow the creation of a simulator
that would make requesting the files (preimages) a foregone conclusion. While the
court in [302] forced the decryption of the entire device (actually multiple devices), we
believe that only the specific files with known preimages should have been compelled.
The remaining files could not have been returned without the use of the respondent’s
mind.
2.5.2 Commitment schemes
Compelling a randomized functionality introduces a new wrinkle beyond the cases
discussed in §2.4 and §2.5.1: now the simulator merely needs to be computationally
indistinguishable from the real transcript, rather than being identical.
Concretely, we consider below a randomized commitment scheme (Com,Decom)
that is computationally binding and hiding. The algorithm Com(s) = (c, r) produces
a commitment c that is sent to the (government) receiver and a random state r that
is maintained by the (respondent) committer, and Decom(c, r) = s uses both of these
values to recover the original secret s. we show below that it is a foregone conclusion
for the government to compel the respondent to commit (but not decommit!) to the
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secret in her mind.
Lemma 2.5.2.1. A compelled action CN,Rcomm to sample a hiding commitment c ←
Com(R.s) is a foregone conclusion, as long as the government has evidence E that
the method R.s exists.
Proof. The government can provide the trivial simulator Scomm that chooses a random
value x and returns a commitment to it. We claim that this simulator can even
fool a distinguisher that has R.s hardcoded into it, because R cannot communicate
the randomness used within the real commitment since it is only chosen later within
Ccomm. If there exists a distinguisherD that can distinguish a commitment toR.s from
a commitment to a random x without knowing the randomness used (i.e., without
opening), then D breaks the hiding property of Com.
Similarly, it is also foregone to compel a commitment to a value s that is not within
R. This includes the settings in which C samples a secret s at random, hardcodes s,
or obtains s from a known location in nature.
On the other hand, compelling the opening of a commitment to a secret value is
not foregone unless the government already had the ability to compel the secret via
other means. This lemma leverages the power of our composition theorem.
Lemma 2.5.2.2. Let CN,Rdecom be a machine that decommits to a value c provided by
the government GN . Also, let E := ∃R.s ∧ E ′ be any evidence that includes the fact
that R.s exists, and let S be any simulator.
Then, (CN,Rdecom, G
N) is a foregone conclusion with respect to E and S if and only if
there exists a simulator S ′ such that compelling the secret R.s is a foregone conclusion
with respect to E and S ′ independently of the commitment scheme.
Proof. We apply the Theorem 2.3.5.1 with the machines Ccomm and Cdecom. Combin-
ing the theorem with Lemma 2.5.2.1, there exists some simulator S ′ such that the
composed machine C := Ccomm‖Cdecom is a foregone conclusion with respect to E and
S ′ if and only if Cdecom is foregone with respect to E and S. Note that C simply com-
mits to this value, provides the commitment to the government and then receives the
same commitment back, and opens the commitment in a binding manner. Hence, C
is equivalent to the machine C ′ that outputs the secret R.s, without any commitment
scheme involved. Therefore, Cdecom is foregone with respect to E and S if and only if
C ′ is foregone with respect to E and S ′, as desired.
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2.5.3 Zero knowledge proofs
Next, we consider an interactive proof protocol Π, where R’s secret equals a witness to
an NP language. It turns out that compelling a ZK proof is possible but uninteresting.
While most of the claims in this section require the government’s evidence to contain
the fact that R knows a secret with a particular structure, in this case that is already
equivalent to the knowledge gained from the ZK proof itself. Sadly, this evidence is
required, even for languages in P! The lemma below also applies to ZK arguments
and to proofs of knowledge since it is agnostic to the knowledge soundness property.
Lemma 2.5.3.1. Let (C, G) execute an interactive ZK proof where C acts as the
Prover with witness R.w, and G acts as the Verifier. Given any evidence E, there
exists a simulator S such that (C,G) is a foregone conclusion with respect to E and
S if and only if the government’s evidence suffices to show that R.s is a witness to
the NP statement.
Proof. If the evidence E allows R to equivocate between a valid and invalid witness
for R.s, then no simulator can consistently emulate both options. On the other hand,
if E guarantees that R.s is a witness, then the compelled action is simulatable by
the algorithm S that hardcodes the circuit G and runs an execution between the ZK
simulator SZK and verifier G, potentially rewinding G as usual. The only remain-
ing equivocation available to the respondent is her choice of R.s among satisfying
witnesses, but this change is inconsequential by witness indistinguishability.
Next, we consider non-interactive ZK proofs of knowledge using a common refer-
ence string (CRS) as the trusted setup, which is sampled honestly by the respondent
and checked by the evidence. In this scenario, the government is in a weaker posi-
tion than before: in order to compel a NIZK, the government must know a witness
themselves.
Lemma 2.5.3.2. Let C denote a non-interactive ZK proof of knowledge using the
witness R.s. It accesses a CRS stored in Nature, where the CRS is placed by R and
verified by E. If there exists E and S such that C is a foregone conclusion with respect
to E and S, then there exists an extractor X that returns a witness.
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Proof. Because the S has no control over the CRS, its proofs are real. If S produces
a proof with noticeable probability (over the random sampling of the CRS, among
other things), then the knowledge soundness property guarantees the existence of
an extractor X ′ that can extract a witness when executing S multiple times with on
different choices of CRS. While the foregone conclusion game in Def. 2.3.2.2 only runs
S once (without rewinding), we can construct the desired extractor X by running the
entire game many times, since R will honestly sample the CRS independently each
time.
2.5.4 Pseudorandom functions
Next, we examine the circumstances under which the government may compel the use
of a pseudorandom function family {Fk : X → Y}k∈K. This question turns crucially
on whether the key is sampled freshly and ephemerally as part of the compelled action,
or if the action requires the use of a long-running key that can be used elsewhere in
Nature.
Lemma 2.5.4.1. Let CN,Rprf be the circuit that samples a random key k ∈ K and
outputs Fk(R.s). This compelled action is a foregone conclusion with respect to any
evidence E that includes the fact that the method R.s exists.
Proof. Just as with Lemma 2.5.2.1, the government can provide the trivial simulator
S that chooses a random output y ∈ Y . Any algorithm D that can distinguish CRprf
from S also serves to break the pseudorandomness of Fk.
Lemma 2.5.4.2. Let C̃N,Rprf be the circuit that computes Fk(x), where the key equals
the respondent’s secret k = R.s and the constant x ∈ X is publicly known. Given the
minimal evidence E := ∃R.s that R knows the key, there is no simulator S under
which C̃prf is foregone with respect to E and S.
Proof. This evidence permits R to equivocate between two secrets k and k′ that
produce different outputs Fk(x) 6= Fk′(x), and it must be possible to efficiently sample
such keys or else making a query to x would distinguish the PRF from a random
function. Any simulator S must fail to output at least one of these strings with
noticeable probability, and R can choose this one to evade simulation.
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Lemma 2.5.4.3. Let C̃prf be defined as in the previous lemma. Suppose the govern-
ment knows the value of k as evidence EN(R) := (R.s = k). Now, there exists a
simulator such that C̃prf is a foregone conclusion.
Proof. Simulator SN computes Fk(m) from the known values. This perfectly emulates
the real transcript.
2.5.5 Symmetric encryption
In this section, we consider the compellability of symmetric (authenticated) encryp-
tion, which is of particular importance due to its ubiquitous use within full-disk
encryption systems. We show that if the respondent keeps the secret key (or a high-
entropy password used to derive it) only in her mind, and there are no side channels
in Nature capturing the intermediate state during encryption and decryption, then
both compelled encryption and decryption are not foregone conclusions.
We focus on the Counter Mode construction of symmetric encryption from a
pseudorandom function where KeyGen samples a PRF key, Enc(k,m) = (r, Fk(r)⊕m)
and Dec(k, (r, c)) = Fk(r) ⊕ c. We remark though that the following theorem would
also hold for many other modes of operation, including ones that provide authenticity.
Theorem 2.5.5.1. Suppose the respondent stores two secrets: a secret key k and a
message m; that is, R.s = (k,m). With respect to the evidence E := ∃R.s that R
knows the secrets,
• Compelled encryption of message m under an ephemeral key k∗ ← K is a fore-
gone conclusion using the simulator that outputs a random element of the ci-
phertext space.
• Compelled encryption of message m or decryption of a ciphertext c using the
respondent’s secret key k are not a foregone conclusion with any simulator.
Proof. For the first claim, S can simply sample a random string c′ in the ciphertext
space. Any algorithm D that can distinguish (r, Fk∗(r)⊕m) from (r, c) also serves to
break the pseudorandomness of Fk.
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For the second claim, we assume without loss of generality that the distinguisher
has m or c hardcoded, and thus the question reduces to simulating Fk(r). For most
alternative keys k′ it must be the case that Fk(r) 6= Fk′(r) by pseudorandomness,
and the evidence permits R to equivocate between secrets k and k′. Any simulator
S must fail to output at least one of these strings with noticeable probability, and R
can choose this one to evade simulation.
The above theorem leverages the strength of the respondent’s key management
within her own mind and the weakness of the government’s evidence in preventing R
from equivocating. If either of these two properties changes, then decryption might
be compellable. Essentially: if there exists any method for the government to decrypt
data without your help, then they can instead compel you to do so.
Theorem 2.5.5.2. If the government knows evidence E and a PPT algorithm K
such that s ← KN recovers R’s secret key s, then there is a simulator S such that
compelled decryption of a known ciphertext c is a foregone conclusion under E and
S.
Proof. Construct the simulator SN that runs KN , fetches the ciphertext from the
known location, and uses the key to decrypt the ciphertext. This simulator is efficient
and it perfectly emulates the real transcript.
This theorem applies broadly to several categories of encryption schemes: enter-
prise or cloud backup systems that use an external key (e.g., one stored in a Hardware
Security Module), threshold encryption with a threshold smaller than the full number
of parties since the Fifth Amendment only protects against self -incrimination, and
exceptional access systems that permit law enforcement access to encrypted devices
via a key known to the vendor [62, 278], one or more courts [77, 204], law enforce-
ment [62], or the device itself [258]. In all such cases, the existence of an alternative
key bypasses the testimonial aspects of the respondent’s assistance.
In the next section, we show specific constructions of secure multi-party systems
that remain resilient to compelled actions; these can be used to build threshold and
backup systems with stronger Fifth Amendment protections.
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2.6 Resilience against compelled requests
So far, we have only considered how past actions impact whether or not a current
compelled request is foregone. In this section, we ask whether a current protocol
execution may open parties up to future compelled requests. If running a protocol
does not open a party up to additional compelled requests, we call it FC-resilient. In
this section, we formally define FC-resilience, design and implement a 2-party secure
computation protocol that is both malicious secure and FC-resilient for one party,
and leverage differential privacy to design a multi-party computation protocol that is
FC-resilient for many parties.
2.6.1 Defining FC-resilience
In this section, we ask whether running protocols that are unrelated to any current
legal issues will open the parties up to future compelled requests that would not have
been possible before running the protocol. To see why this is an issue, consider the
following scenario: Alice participates in a multi-party computation with several other
parties, including Bob, in which she and Bob receive the same output. Later, Alice is
the target of a compelled request in which the government seeks the result of the com-
putation. Since the government could access the information without involving Alice
(by compelling testimony from Bob instead), the output of the protocol is a foregone
conclusion and Alice must provide it. Depending on the function computed, this may
reveal information about Alice’s secret inputs that was not previously compellable
because it had only been stored in Alice’s mind.
We provide a proactive cryptographic countermeasure against the above scenario,
which we dub FC-resilience. Informally, we say that a protocol is FC-resilient if all
compelled actions that are foregone after running the protocol were already foregone
before running the protocol.
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Model. Concretely, we consider an interactive protocol Π between n + 1 parties
P∗, P1, . . . , Pn that is secure for computing function f with the n + 1 parties’ inputs
up to abort and with erasures. If P∗ has just as much ability to equivocate on any
compelled action before running the protocol as after, then we say that Π is FC-
resilient for P∗.
We use the nomenclature that the government’s evidence E checks a string X
if it verifies that X exists in Nature at a public canonical location, returning false
otherwise. (The evidence may still return false even if X does exist, unless some other
conditions are met as well.)
In our setting, we presume the government knows that the parties have executed
t timesteps of the protocol and that its evidence will check for this fact. Given a
protocol Π and a timestamp t, we say that Π’s modifications to nature in the F -
hybrid model with secure erasures, denoted MΠ,P∗t , include the messages and local
state of all protocol parties after running t steps of Π, except for P∗’s tapes for its
communication with sub-module F . (Formal modeling of the Turing machines of the
parties was given in §2.3.2.)
We are now ready to define FC-resilience. Our definition requires that the execu-
tion of Π cannot subject P∗ to any new compelled actions, no matter what time the
government pauses Π to issue its request.
Definition 2.6.1.1 (FC-resilience for P∗). Let protocol Π be a protocol among parties
P∗, P1, . . . , Pn. Let E be an evidence machine. We say that Π is FC-resilient for party
P∗ if the following holds true:
Suppose (C,G) is a foregone conclusion in the F -hybrid model when addressing
party P∗ with respect to E
Π
t , S, for some t ≥ 0, where EΠt runs machine E and also
checks MΠ,P∗t . Then there exist machines C0, G0, and S0 such that: (1) (C0, G0) is
a foregone conclusion with E and S0; and (2) The two compelled disclosures have
indistinguishable transcripts: ∀ R, ∀N , t(C0N,R, G0N) ≈c t(CN,R, GN)
The idea is that although the government can now compel (C,G) after having
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witnessed up to all of the transcript of Π, it could have compelled an action (C0, G0)
that yields an indistinguishable result, even without having seen the protocol tran-
script. Thus, the transcript of Π did not add any “new” possible information for
which P∗ can be compelled after running Π, but not before.
F separates P∗’s mind from local state. It would be convenient if we could keep
all of P∗’s state as part of the “contents of her mind” rather than Nature. However,
P∗ is not likely to be storing her state or performing computations in her head. More
likely, P∗ will be doing these on a local computer, and she can only hold a small
amount of state (e.g., a password) in her head.
To model this, we permit P∗ to access an ideal sub-module which encapsulates
both the small, long-term “state of the respondent’s mind” as well as the limited
operations that the respondent carefully performs only when she is not at risk of
being compelled. Qualitatively, it is preferable to minimize the number of times F is
invoked and the state that it stores.
The formal design of this sub-module is inspired by the treatment of tamper-
proof hardware tokens in UC [187]. However, it represents something very different
in this model: the occasions when the party is “currently using” the limited long-term
state of the mind. The model prevents this state from entering Nature during the
computation. However, any function of the output of this sub-module does become
part of Nature, and it is incumbent upon P∗ to choose a functionality F whose outputs
don’t trivially cause new compelled action to become foregone conclusions.
Different possibilities for the actual functionality of F are possible depending on
how assured P∗ is of a lack of sudden compelled requests. In this work, we consider
the functionality Fpbkdf that computes a PBKDF of the party’s password in a safe
space. This functionality is described in Fig 2·2. Fpbkdf samples a long-term password
from a distribution with sufficient min-entropy λ and then runs a password-based key
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derivation function on demand.
One might worry that using a password-derived key would subject our construction
to password brute-force attacks that would not occur with a non-password-derived
key K. Fortunately, as long as we store the PBKDF salt in the same manner that
K would have been stored (e.g., in a trusted enclave), then our password-derived key
resists brute-force attacks and retains the same cybersecurity protections as K.
Functionality Fpbkdf
Public parameters: λ, PBKDF f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
Setup: Upon receiving setup from P , do the following:
1. If there is already a stored pw, halt
2. Generate a random pw from a distribution with good min-entropy
3. Generate a random salt uniformly at random with good entropy
4. Store pw
5. Output salt to P
Refresh: Upon receiving refresh from P , do the following:
1. Generate a random salt uniformly at random with good entropy
2. Output salt to P
Query: Upon receiving (query, salt,m) from P :
1. Check whether there is a stored pw. If there is not, halt
2. Output f(pw, salt,m) to P
Figure 2·2: Ideal functionality for Fpbkdf, a possible version of F , which assumes
P will not be compelled while computing a PBKDF of her password
Government may compel at any time. Just as our foregone conclusion defini-
tion gave the government the strong power to view anything in the rest of the world,
our FC-resilience definition allows the government full freedom to determine when
to make its compelled request. An FC-resilient protocol must maintain protection
against compelled requests made against P∗ whether the protocol has completed or
has been interrupted partway through (e.g., with intermediate state that has not yet
been deleted). We presume that compelled requests only occur at one instant of the
protocol execution; because the government is non-censoring, we presume that parties
can alert each other to abort the protocol if they have been compelled to disclose in-
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formation. Due to our composition theorem, it suffices to consider a single compelled
request made by the government to P∗. Finally, we presume that the government is
aware of the protocol execution.
2.6.2 FC-resilient two-party computation
In this section, we design and implement secure 2-party computation protocols based
on Yao’s garbled circuits [325] that are FC-resilient for one party in the Fpbkdf-hybrid
setting.
This is a non-trivial objective: While executing most MPC protocols, the parties’
inputs and intermediate state are typically all foregone conclusions for the simple
reason that all the (large) state is distributed throughout Nature rather than being
stored within anyone’s mind. This compelling adversary violates the non-collusion
assumption required for secure MPC (even if the original protocol was malicious
secure, or handled adaptive or mobile adversaries).
Using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can protect against compelled disclo-
sure because compelled decryption is not a foregone conclusion (§2.5.5). For faster
performance, we construct and implement a new secure computation protocol that is
resilient to government compelled disclosure without the need for FHE. Our protocol
involves careful modifications to Yao’s garbled circuits at the input and output stages.
It assumes secure deletion and a reliable communication channel whereby the parties
can halt the secure computation if any or all of them are compelled to provide their
state.
Construction of FC-resilient 2PC
We consider Yao’s garbled circuits where the garbler additionally has access to the
ideal module Fpbkdf. For now assume that only the garbler receives output from the
2PC; we will relax this assumption later. Our method maintains malicious security
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against the evaluator, and it is compatible with two methods for ensuring malicious
security against the garbler: cut-and-choose [213, §3.3] and authenticated garbling
[313].
The main idea is that the garbler will “self-garble” tables for her input and output
wires, so that even she does not know how to interpret her input or output without
re-entering her password. The garbler inputs her password into the Fpbkdf module
during three phases of the protocol. First, during pre-computation when preparing the
garbled circuits, the garbler generates labels for the input wires uniformly at random
(as normal) and augments these labels with a pseudorandom tag that is based on the
PBKDF. For the outputs to the circuit, garbler appends no-op gates to the circuit
where the output wire labels are again chosen pseudorandomly using the PBKDF.
She then securely deletes the mapping of wire labels for her input and output bits,
so that it can only be reconstructed with her own password. Second, upon receiving
her own input, the garbler uses the PBKDF again and matches the resulting values
with the pre-computed tags; this informs the garbler which wire labels to send to
the evaluator while safeguarding the input itself. Third, at the end of the protocol,
the garbler uses her PBKDF to find the outputs by using the output tables of the
no-op gates. The concrete self-garbled tables for authenticated garbling are shown in
Table 2.3.
Figure 2·3 depicts the full protocol Π, including a detailed description of all
changes to garbled circuits compatible with the cut-and-choose approach. In to-
tal, our construction imposes an additive overhead to Yao’s garbled circuits equal
to a constant number of PBKDF calls per input and output wire. We emphasize
that neither the password sub-module nor the garbler’s password are required during
circuit evaluation; they are only used at the beginning and end to provide input and
read output.
Theorem 2.6.2.1 (simplified). Under the same cryptographic assumptions as
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Tag Self-garbled masked input (x̂w)
PBKDF (w, xw = 0)1···n−1 PBKDF (w, xw = 0)n ⊕ λw
PBKDF (w, xw = 1)1···n−1 PBKDF (w, xw = 1)n ⊕ (λw ⊕ 1)
(a) Self-garbled input tables for wire w (permutation not shown)
Info from E Self-garbled masked output (xw)
x̂w = 0, sw = 0 PBKDF (w, x̂w = 0, sw = 0)⊕ rw
x̂w = 0, sw = 1 PBKDF (w, x̂w = 0, sw = 1)⊕ (rw ⊕ 1)
x̂w = 1, sw = 0 PBKDF (w, x̂w = 1, sw = 0)⊕ (rw ⊕ 1)
x̂w = 1, sw = 1 PBKDF (w, x̂w = 1, sw = 1)⊕ rw
(b) Self-garbled output tables for wire w
Table 2.3: Self-garbled tables for the garbler in the authenticated-garbling-based
2PC protocol FC-resilient for the garbler. w is the wire index, x is the true wire
value, x̂ is the masked wire value, and λ = r ⊕ s is the mask on the wire. r was
held by the garbler during pre-processing but was securely deleted; s is held by the
evaluator.
malicious-secure Yao’s garbled circuits, protocol Π in Figure 2·3 is secure against
malicious adversaries and is FC-resilient for the garbler.
We prove this theorem by proving malicious security and FC-resilience individu-
ally, after proving some preliminary useful lemmas.
Definition 2.6.2.2 (Straightforwardly compellable). We say a value x is straightfor-
wardly compellable (or just compellable) under evidence E if there exists efficient C
that makes no calls to R, and exists G such that x ∈ t(C,G).
Lemma 2.6.2.3. Let X be a public distribution. Then x ∼ X is straightforwardly
compellable under any E.
If X is a distribution described at a public location in N , then x ∼ X is straight-
forwardly compellable under E that checks that X is described at the proper location
in N .
Proof. For the first statement, C can simply sample its own fresh x ∼ X. For the
second statement, C can query N to get X, then sample x ∼ X. (Oftentimes, X is
a point mass.)
Lemma 2.6.2.4. Let x be straightforwardly compellable under evidence E. Let C,G
be such that t(CN,R, GN) = x for all N and allowed R. Then there exist efficient C0,
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G0, and S, where C0 does not query R, such that (C0, G0) is a foregone conclusion
with respect to E and S.
Proof. Notice that the first three properties of a foregone conclusion are trivial to
achieve (aside from S efficiency, which we will come back to). There exist efficient C0
and G0 that output x by Lemma 2.6.2.3. The evidence is the same, so the existence
of an α-allowed R, and the non-censorship property of E, are unaltered.
S emulates the execution of C0 and G0 and outputs the result.
Thus, (C0, G0) is a foregone conclusion with respect to E and S.
Lemma 2.6.2.5. Let X be a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable
from a public distribution Y . Then there exists C,G, S such that t(CN,R, GN) contains
a fresh sample from distribution X and S returns a fresh sample from Y . Then (C,G)
is a foregone conclusion with respect to to S and any evidence E.
Proof. We know that sampling a fresh y ∼ Y is straightforwardly compellable under
any evidence E. Let (C,G) be a foregone conclusion with respect to E and a simulator
S, where S samples y ∼ Y and outputs the result.
Consider probabilistic poly-time distinguisherD attempting to distinguishX from
Y . Observe that if x ∼ X is not a foregone conclusion with respect to E and S, then
D can distinguish X from Y . Thus, compelling a fresh sample x from C,G is a
foregone conclusion with respect to E and S.
Now that we have proven these lemmas, we can go on to prove the theorem
itself. Our first goal is to ensure that this protocol retains malicious security against
(separately) corrupt G and V . Informally, we will show that if this protocol does not
have this property, then we can break either the PRF called by Fpbkdf, or the security
of the 2PC protocol described in [213].
Theorem 2.6.2.6. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Let Π be an instantiation of
our protocol (Figure 2·3) for f . Assume that the oblivious transfer protocol is secure,
that we have a perfectly-binding commitment scheme (used by the garbler) and a
perfectly-hiding commitment scheme (used by the evaluator for coin-tossing), and that
Fpbkdf generates a password with good min-entropy and contains a good pseudorandom
function. Then, Π securely computes f .
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Proof of Theorem 2.6.2.6. We prove this via a series of hybrids that show that an
execution of this protocol (using circuit C2) is indistinguishable from an execution of
the protocol of [213], which we know securely computes f under the same assumptions:
H0 The real protocol described above
H1 No permuted/masked tables – follow the protocol through step 6 (decommit-
ment for check-circuits), but then skip steps 7, 8, 9a, and 9b. Instead, keep the
original garbled tables and go straight to step 9c.
H2 Same as H1, but instead of sampling the outputs of the no-op gate wc,i,b from
Fpbkdf, G instead chooses them as normal wire labels (random values).
H3 The ideal functionality for a 2PC computing f(x, y).
It is easy to see that H0 ≡ H1: Observe that the messages sent in each protocol
are exactly the same; the only changes are to G’s local state. G clearly cannot learn
anything new about V ’s input in H0 that it couldn’t learn in H1, since all the extra
computation happens on information G already had. Since the distributions of H0
and H1 are equal for all x and y, no distinguisher can tell which game we are playing.
We next show that H1 ≈c H2. Let A be an adversary attempting to distinguish
Fpbkdf from random. Suppose it has access to A′ which can distinguish H1 from H2.
A first calls Fpbkdf(setup, 2λ). It then runs an entire execution of the protocol in
Figure 2·3 and inputs the transcript into A′. When it computes the wire labels for
the output wire, it sets wc,out,b = Fpbkdf(query, salt, (c, i, b)) for c ∈ [s], i ∈ [n], and
b ∈ {0, 1}. When A′ outputs its guess as to which hybrid it is in, A guesses that it is
interacting with a random function if A′ guessed H2, and a pseudorandom function if
it guessed H1. It is not hard to see that A will have the same advantage as A′. Thus,
the security of Fpbkdf ensures that H1 is indistinguishable from H2.
Finally, to show that H2 ≈c H3, we rely on the original security proof of [213].
Observe that H2 is the protocol of [213]. We can use C2 as the auxiliary input circuit
(called C0 in that paper) to that protocol, since it computes f(x, y), The proof of
security follows directly, for both a malicious garbler and a malicious evaluator.
Finally, we wish to show that the protocol in Figure 2·3 is FC-resilient for the
garbler.
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Theorem 2.6.2.7. Assuming secure deletion for the garbler G, and assuming the
existence of a channel through which the parties can halt the computation if any of
them is compelled, then the protocol in Figure 2·3 is FC-resilient for G.
Proving this theorem will require keeping track of the changes the protocol makes
to Nature over time. Given an interactive protocol Π, we wish to specify formally
the state of nature N after t timesteps. This models a scenario where the protocol is
interrupted by a request to compel information in the middle of the protocol. (After
this interruption, we assume all parties abort and do not complete the protocol.)
Following the ITM model of Canetti [69], only one machine is deemed to be active
in a given timestep. The active machine can write to or read from a tape, or move
a head. This action could represent one step of local computation (writing/reading
a local work tape) or communication to another party (by writing on that machine’s
communication input tape).
At any point in time, we consider the configuration of an interactive Turing ma-
chine to comprise the contents of all tapes (including input and output tapes), the
current state, and the location of the head in each tape. We refer readers to [69, Def. 4]
for more details.
The protocol’s changes to nature consist of the entire state of Π at a given time
except for the contents of P∗’s sub-module F .
Definition 2.6.2.8 (Protocol modifications to Nature). Let Π be a protocol among
parties P∗, P1, . . . , Pn, where P∗ has a sub-module F . Given t ∈ N, let Π’s modifi-
cations to nature MΠ,P∗t be the set of all messages sent to and from all parties up
through t total timesteps of computation (by all parties), the current configuration of
all parties except P∗ after t timesteps, and the current configuration of P∗ except its
input tape, its output tape, and its tapes communicating with sub-module F (and
the tapes of F itself).
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.6.2.7.
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Proof of Theorem 2.6.2.7. Let Π be an instantiation of the protocol in Figure 2·3, and
suppose it runs on inputs x and y for parties garbler G and evaluator V respectively.
Let C,G be a compelled request, let E be an evidence machine that checks the
auxiliary inputs of Π and V ’s input, and let S be a simulator. Suppose the compelled
request is made after t ∈ N timesteps of computation of Π, and let MΠ,Gt be the
additions to Nature by timestep t, as in Definition 2.6.2.8. Let Et check M
Π,G
t and
then run E. Say (C,G) is a (λ, α)-foregone conclusion with evidence Et and simulator
S.
We will prove the claim by showing that all elements ofMΠ,Gt are straightforwardly
compellable under E.
First, notice that the satisfiability and non-censoring properties are met: E checks
a subset of the locations in N compared to Et, so all α-allowed R from the post-
protocol foregone conclusion are still α-allowed under E. And, by construction, Et is
non-censoring if and only if E is.
The remaining goal is to show that all elements of MΠ,Gt are straightforwardly
compellable. This will complete the proof, by Lemma 2.6.2.4 and by our composition
theorem (Theorem 2.3.5.1).
We can lean on Lemma 2.6.2.3 to show this, and we can instead show that all
values in MΠ,Gt were generated from known distributions or could be generated from
Nature.
Essentially, this means we must “simulate” all values added to MΠ,Gt starting from
only the auxiliary inputs and the other parties’ inputs, and show that they could have
been simulated before running the protocol. This will prove the claim, since this is
the only additional information that the evidence E and simulator S can work with.
Consider two cases, depending on t.
Case 1: The compelled request occurs before step 9. In this case, it is Pareto-optimal
for the request to occur immediately before step 8. It is always better for the
government for information to be added to N , and until step 8, MΠ,Gt only
grows as t increases. Only during step 8 is G’s local state erased, so MΠ,Gt is
smaller for t in step 8 than it is for t immediately before step 8.
We proceed to demonstrate that we can simulate these values even before run-
ning the protocol. At t immediately before step 8, the information in MΠ,Gt
is:
• The auxiliary inputs for both parties and V ’s input. These exist before the
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protocol and were checked by E, and are compellable by Lemma 2.6.2.3.
• Preprocessing phase (steps 0, 1, 2a): All values generated by G during
these steps are ephemeral random values with known distributions and are
compellable by Lemma 2.6.2.3).
• Preprocessing phase (step 2b): The output wire labels are the output
of a PRF with an ephemeral “key” (actually salt). By Lemma 2.5.4.1,
compelling the wire labels is foregone.
• Evaluation Part 1 phase (steps 3-6): All new additions to MΠ,Gt in this
phase are either new ephemeral random values, or a function of straight-
forwardly compellable information.
• Preparation phase (step 7a): As discussed in §2.5, the results of the calling
the PRF in step 7a straightforwardly compellable.
• Preparation phase (steps 7b, 7c): Step 7b involves only fresh random sam-
ples, and step 7c is a function of existing values.
• All information held by V . This is all a function of V ’s input and the
messages sent to V (which already showed was compellable).
As mentioned, running step 8 will only limit the government’s ability to create
a foregone conclusion. Thus, for t before step 9 of Π, all values in MΠ,Gt are
straightforwardly compellable.
Case 2: The compelled request occurs during or after step 9.
If the compelled request occurs during or after step 9, then it is Pareto-optimal
for the request to occur at the end of the protocol, for the same reasoning as
in the previous case. We proceed to demonstrate how to simulate Part 2 of
the evaluation. In this phase, we must also deal with G’s input x, which is not
efficiently compellable (though it also is not directly part of MΠ,Gt ).
• Step 9: Now that the mappings of wire labels to values have been deleted,
G has in effect “garbled” her own state so that simply writing mc,i,xi or
wc,i,xi (or tc,i,xi) does not reveal xi itself. These values cannot be compelled
by indexing xi (since the government does not know G’s secret xi), so
the best the government can do in the existing C,G is compel one of
these values indexed by an arbitrarily chosen bit b (unless E itself contains
xi). By Lemma 2.6.2.5, these values are compellable. Furthermore, all
94
values computed in the decommitments are functions of values that were
straightforwardly compellable.
• Step 10, 11a: All this is done by V , and thus is in N either way.
• Step 11b: First, note that the wc,out,b value was already compellable. Sec-
ond, recall that the output tapes of Fpbkdf (and G’s final output tape) are
not included in MΠ,Gt . Thus, all the information in this step was already
compellable.
So, for t after step 8 of Π, all values in MΠ,Gt are compellable.
Thus, by Lemma 2.6.2.4 and the Sequential Composition Theorem (2.3.5.1), we know
that if (C,G) was a foregone conclusion with respect to Et and S and the request
occurred after step 8 of the protocol, we can create machines C0, G0, S0 such that
t(C0
N,R, GN) = t(CN,R, GN) for all N,R and (C0, G0) is a foregone conclusion with
respect to E and S0. This shows that the protocol Π in Figure 2·3 is FC-resilient for
the garbler and completes the proof.
Implementation of FC-resilient 2PC
We implemented an FC-resilient two-party computation based on the authenticated
garbling work of [313]. Our implementation was forked from emp-toolkit [314], and
our source code can be found at this GitHub repository.1
The main part of our implementation was about 250 additional lines of code. The
code contained two main changes: giving the output to the garbler rather than the
evaluator, and implementing the the self-garbled tables shown in Table 2.3. The
tables were created during function-dependent pre-processing, and accessed at the
beginning and end of the online phase. The PBKDF used was Argon2i [43].
We emphasize that the added runtime is linear in the input/output wires, but
is independent of the size of the circuit itself. To demonstrate this, we tested our
implementation by running repeated iterations of SHA-256 while XORing the result
with a “chaining” value as is done in computing PBKDF2 [289]. All experiments were
1https://github.com/sarahscheffler/password-ag2pc
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performed on a Dell XPS 9370 laptop with an Intel i7-8650U processor and 16GB of
RAM. The results are in Table 2.4; they show that the FC-resilience cost of running
thousands of executions of a PBKDF (two per input wire, four per output wire) is
costly for small circuits but quickly becomes negligible.
N Total time FC-resil. parts Unmod. parts
1 G 1551 (15.48) 1161 (14.01) 389.9 (7.760)
E 1406 (17.02) 1003 (15.37) 402.5 (7.270)
10 G 4758 (37.90) 1673 (15.74) 3084 (34.50)
E 4612 (42.04) 1417 (17.98) 3195 (33.63)
100 G 35320 (1229) 2279 (175.9) 33040 (1089)
E 35180 (1216) 1073 (134.1) 34106 (1127)
Table 2.4: Performance times (ms) for our test implementation of FC-resilient
authenticated garbling, computing N iterations of SHA-256. The average time over
10 runs is shown with the standard deviation in parentheses. Pre-processing and
online times are combined.
Constructing FC-resilient zero-knowledge proofs
ZKGC [182] is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge in which the verifier garbles a
circuit and the prover evaluates the circuit using its witness as input. It follows from
the Theorem 2.6.2.1 that ZKGC with self-garbled tables is FC-resilient for the verifier.
Corollary 2.6.2.9. The ZKGC protocol combined with our self-garbled table con-
struction is FC-resilient for the verifier.
What about FC-resilience for the prover? Suppose Alice engages in an interactive
zero-knowledge proof with Bob. Interactive zero-knowledge proofs are generally not
transferable, from a cryptographic point of view. However, from a legal viewpoint,
if the government wishes to investigate Alice, it can instruct Bob to disclose his
interaction with her. Since Bob is not part of Alice’s mind, he is part of Nature,
and we presume that his testimony is truthful and can be added to the evidence E.
Hence, the government can learn one bit about Alice based on testimony from Bob,
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so we believe that zero knowledge proofs cannot be FC-resilient for the prover. This
makes it extremely challenging to create FC-resilient protocols where anyone other
than P∗ receives output it could not have already computed. We next describe one
method for achieving this outcome.
2.6.3 FC-resilient multi-party computation
Whereas the constructions in the last section only provided results to one party, in this
section we describe a technique that permits everyone to receive the output of a large
n-party secure computation, using ideas from differential privacy. This construction
uses the BMR multi-party garbled circuit protocol [26], and it only achieves semi-
honest security.
From an FC-resilience perspective, there are two challenges that occur when mul-
tiple parties receive output. First, we require a more complicated output opening
protocol that requires all n parties to use their passwords in order to read the final
result. In the semi-honest setting, the self-garbled no-op gates from the previous sec-
tion solve this problem: each party masks the output table with a PBKDF of their
password during garbling, and then each party in sequence can de-garble the final
output wire at the end of the protocol.
Second, any party must operate under the assumption that the result of the com-
putation can be compelled by the other participants, so she must ensure that the
result reveals very little about any party’s input. We propose to address this issue
by considering MPC applied to differentially private functions. This comes at the ex-
pense of requiring a looser distinguishing bound when defining foregone conclusions,
since differential privacy does not guarantee negligible statistical distance between
neighboring distributions.
More formally, we present the following lemma to show that differentially-private
functionalities are foregone if we assume this looser distinguishing bound. Recall that
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a function f is differentially private if for all “neighboring” inputs X1 and X2, for all
possible subsets of the image of f , S ⊆ im(f), we have Pr[f(X1) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[f(X2) ∈
S], where ǫ is a parameter. In the context of MPC, inputs X1 and X2 are neighboring
if they differ by the inclusion/exclusion of one party P∗’s input.
Lemma 2.6.3.1. Let f be a differentially-private mechanism, X be a dataset in
Nature, and X ′ = X ∪ {R.s}. Consider the compelled action C := f(X ′) with the
evidence E that checks for the existence of a secret input R.s. Then there exists a
simulator S such that C is foregone with respect to E and S.
Proof. Construct the simulator SN that queries Nature to recover X and then returns
y ← f(X). Differential privacy guarantees that the two distributions CN,R and SN
are eǫ-statistically close (over the coins of f), as desired.
From a scientific perspective, widening the distinguishing bound makes actions
easier to compel, which has a two-sided impact on FC-resilience: the evidence gath-
ered from voluntarily executing a cryptographic protocol might be used to compel
more functionalities, but these functionalities may also have been compellable before-
hand. The question then arises: what distinguishing bound is desired by the courts?
This appears to be an open question: although the burden of proof to show that an
action is a foregone conclusion is on the government, “how high that burden is remains
surprisingly unclear” [193] from existing case law. Possible evidentiary standards to
apply in foregone conclusion cases include the “reasonable suspicion” standard [281]
that almost certainly does allow for noticeable chance of error, and the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard that may not [311]. While we have taken the approach
in this work that a negligible error rate is desirable since it suffices “to protect the
innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances” [270] and
it yields an appealing composition property, our definition is easily extensible to any
choice that courts decide as a policy decision.
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2.7 Conclusion
This work initiates a scientific study of disclosures compelled by the U.S. govern-
ment under the foregone conclusion doctrine. We provide a cryptographic security
definition that is grounded in the law but that can be used by security researchers
without the need to understand the law. We show that existing cryptosystems can be
vulnerable to this threat, yet it is possible to design countermeasures at reasonable
cost.
Beyond this paper’s scientific contributions, this work also has significant bearing
on a potential upcoming Supreme Court case. As we discuss in §2.4.1, state Supreme
Courts and lower federal courts are divided on the issue of compelled decryption under
the foregone conclusion doctrine. Legal scholars believe that the U.S. Supreme Court
will take one of these cases soon to resolve the issue [195]. For this case to come to
a sound conclusion, the courts must analyze the foregone conclusion doctrine from
many perspectives. We hope that the technical lens provided by this paper will shine
new light on the doctrine that was not provided by prior legal analysis. The Supreme
Court’s decision will impact compelled decryption for the foreseeable future; we can
only hope that the result is not already a foregone conclusion.
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Input: G has input x ∈ {0, 1}n, V has input y ∈ {0, 1}n.
Auxiliary input and setup: G has access to Fpbkdf and has already run Fpbkdf(setup, 2λ).
Both parties have λ, s, and a description of circuit C1 such that C1(x, y) = f(x, y). The parties
have a reliable channel through which they can indicate that they were the target of a compelled
request.
Output: G receives f(x, y),V receives no output.
Throughout the protocol, if either party receives a compelled request, communicate this on the
reliable channel and halt.
Preprocessing:
0. G generates a fresh salt salt← Fpbkdf(refresh).
1. Circuit construction and modification: The parties append a single no-op gate to the
output of C1; call the resulting circuit C2. The parties then modify C2 as in [213].
2. Commitment Construction:
(a) Output Wire Label Generation: Let the output wire of C2 (the output of the no-
op gate) be indexed by out. For c ∈ [s] and for b ∈ {0, 1}, G creates wc,out,b =
Fpbkdf(query, salt, (c, out, b))1···λ. No table from this wire to the output is created.
(b) Remaining Circuit and Commitment Generation: G generates the rest of the wire
labels and garbled tables as normal. She also computes commitments to V ’s input
wires, and commitment-sets for her own input wires as normal (see [213]). Let
wc,i,b be the wire label for circuit c, input wire i, and wire value b. Let rc,i,b be
the commitment randomness used to commit to wc,i,b.
Evaluation Part 1 (V ’s input known):
3. Execute Oblivious Transfers as usual
4. Send Circuits and Commitments. (Note that V does not have the ability to map the
final gate output to 0 or 1, it only gets wc,out,b which it must send back to G.)
5. Prepare challenge strings
6. Decommitment phase for check-circuits. Let the remaining set of evaluation circuits be
C ⊂ [n].
Continued in Fig. 2·3b.
(a)
Figure 2·3: 2PC protocol Π that securely computes f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
among garbler G and evaluator V with malicious security for both parties, and with
FC-resilience for the garbler. (Continued in Fig. 2·3b)
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Continued from Fig. 2·3a.
Preparation for G input:
7. Generation of Permuted Tables
(a) Tag and mask sampling: For c ∈ C, i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1}, G queries zc,i,b =
Fpbkdf(query, salt, (c, i, b)), and parses zc,i,b = (tc,i,b,mc,i,b) as a “tag” tc,i,b and
a “mask” mc,i,b, each of length λ.
(b) Permutation bit sampling: G picks pc,i ← {0, 1} uniformly at random for c ∈
C, i ∈ [n].
(c) Build permuted masked tables: For each circuit c ∈ C, for each input wire
i ∈ [n], mask the wire value and commitment randomness with mc,i,b, la-
bel it with tag tc,i,b and permute the rows for b = 0 and b = 1 depend-
ing on pc,i. That is, record rows (c, i, tc,i,pc,i ,mc,i,pc,i ⊕ (wc,i,pc,i‖rc,i,pc,i)) and
(c, i, tc,i,1−pc,i ,mc,i,1−pc,i ⊕ (wc,i,1−pc,i‖rc,i,1−pc,i)) ordered by pc,i.
8. Secure deletion: G securely deletes all information except the permuted table from step
7c and the salt.
Evaluation Part 2 (G’s input known):
9. Decommitment phase for G’s input in evaluation-circuits:
(a) Now that G has her input x = x1 · · ·xn, she recomputes (tc,i,xi ,mc,i,xi) =
Fpbkdf(query, salt, (c, i, xi)) for c ∈ C, i ∈ [n].
(b) G finds the table row indexed by c, i, tc,i,xi and uses mc,i,xi to unmask wc,i,xi and
rc,i,xi .
(c) G decommits to wc,i,xi and sends that to V (as usual).
10. 10. Correctness and consistency checks
11. 11. Circuit evaluation
(a) For circuits c ∈ C, V evaluates the circuit up until the final wire label, wc,out,b. It
sends this value back to G.
(b) G queries w′c,out,b′ = Fpbkdf(query, salt, (c, out, b′)) for circuits c ∈ C and b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
If neither of these match the value sent by V , G aborts and outputs ⊥. If w′c,out,b′
matches one of the values sent by V for all c ∈ C, then G takes the b′ that appears
the most and outputs it.
(b)
Figure 2·3: 2PC protocol Π that securely computes f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
among garbler G and evaluator V with malicious security for both parties, and with




non-binary classifiers to binary decisions
This chapter is based on joint work with Ran Canetti, Aloni Cohen, Nishanth Dikkala,
Govind Ramnarayan, and Adam Smith [70].
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we turn to the question of fair post-processing. We suppose that
individuals belong to one of two or more disjoint protected groups. Our overall task
is to decide whether a given individual has some hidden binary property B in a way
that ensures “fair balancing of errors” across the groups. To this end, we consider
the following two-stage mechanism. Stage 1 is a nonbinary (“soft”) classifier Ŝ which,
when run on input x, returns a nonbinary score s ∈ [0, 1], representing the classifier’s
guess at the chance that x has property B. To ensure this score s is “meaningful,”
we require that Ŝ be groupwise calibrated : within each group, for each s ∈ [0, 1], the
fraction of individuals in the group that get score s is s. This stage’s goal is to gather
information and provide the best accuracy possible, with minimal regard to fairness.
Stage 2 takes as input the output s = Ŝ(x) of the first stage, and x’s group. It then
outputs a binary (“hard”) decision: its best guess at whether x has property B. This
stage is aimed at distributing the errors of the first process “fairly.” The main thrust
of our work is to design the second stage.
Following [81,162] we consider the following four performance measures based on
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the confusion matrix of the resulting hard classifier. Positive predictive value (PPV)
is the fraction of individuals that have the property among all the individuals the
classifier predicted to have the property. Negative predictive value (NPV) is defined
analogously. The false positive rate (FPR) is the fraction of individuals predicted to
have the property among all individuals that actually do not have the property. False
negative rate (FNR) is defined analogously. Ideally, we would seek to equalize all four
of these measures between the groups: that is, the PPV (resp. NPV, FPR, FNR) for
group 1 is equal to the PPV (resp. NPV, FPR, FNR) for group 2. Unfortunately, this
is impossible in general [81, 200]. Our broad motivating question is thus:
Under what conditions can we post-process a calibrated soft classi-
fier’s outputs so that the resulting hard classifier equates a subset of
{PPV,NPV, FNR, FPR} across a set of protected groups? How can we
balance these conflicting goals?
Our first set of results involves post-processing via a simple threshold mechanism.
We will show in §3.3 that using a single threshold across all groups cannot in general
guarantee equality of either PPV or NPV across groups. Using different thresholds for
the different groups, either PPV or NPV can be equalized, but not both, assuming a
non-degeneracy property on the outputs of Ŝ.
Our second set of results (§3.5) allows the hard classifier to defer some of its
outputs, that is, to respond with ⊥ or “I don’t know.” The deferred inputs are
then sent to a different process; we describe the nuances of this choice in §3.7. With
deferrals, one can equalize both the PPV and NPV of the groups using thresholds,
conditioned on the output not being ⊥. Beyond thresholds, we describe several
strategies for equalizing all four quantities (PPV, NPV, FPR, FNR) across all groups.
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3.1.1 Related work
We briefly describe the works most closely related to ours, though both the list of
works and their summaries are inevitably too short. Our work fits in a research pro-
gram on group fairness notions following the work of Chouldechova [81] and Kleinberg
et al. [200]. Those works demonstrate the inherent infeasibility of simultaneously
equalizing a collection of measures of group accuracy. Our work considers the notions
of calibration as formalized in [248] and those of PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR from [81]
and [200].
The power of post-processing calibrated scores into decisions using threshold clas-
sifiers in the context of fairness has been previously studied by Corbett-Davies, Pier-
son, Feller, Goel, and Huq [92]. As in our work, they show that it is feasible to equalize
certain statistical fairness notions across groups using (possibly different) thresholds.
They additionally show that these thresholds are in some sense optimal. Whereas [92]
focuses on statistical parity, conditional statistical parity, and false positive rate, our
most comparable results consider PPV. In our work, we further show that in some
cases thresholds fail to equalize both PPV and NPV (called predictive parity by [81]),
unless we also allow our post-processor to defer on some inputs. Our work also studies
methods of post-processing that are much more powerful than thresholding, especially
when allowing deferrals. On the technical side, [92] assumes that their soft classifiers
are supported on the continuous interval [0, 1], simplifying the analyses. We instead
study classifiers with finite support as it is closer to true practice in many settings
(e.g., COMPAS risk scores).
Using deferrals to promote fairness has been considered also in the work of Madras,
Pitassi, and Zemel [217]. Specifically they consider how deferring on some inputs
may promote a combination of accuracy and fairness, especially when taking explicit
account of the downstream decision maker. They make use of two-threshold deferring
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post-processors like those discussed in Section 5. While it helped inform our work,
[217] takes a more experimental approach and focuses on minimizing the “disparate
impact,” a measure of total difference in classification error between groups, while
maximizing accuracy. One important difference between our works is that Madras
et al. distinguish between “rejecting” and “deferring.” Rejecting is oblivious as to
properties of the downstream decision maker, while deferring tries to counteract the
biases of the decision maker. Our work considers only the former notion, but uses
the term “defer” instead of “reject.”
An earlier chapter in algorithmic fairness
The most modern incarnation of the field of algorithmic fairness is still in a nascent
rapidly-changing phase, where the methods are highly variable and it is not yet clear
which parts of the field will coalesce into long-lasting areas of study. However, the con-
cepts in the field are much older than they seem. Cole and Zieky provide an excellent
summary of fairness research in the 1960s and 70s applied to the problem of stan-
dardized testing in the civil rights movement [87], and Hutchinson et al. [171] provide
an in-depth analysis of how that research relates to modern algorithmic fairness as
applied to machine learning. Several definitions were proposed in the late 1960s and
early 70s, most prominently Cleary’s definition of fair prediction via underpredictions
for one group (highly related to groupwise calibration) [83], Kirkpatrick’s methods
for predicting job performance using biased measurement tools [199], Thorndike’s
notion of fair representation [286], and Darlington’s four fairness definitions for corre-
lations which roughly correspond to calibration, proportionality, equalized odds, and
demographic parity [102]. In the midst of all these proposed definitions to resolve
inequities in standardized testing, some researchers began to notice that these defini-
tions are inherently incompatible with each other unless the underlying dataset has
some specific convenient properties [245].
105
These incompatibilities were re-discovered in the setting of machine learning in
Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan’s influential work Inherent trade-offs in the
fair determination of risk scores [200], and independently by Chouldechova in Fair
prediction with disparate impact [81]. Essentially, these two works show two variants
of the same theme: the four main error metrics we would wish to equalize between
groups, positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), false positive
rate (FPR), and false negative rate (FNR), cannot all be simultaneously equalized
between groups simultaneously. The only exception to this rule is when the groups
have equal base rates between the two groups, or the classifier makes no errors. As we
described in §1.2.2, this impossibility result greatly limits the possible mathematical
approaches to achieving fairness.
3.1.2 Organization
We list several useful definitions and preliminaries in §3.2. §3.3 contains our main
analysis of post-processing groupwise-calibrated soft classifiers with thresholds; some
additional extensions of this analysis are presented in §3.4. In §3.5, we present our
results on post-processing groupwise-calibrated soft classifiers with deferrals, with
several different mechanisms. In §3.6 we provide some experimental data using our
methods, and in §3.7 we discuss various deferral models.
3.2 Preliminaries
We study the problem of binary classification. An instance is an element, usually
denoted x, of a universe X . We restrict our attention to instances sampled uniformly
at random from the universe, denoted X ∼ X . Our theory extends directly to any
other distribution on X ; that distribution does not need to be known to the classifiers.
Each instance x is associated with a true type Y (x) ∈ {0, 1}. Each instance x is also
associated with a group G(x) ∈ G, where G is the set of groups. We restrict our
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attention to sets G that form a partition of the universe X . We denote by Xg the set of
instances x in group g, and by Xg the random variable distributed uniformly over Xg.
Note that for any events E1 and E2, PrX∼Xg [E1 | E2] = PrX∼X [E1 | E2, G(X) = g].
Definition 3.2.0.1 (Base rate (BR)). The base rate of a group g ∈ G, is
BRg = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1] = E[Y (Xg)]. (3.1)
When X is finite, BRg is simply the fraction of individuals x in the group g for whom
Y (x) = 1.
A classifier is a randomized function with domain X×G.1A hard classifier, denoted
Ŷ , outputs a prediction in {0, 1}, interpreted as a guess of the true type Y (x). A soft
classifier, denoted Ŝ, outputs a score s ∈ [0, 1], interpreted as a measure of confidence
that Y (x) = 1. We restrict our attention to soft classifiers with finite image. We call
a classifier group blind if its output is independent of the input group g. For all
groups g ∈ G, we call a hard classifier Ŷ non-trivial on g if Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1] > 0 and
Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 0] > 0. Hard classifiers are trivial on g if they are not non-trivial on g.
A post-processor is a randomized function with domain [0, 1]×G. As with classi-
fiers, a post-processor can be hard or soft. A hard post-processor, denoted D̂, outputs
a prediction in {0, 1}. A soft post-processor, denoted D̂soft, outputs a score s ∈ [0, 1].
Observe that for a soft classifier Ŝ, D̂ ◦ Ŝ is a hard classifier, and D̂soft ◦ Ŝ is a soft
classifier. As with classifiers, we call a post-processor group blind if its output is
independent of the group g, and we restrict our attention to post-processors with fi-
nite image. The restriction to finite image is for mathematical convenience (and also
because digital memory leads to discrete universes); our results generalize to infinite
images as well.
In Section 3.5, we expand the definitions of both classifier and post-processors to
allow an additional input or output: the special symbol ⊥.
As the focus of this paper is on the post processing of classifiers, we set aside
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The probability above is taken over the sampling of X, as well as random choices
made by Ŝ at classification time.
Definition 3.2.1.2 (Groupwise Calibration (Soft)). We say that a soft classifier Ŝ
is groupwise calibrated if it is calibrated within all groups. That is, ∀g ∈ G and
∀s ∈ [0, 1] for which Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s] > 0, we have that
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s] = s.
Groupwise calibration is essentially the same notion as multicalibration [164] with
the difference that in their case the true types are values in [0, 1]. We use a different
term to emphasize that we restrict our attention to collections of groups G that form
a partition of the universe X .
The two definitions above are stated for soft classifiers whose output distribution
is discrete, since we must be able to condition on the event Ŝ(X) = s or Ŝ(Xg) = s.
That said, it extends naturally to classifiers with continuously-distributed outputs
provided that the conditional probabilities are well defined.
3.2.2 Accuracy Profiles (APs)
Throughout this work, we make repeated reference to the probability mass function
of the random variable Ŝ(Xg) for a calibrated soft classifier Ŝ acting on a randomly
distributed input Xg. We call this distribution on calibrated scores an accuracy profile
(AP).
Definition 3.2.2.1 (Accuracy Profile (AP)). The accuracy profile (AP) of a cali-
brated soft classifier Ŝ for a group g, denoted by P̂g, is the PMF of Ŝ(Xg). That is,
for s ∈ [0, 1], P̂g(s) = Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s].
Abusing notation, we denote by P̂ the collection {P̂g}g∈G, and call it the AP of
Ŝ. We denote by Supp(P̂g) the support of the AP P̂g, namely the set Supp(P̂) = {s :
∃x ∈ Xg, ∃r s.t. Ŝ(x, r) = s} ⊆ [0, 1].
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An accuracy profile is a distribution of scores for a calibrated classifier Ŝ. Because
Ŝ is calibrated, the AP conveys information about the performance of Ŝ, and is
constrained by properties of the underlying distribution on X. For example, the
AP’s expectation is exactly the base rate for the population:
Proposition 3.2.2.2. For any groupwise calibrated soft classifier Ŝ, for all groups
g ∈ G: BRg = E[Ŝ(Xg)].
Proof of Proposition 3.2.2.2.










where the third line follows from the definition of a calibrated classifier (Defini-
tion 3.2.1.2).
Accuracy profiles also provide useful geometric intuition for reasoning about the
effects of post-processing calibrated scores. We elaborate on this in Section 3.3.1 (see
Figure 3·2).
3.2.3 Group fairness measures
Several well-studied measures of statistical “fairness” (e.g., [81,162,164,189,200,248])
look at how the following key performance measures of a classifier differ across groups.
The false positive rate (FPR) of a hard classifier Ŷ for a group g is the rate at which
Ŷ gives a positive classification among instances x ∈ Xg with true type 0. The false
negative rate (FNR) is defined analogously for predicted negative instances with true
type 1. Positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) track the
rate of mistakes within instances that share a predicted type. Informally, positive
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predictive value captures how much meaning can be given to a predicted 1, and
negative predictive value is similar for predicted 0. We now define these statistics
formally.
Definition 3.2.3.1. Given a hard classifier Ŷ and a group g, we define
the false positive rate of Ŷ for g: FPRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0];
the false negative rate of Ŷ for g: FNRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 0 | Y (Xg) = 1];
the positive predictive value of Ŷ for g: PPVŶ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŷ (Xg) = 1];
the negative predictive value of Ŷ for g: NPVŶ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Ŷ (Xg) = 0].
The probability statements in the definitions above reflect two sources of random-
ness: the sampling of Xg from the group g and any random choices made by the
classifier Ŷ .
Among previous works, some [162,200] focus on equalizing only one or both of the
false positive rates and false negative rates across groups, called balance for the neg-
ative and positive classes, respectively. Equalizing positive and negative predictive
value across groups is often combined into one condition called predictive parity [81].
We split the value out to be a separate condition for the positive and negative predic-
tive classes. Predictive parity appears to be a hard-classifier analogue of calibration:
both can be interpreted as saying that the output of the classifier (hard or soft) con-
tains all the information contained in group membership. Our results highlight that
the relationship between these notions is more subtle than it first appears; see Section
3.3 for further discussion.
3.3 The limits of post-processing
Suppose throughout this section that Ŝ is a groupwise calibrated soft classifier. Our
goal in this section is to make binary predictions based on Ŝ(x) — and possibly the
group G(x) — subject to equalizing PPV and/or NPV among groups. That is, we wish
to make a prediction using a hard post-processor D̂ such that Ŷ = D̂◦Ŝ equalizes PPV
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and/or NPV among groups. We chose to concentrate first on (the difficulties with)
equalizing PPV and NPV rather than FPR and FNR due to the conceptual similarity
of PPV and NPV to calibration. Also, the case of equalizing false positive rates with
thresholds is addressed in [92].
3.3.1 Fairness conditions for post-processors
We begin by making a simple observation about post-processing that provides some
geometric intuition for the rest of this section. Just as in Proposition 3.2.2.2, we can
express PPVŶ ,g and NPVŶ ,g succinctly in terms of conditional expectations over the
AP P̂g.
Proposition 3.3.1.1. Let Ŷ = D̂ ◦ Ŝ be a hard classifier that is non-trivial for all
g ∈ G where Ŝ is groupwise calibrated with respect to G. For any g ∈ G we have:
PPVŶ ,g = E[Ŝ(Xg) | Ŷ (Xg) = 1]
NPVŶ ,g = 1− E[Ŝ(Xg) | Ŷ (Xg) = 0]
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1.1. We first observe that the output of a post-processor is
conditionally independent of the true type, conditioned on the output of the soft
classifier it is post-processing and the group membership:
Fact 3.3.1.2. Consider any randomized function D̂ : [0, 1]× G → {0, 1}. Since D̂ is
a randomized function with inputs s ∈ [0, 1] and g ∈ G, we have that
(D̂(Ŝ(X), G(X)) ⊥ Y (X)) | (Ŝ(X), G(X)) (3.2)
or in other words that D̂(Ŝ(X), G(X)) is conditionally independent of the true type
Y (X), since fixing the inputs to D̂ makes its output purely a function of its random
string.
Now recall that PPVŶ ,g and NPVŶ ,g are well-defined for all groups because Ŷ is
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non-trivial on all groups. We then have








Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s, D̂(Ŝ(Xg), g)]




sPr[Ŝ(Xg) = s|D̂(Ŝ(Xg), g) = 1]
= E[Ŝ(Xg) | Ŷ (Xg) = 1]
where the fourth line follows from the fact that the group g is fixed within Xg, which
lets us apply Fact 3.3.1.2, and the fact that Ŝ is calibrated on g. Similar simplifications
give us that
NPVŶ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | D̂(Ŝ(Xg), g) = 0]
= 1− Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | D̂(Ŝ(Xg), g) = 0]
= 1− E[Ŝ(Xg) | D̂(Ŝ(Xg), g) = 0]
Using Proposition 3.3.1.1, we can geometrically see how certain post-processing
decision rules will interact with the AP for a group g. For example, using a threshold,
the expected true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives can be
estimated, as shown in Figure 3·2.
Proposition 3.3.1.3 below gives a characterizations of the false positive and false
negative rates in a manner analogous to how Proposition 3.3.1.1 describes PPV and
NPV:
Proposition 3.3.1.3. Let Ŷ and Ŝ be hard and soft classifiers as in Proposition
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Figure 3·2: Accuracy Profiles (APs, definition 3.2.2.1) yield useful geometric intu-
itions, which come from the calibration property (definition 3.2.1.1). With a thresh-
old, the expected PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR can be seen visually.
3.3.1.1. Then for any g ∈ G,
FPRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1] ·
1− E[Ŝ(Xg) | Ŷ (Xg) = 1]
1− E[Ŝ(Xg)]
FNRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 0] ·
E[Ŝ(Xg) | Ŷ (Xg) = 0]
E[Ŝ(Xg)]
Assume that Pr[Y (Xg) = 1] > 0 and Pr[Y (Xg) = 0] > 0 (that is, assume 0 < BRg <
1) so that FPR and FNR are well-defined.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1.3. We give the proof for FPR, and the proof for FNR is
similar. By applying Bayes’ rule, we can write
FPRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0]
= Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Ŷ (Xg) = 1] ·
Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 0]
(3.3)
Noting that Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Ŷ (Xg) = 1] = 1 − PPVŶ ,g, we can apply Proposition
3.3.1.1 and rearrange to write the RHS of Equation 3.3 as follows.
RHS of (3.3) = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1] ·
1− E[Ŝ(Xg) | Ŷ (Xg) = 1]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 0]
(3.4)
We note that Pr[Y (Xg) = 0] = 1− E[Ŝ(Xg)] (Proposition 3.2.2.2). Substituting this
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in to the RHS of Equation 3.4, we conclude the result.
3.3.2 General impossibility of equalizing Positive and Negative Predictive
Value
It is not always possible to directly post-process a soft groupwise calibrated classi-
fier into a hard one with equalized PPV (or NPV) for all groups, as we demonstrate
by counterexample in Proposition 3.3.2.1. Before proceeding, we note that our coun-
terexample is somewhat contrived—in particular, the AP induced by the soft classifier
Ŝ in the proof of Proposition 3.3.2.1 takes only one value on each group. When the
AP of Ŝ is more nicely structured on each group (which we will make explicit in
Definition 3.3.3.1), we will see that there are general methods to equalize PPV (or
NPV).
Proposition 3.3.2.1. Fix two disjoint groups g1 and g2 with respective base rates BR1
and BR2 such that BR1 6= BR2. Then there exists a soft classifier Ŝ that is groupwise
calibrated, but for which there is no post-processor D̂ : [0, 1] × G → {0, 1} such that
D̂ ◦ Ŝ equalizes PPV, unless Pr[D̂(BRi, gi) = 1] = 0 for i = 1 or 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2.1. Consider the classifier Ŝ such that Ŝ(x) = BR1 if x ∈ g1
and Ŝ(x) = BR2 if x ∈ g2. This classifier is trivially groupwise calibrated. Since
Pr[D̂(BRi, gi) = 1] > 0 for i = 1 and 2, we conclude that PPVŶ ,gi is well-defined for g1
and g2. The proof now follows from the characterization of PPV in Proposition 3.3.1.1.
This is because PPVŶ ,gi is equal to the expectation of Ŝ(X) where X is drawn from
a distribution with support contained in gi, and hence it is equal to BRi, and BR1 6=
BR2.
The analogous statement regarding impossibility of equalizing NPV is formulated
as Proposition 3.4.1.1 in §3.4.1.
3.3.3 A niceness condition for APs
We now give a non-degeneracy condition on APs motivated by the impossibility result
for post-processing given by Proposition 3.3.2.1.
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Definition 3.3.3.1 (Niceness of APs). Let G be a set of groups. A distribution on
calibrated scores P̂ is nice if Supp(P̂g) is the same for all g ∈ G.
Note that this condition rules out the counterexample given by Proposition 3.3.2.1,
since the APs in the counterexample had different (in fact, disjoint) supports for
different groups. Hence, we can hope to successfully post-process soft classifiers with
nice APs.
3.3.4 Equalizing Positive and Negative Predictive Value by thresholding
We pay special attention to thresholds because they are simple to understand and
therefore very widely used. We use one slight modification to deterministic thresholds
that adds an element of randomness: if a score is at the threshold, we randomly
determine which side of the threshold it falls on, according to a distribution defined
below.
Definition 3.3.4.1 (Threshold Post-Processor). A threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ) :
[0, 1]×G → {1, 0} is a function from a score s ∈ [0, 1] and a group g ∈ G, parameterized
by τ and ρ. The threshold parameter τ : G → [0, 1] specifies the threshold for the
group g, and ρ : G → [0, 1] is the probability of returning 1 when the input score s is











1 s > τ(g)
0 s < τ(g)
1 w.p. ρ(g) else 0 s = τ(g)
In the setting of an infinite number of scores and a continuous domain (i.e. scores
are represented by a probability density function instead of a probability mass func-
tion), we can use purely deterministic threshold functions in which ρ ≡ 1, and achieve
very similar results for the rest of this section.
If both τ(g) and ρ(g) do not vary across groups g ∈ G, then the post-processor
is the same across groups. In this case, we will call the post-processor a group blind
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threshold post-processor, and will overload τ and ρ to be constants.
We now study the effectiveness of thresholds for post-processing soft classifiers
with nice APs. The main takeaways are:
1. If the APs are nice, then threshold post-processors can equalize PPV (Proposi-
tions 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.5).
2. However, group blind threshold post-processors are rather limited in their ability
to equalize PPV (Proposition 3.3.4.3).
3. Furthermore, equalizing PPV with thresholds (group blind or otherwise) may
have undesirable social consequences (Example 3.3.4.8).
4. Thresholds cannot always equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously, even for nice
APs (Proposition 3.3.4.9).
Results 1-3 also apply to NPV (see Proposition 3.4.1.3).
Group Blind Thresholds
We begin by classifying which group blind threshold post-processors can equalize PPV
across all groups (Propositions 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.3). By symmetry, our arguments give
a similar characterization for equalizing NPV.
Proposition 3.3.4.2. For every nice groupwise calibrated soft classifier Ŝ and for
every group blind threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ) such that τ(g) = max(Supp(P̂g)) for
all g, then the composed classifier Ŷ = D̂(τ,ρ) ◦ Ŝ equalizes PPV across all groups for
which Ŷ is non-trivial.
The existence of the threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.3.4.2 follows from
the assumed finiteness of the range of the soft classifier. In the case where the range
of the soft classifier is infinite, such post-processors may not exist.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.4.2. Any of the given post-processors only ever maps the
largest score in the support of P̂g to 1, for all groups g. Hence, PPVg is exactly the
largest score in Supp(P̂g). By the assumption that P̂ is nice, Supp(P̂g) is the same
for all groups g, and hence the PPV is equalized across groups.
We prove the analogous statement for NPV in Proposition 3.4.1.2 in the §3.4.1. We
proceed to show that the post-processors described in Proposition 3.3.4.2 are the only
non-trivial, group blind post-processors that equalize PPV across groups in general,
as we prove in Proposition 3.3.4.3.
Proposition 3.3.4.3. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a nice
AP for which no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor, other than the ones
in Proposition 3.3.4.2, can equalize PPV across groups.
At a high level, the proof of Proposition 3.3.4.3 works as follows: We can make
the AP on one group uniform, and the AP of another group strictly increasing. Then,
threshold post-processors naturally favor the latter group, as the AP for that group
gives more weight to higher scores than lower ones when compared to the former AP.
Our characterization of PPV (Proposition 3.3.1.1) features prominently in the proof.
In preparation for proving Proposition 3.3.4.3, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3.4.4. Let g1, g2 ∈ G be two different groups, and fix a group blind threshold
post-processor D̂(τ,ρ). Let P̂g1,(τ,ρ) be the expected conditional AP on scores ≥ τ that
results from starting with the AP P̂g1 over scores in group g1 and conditioning on
the scores that D̂(τ,ρ) sends to 1, and similarly let P̂g2,(τ,ρ) denote the same type of
conditional AP when starting with the P̂g2 over scores in group g2.
If P̂g2,(τ,ρ) strictly stochastically dominates P̂g1,(τ,ρ), then
PPVD̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ,g1
< PPVD̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ,g2
Proof. We use the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.3.1.1, for the special
case where the post-processor thresholds as described above. We can write the PPV
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for group g1 as follows:
PPVD̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ,g1 = EX1∼Xg1




where the second line follows from the definition of P̂g1,(τ,ρ).




Since P̂g2,(τ,ρ) stochastically dominates P̂g1,(τ,ρ), the expectation on the RHS of
Equation 3.6 is larger than the expectation on the RHS of Equation 3.5, yielding the
result.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4.3. Fix two groups g1 and g2 and a finite set of points S ⊂
[0, 1] such that the PMFs of the soft classifier Ŝ on g1 and g2 have support equal to
S - that is, Supp(P̂g1) = Supp(P̂g2) = S.
Let the PMFs of the soft classifier Ŝ on these two groups respectively be given by
P̂g1(s) = 1/|Supp(P̂g1)| and P̂g2(s) ∝ s for all s ∈ S, where P̂g2 is normalized with
a constant such that it sums to 1. Fix a group blind threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ)
that is not one of the ones mentioned in Proposition 3.3.4.2. Since Ŝ(τ,ρ) is group
blind, its threshold function is a constant which we name τ .
Let P̂g1,(τ,ρ) be the expected conditional AP on scores≥ τ that results from starting
with the AP P̂g1 over scores in group g1 and conditioning on the scores that D̂(τ,ρ)
sends to 1. We can get this conditional PMF by removing scores s < τ , multiplying
P̂g1(τ) by ρ, and re-normalizing the remaining values to get a distribution. Let P̂g2,(τ,ρ)
be defined similarly.
We claim that P̂g2,(τ,ρ) strictly stochastically dominates P̂g1,(τ,ρ), which allows us
to invoke Lemma 3.3.4.4 to conclude that the PPV on the two groups are unequal.
We now show that P̂g2,(τ,ρ) strictly stochastically dominates P̂g1,(τ,ρ). This is clearly
true by design if ρ = 0 or 1: in this case, the post-processor is simply a deterministic
threshold function, and we know by design that P̂g1,(τ,ρ) is uniform while P̂g2,(τ,ρ) is a
strictly increasing function. If ρ = r for some r ∈ (0, 1), then we can write P̂g1,(τ,ρ) as
a convex combination of P̂g1,τ,0 and P̂g1,τ,1 (with weight r on the distribution where
ρ = 1, and weight 1−r on the distribution where ρ = 0). We can write P̂g2,(τ,ρ) as the
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same convex combination of the conditional distributions over g2 where ρ = 0 and
ρ = 1. Since we already established stochastic domination for the cases where ρ = 0
and ρ = 1, this establishes stochastic domination for the case where ρ ∈ (0, 1).
We achieve the same result for NPV in Proposition 3.4.1.3. In the setting where the
range of the soft classifier is infinite and continuous, we show in Proposition 3.4.2.1
that a similar negative result holds, but without the existence of the classifiers in
Proposition 3.3.4.2.
Propositions 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.3 demonstrate the limits of group blind thresholds
on calibrated scores. Though this method of post-processing has social appeal, it
does not actually preserve the fairness properties that one would expect. In the next
section we repeat our analysis but relax our group blindness requirement.
Group-Aware Thresholds
If we allow the different groups to have different thresholds, then we grant ourselves
more degrees of freedom to be able to satisfy binary fairness constraints. In par-
ticular, we can equalize PPV across groups in a more meaningful way than done in
Proposition 3.3.4.2.
Recall that the group blind threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.3.4.2 are
the only group blind threshold post-processors that work on certain nice APs (shown
in Proposition 3.3.4.3). However, these post-processors have the property that the
only score they map to 1 is the largest score in the support, which can be undesirable
for many applications.
In particular, all classifiers in Proposition 3.3.4.3 make the PPV on each group
gi equal to the maximum score in the support of P̂gi . However, the (not necessarily
group blind) threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.3.4.5 below can make the PPV
on each group equal to any fixed value between the maximum base rate of gi and the
maximum score in Supp(P̂gi).
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Proposition 3.3.4.5. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifier Ŝ with a nice
AP P̂ such that Ŝ is groupwise calibrated over G and |Supp(P̂g)| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G,
then there exists a non group blind, non-trivial threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ) that is
not one of the ones from Proposition 3.3.4.2 such that the hard classifier Ŷ = D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ
equalizes PPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the PPV of all the groups is equal to an arbitrary
value in (maxi BRgi , smax), where maxi BRgi is the maximum base rate among the
groups gi ∈ G and smax is the maximum score in the support of P̂gi. For the case
where the support of P̂gi is infinite, smax is instead the supremum of scores.
Moreover, since this post-processor is not group blind, it is not one of the post-
processors described in Proposition 3.3.4.2.
In preparation for proving Proposition 3.3.4.5, we first prove the following two
claims:
Claim 3.3.4.6 (Monotonicity of PPV and NPV). Fix a soft classifier Ŝ and corre-
sponding AP P̂, as well as a group g. Fix group blind threshold post-processors D̂τ1,ρ1





Proof. We show conclusion (a); conclusion (b) is shown analogously. Define P̂g,τ1,ρ1
to be the conditional PMF on scores ≥ τ1 that results from starting with the AP P̂g
over scores in group g and conditioning on the scores that D̂τ1,ρ1 sends to 1, and let
P̂g,τ2,ρ2 be defined similarly for the threshold post-processor D̂τ2,ρ2 .
We claim that P̂g,τ2,ρ2 stochastically dominates P̂g,τ1,ρ1 , which yields the desired
result by the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.3.1.1 and more explicitly
written in Equations 3.5 and 3.6.
Claim 3.3.4.7 (Continuity of PPV). Fix a soft classifier Ŝ and corresponding AP P̂,
as well as a group g. Suppose we have two post-processing algorithms, D̂1 and D̂2.
Let P̂g,D̂1 be the expected conditional AP that results from starting with the AP P̂g
over scores in group g and conditioning on the scores that D̂1 sends to 1, and define
P̂g,D̂2 similarly. If dTV (P̂g,D̂1 , P̂g,D̂2) < ǫ, then |PPVg,D̂1◦Ŝ − PPVg,D̂2◦Ŝ| < O(ǫ). Or
in words, if the distance between the conditional APs is small, then the difference in
PPV is small.
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Proof. Recall the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.3.1.1 (and more
explicitly written in Equation 3.5). This tells us that the PPV of group g for the
classifier D̂1 ◦ Ŝ is exactly the expectation of a random variable distributed according
to P̂g,D̂1 . Similarly, the PPV of group g for the classifier D̂2 ◦ Ŝ is the expectation
of a r.v. distributed according to P̂g,D̂2 . Since both P̂g,D̂1 and P̂g,D̂2 have support
bounded between 0 and 1, their expectations can differ by at most ǫ, from which the
claim follows. For completeness, we prove this below.
Suppose wlog that P̂g,D̂1 has the larger expectation. Let S = {s ∈ Supp(P̂g) :









< PPVg,D̂2◦Ŝ + ǫ
where in the second line we use the fact that PPVg,D̂2◦Ŝ is the expectation of P̂g,D̂2 ,
and in the last line we use the fact that s ∈ [0, 1] and that the TV-distance between
the two distributions is less than ǫ.
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 3.3.4.5.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4.5. Fix a soft classifier Ŝ with a nice AP P̂ that is groupwise
calibrated over g1, . . . , gn, and fix a desired value v ∈ (maxi BRgi , smax). We will show
that we can design a threshold post-processor (τ, ρ) such that PPVg,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ = v for
all groups g.
Fix an arbitrary group gj. We proceed via a continuity argument to show that
we can tune the threshold on gj to achieve PPV equal to v. The maximum possible
value for PPVgj ,D̂(τ,ρ) is smax (achieved when τ = smax, by Claim 3.3.4.6), where smax
is the largest score in the support, as defined in the proposition statement. We ignore
the trivial post-processor that never maps anything to 1, and hence leaves the PPV
undefined.
Furthermore, note that, for any group, a lower bound on the PPV of a hard
classifier on that group is the base rate of the group, where the lower bound is
matched by the trivial post-processor that sends every score to 1. This follows from
Claim 3.3.4.6.
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We now claim that there is a setting of τ(gj) and ρ(gj) that achieves PPVg,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ =
v. We accomplish this by showing that there is a way to change (τ(gj), ρ(gj)) such
that the PPV decreases continuously. We first show:
Now, consider the following way to change (τ(gj), ρ(gj)). Fix ǫ > 0, and an initial
setting for (τ(gj), ρ(gj)) s.t. τ(gj) is not the smallest item in the support or ρ(gj) > ǫ.
Reduce ρ(gj) by ǫ, wrapping around on the interval (0, 1] and decreasing τ(gj) to the
next largest item in the support when this would otherwise make ρ(gj) negative.
This very minor transformation to the threshold changes the AP conditional on
outputting 1 very slightly - so slightly that the TV distance between the old condi-
tional AP and the new AP is at most some ǫ′ which is a function of ǫ. This lets us
apply Claim 3.3.4.7 to show that the PPV changes by at most a function of ǫ. So
as we take ǫ going towards 0, this shows that the PPV changes by an amount going
towards 0. This establishes that the PPV changes “continuously” with respect to this
deforming procedure.
By Claim 3.3.4.6, we have that the above deforming procedure can only decrease
the PPV. Therefore, we can continuously decrease the PPV, starting from smax, by
continuously deforming the threshold post-processor with the method above. Note
that smax > v > maxi BRgi ≥ BRgj . By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must
be a setting of (τ(gj), ρ(gj)) such that PPVgj ,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ = v.
We assert the analogous statement for the case of NPV in Claim 3.4.1.5. The
corresponding statement for the case of soft classifiers with infinite range is asserted
in Proposition 3.4.2.2.
The Limits of Thresholding
While Proposition 3.3.4.5 shows that a threshold post-processor can equalize the
PPV across n groups, this threshold post-processor can be unsatisfying. Consider an
example with two groups g1 and g2 in an image classification setting, where group
g2 is found to post more disallowed imagery. Suppose that we have an AP that is
decreasing with respect to score on group g1, and increasing with respect to score
on group g2. This is illustrated in Example 3.3.4.8 and Figure 3·3. This means that
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a group blind threshold post-processor yields larger PPV on g2, since large scores
are given more weight in g2. So, to equalize the PPV between the two groups, we
will classify more low scores as positive in g2 than g1. This effectively means that our
threshold on group g2 is more lenient than our threshold on g1, which seems blatantly
unfair, since g2 is the posting more undesirable content in the first place!
Example 3.3.4.8 (Socially Unsatisfying Example). Fix groups g1 and g2, and we fix
the AP of the soft classifier Ŝ as follows. Let Supp(P̂g1) = Supp(P̂g2), let P̂g1(s) ∝ a−s
for appropriately selected constant a > 0 and let P̂g2(s) ∝ s. Group g2 has a higher
base rate and may have social advantages over group g1.
Let D̂(τ,ρ) be a non-trivial post-processor. If D̂(τ,ρ) were group blind, then by
Lemma 3.3.4.4, since P̂g2,D̂(τ,ρ) stochastically dominates P̂g1,D̂(τ,ρ) , the PPV on g2 must
be larger than the PPV of g1.
To equalize PPV, by Claim 3.3.4.6, we must have either τ(g2) < τ(g1), or τ(g2) =
τ(g1) and ρ(g2) < ρ(g1). Group g1 is now held to a higher standard than the group
that posts more undesirable content (g2) in order to maintain equality of PPV. Fig-
ure 3·3 illustrates example thresholds that equalize the PPV.
Figure 3·3: Accompanying Example 3.3.4.8, the PPV for both groups is 0.77. How-
ever, the threshold for g1 (dark blue) is higher than the threshold for g2 (orange),
even though g2 is the more problematic group.
The only property needed for Example 3.3.4.8 is that the AP of one group stochas-
tically dominates the AP of another group. We suspect that this to will occur in many
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settings. Furthermore, thresholding cannot in general equalize both PPV and NPV
simultaneously, even for nice APs and using non-group blind thresholds.
Proposition 3.3.4.9. Fix groups g1 and g2. There exists a soft classifier Ŝ with a
nice AP P̂ such that no threshold post-processor can simultaneously equalize PPV and
NPV between groups g1 and g2.
Before proving the statement, we first show that the base rates of g1 and g2 can
be written as convex combinations of the PPV and 1−NPV on the respective groups:
Claim 3.3.4.10. Fix any group g ∈ G, and let the hard classifier Ŷ be non-trivial.
Then the base rate of g can be written as a convex combination of PPVg,Ŷ and 1 −
NPVg,Ŷ
Proof.
BRg = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1]
= Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŷ (Xg) = 1] Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1]
+ Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŷ (Xg) = 0] Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 0]
= PPVg,Ŷ · θ + (1− NPVg,Ŷ ) · (1− θ)
where θ := Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1].
A simple intuition for the proof of Proposition 3.3.4.9 is as follows. Suppose we
have two groups, and the soft classifier is almost perfect on one group - for all but
a small fraction of inputs it gives the correct binary score, and gives the remaining
inputs score 0.5. On the other group, it is the opposite - almost every input is given
score 0.5, and there are only a few inputs given their ground truth score. The corre-
sponding APs of each group have equal supports, and therefore are “nice.” However,
it is clear that any threshold post-processor on the first group will have extremely
high PPV and NPV, while any threshold post-processor on the second group will
have to make a decision on where to round the inputs in the 0.5 bucket, and will
correspondingly either have low PPV or NPV.
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This example is somewhat unsatisfying, as the AP satisfies niceness by a tech-
nicality (for example, it is extremely close to a AP with disjoint supports between
groups). The proof generalizes the above example to a case where scores for one group
are slightly more “correlated” with the ground truth labels than scores for the other
group. §3.4.2 shows the corresponding result when the range of the soft classifier is
infinite.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4.9. Let Supp(P̂g1) = Supp(P̂g2). Let P̂g1 be uniform over
scores, and let P̂g2(s) = −a(s − 1/2)2 + b for some appropriately chosen constants
a, b ≥ 0 such that P̂g2 is a valid probability distribution.
We claim that there is no threshold post-processor that can equalize PPV and
NPV simultaneously for these two groups. First, note that the base rates for the two
groups are equal to 1/2 by design, due to the symmetric nature of the AP on each
group. Just like in the proof of Proposition 3.3.4.3, we use the notation P̂g1,≥(τ,ρ) to
denote the conditional AP supported on scores ≥ τ that results from starting with
the AP P̂g1 over all scores in group g1 and conditioning on the scores that D̂(τ,ρ) sends
to 1, and define P̂g2,≥(τ,ρ) similarly. Let P̂gi,≤(τ,ρ) denote the conditional AP starting
from group gi and conditioning on the scores that D̂(τ,ρ) sends to 0.
We proceed by a case analysis on the location of the threshold for group g1 - that
is, on τ(g1).
Case 1: τ(g1) ≥ 1/2. First, suppose additionally that D̂(τ,ρ) is group blind over
g1, g2, then P̂g2,(τ,ρ) is strictly stochastically dominated by P̂g1,(τ,ρ) so the PPV is lower
on g2 than g1 (Lemma 3.3.4.4). Therefore, to equalize the PPV between the two
groups, the threshold on group g2 must be to the “right” of the threshold on g1 (that
is, either τ(g2) > τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and ρ(g2) < ρ(g1)), which follows from
Claim 3.3.4.6.
However, we claim that this setting of thresholds makes the NPV on group g2
lower than the NPV on group g1. It suffices to show that, for any constant threshold
post-processor classifier D̂(τ,ρ) with τ(g1) = τ(g2) ≥ 1/2, the NPV on group g2 is lower
than the NPV on group g1. This implies that the same statement holds when either
τ(g2) > τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and ρ(g2) < ρ(g1) as well, due to the monotonicity
property of NPV (Claim 3.3.4.6). This suffices to prove Proposition 3.3.4.9 for the
case when τ(g1) ≥ 1/2: we need to set τ(g2), ρ(g2) such that either τ(g2) > τ(g1) or
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τ(g2) = τ(g1) and ρ(g2) < ρ(g1) in order to equalize PPV, but this leaves the NPV on
group g2 lower than the NPV on group g1.
Now we proceed to show that the NPV is lower on g2 when the threshold post-
processor is constant. Fix a constant threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ) with τ ≥ 1/2.
We have already established that this means that PPVg2,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ < PPVg1,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ.
Now, since the base rates of g1 and g2 are equal, this implies that
1− NPVg2,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ > 1− NPVg1,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ
Rearranging, this shows that NPVg2,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ < NPVg1,D̂(τ,ρ)◦Ŝ, finishing the proof of this
case.
Case 2: τ(g1) < 1/2. The argument in this case is symmetrical to the previous
case, where we switch the roles of PPV and NPV in the argument. We sketch it for
the sake of completeness.
Fix a constant threshold post-processor such that τ(g1) = τ(g2) < 1/2. By
design, P̂g2,≤(τ,ρ) strictly stochastically dominates P̂g1,≤(τ,ρ). Hence, the NPV on group
g2 is smaller than the NPV on group g1 (this follows from an analogous version of
Lemma 3.3.4.4 for NPV instead of PPV). This means that the threshold post-processor
cannot be constant to equalize NPVs - it must be moved such that either τ(g2) < τ(g1)
or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and ρ(g2) > ρ(g1) (Claim 3.3.4.6).
However, by the same convex combination argument as in the previous case, we get
that any such constant threshold post-processor must make the PPV on g2 strictly
smaller than the PPV on g1. By the monotonicity of PPV, this means that any
threshold post-processor with either τ(g2) < τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and ρ(g2) > ρ(g1)
must also make the PPV on g2 smaller than the PPV on g1, finishing the proof.
3.3.5 Equalizing APs
While thresholding is a conceptually simple approach to post-processing a soft clas-
sifier, its power is limited. We now consider a very different approach using soft
post-processors to equalize the APs across groups of a soft classifier. The intuition is
that if the APs are equal across groups, then any hard post-processor that is group
blind should result in equal PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR. We formalize this intuition
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in Claim 3.3.5.1.
Let Ŝ be a soft classifier and for each group g ∈ G, let P̂g be the AP of Ŝ for group
g. For a soft post-processor D̂soft, let Ŝ ′ = D̂soft ◦ Ŝ and let P̂ ′g be the corresponding
AP for group g.
Our goal is to find a soft post-processor D̂soft such that Ŝ ′ is groupwise calibrated,
and P̂ ′g = P̂ ′g′ for all g, g′ ∈ G. In this section, we describe only one approach to
constructing D̂soft which we call mass averaging.
The approach of equalizing APs has a fundamental weakness: if P̂ ′g = P̂ ′g′ and both
are calibrated, then BRg = BRg′ . This severely limits applicability of this approach.
However, this limitation will be removed in Section 3.5.2 by allowing deferrals.
Claim 3.3.5.1. If the APs are equal for two groups, then PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR
are equalized by any hard post-processor D̂ satisfying group blindness.
The group blindness requirement in the claim is necessary: consider the (not group
blind) post-processor that outputs 0 on one group and 1 on the other; PPV will not
be equalized.
Proof of Claim: 3.3.5.1. We prove only that PPV is equalized; the remaining proper-
ties may be proved similarly. Let Ŷ = D̂ ◦ Ŝ be a hard classifier Ŷ that is a group
blind post-processor D̂ composed with a calibrated soft classifier Ŝ. All probabilities
below are over Xg ∼ Xg, and the coins of Ŝ and D̂.
PPVŶ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŷ (Xg, g) = 1]
=
Pr[Y (X) = 1]





Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s] · Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1]
· Pr[Ŷ (Xg, g) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1]
)
Each factor in this product is equal across groups by the assumptions. Namely,
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1] is equalized by calibration and equalized APs; Pr[Ŷ (Xg, g) = 1] by
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group blindness and equalized APs; Pr[Ŷ (Xg, g) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1] by
group blindness; Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s] by calibration; and finally Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s]
by equalized APs.
Mass Averaging
The mass-averaging technique is best illustrated with an example. Suppose that P̂g1
is uniform over {0, 0.5, 1}, and P̂g2 is uniform over {0, 1}. It is easy to define a
soft post-processor D̂soft which equalizes these two APs. On g1, we leave the score












The APs for groups g1 and g2 of the resulting soft classifier Ŝ
′ = D̂soft ◦ Ŝ are equal,
and are equal to P̂g1 .
In the example, the probability mass is being redistributed by averaging the scores.
This can be equivalently viewed as adding noise to the scores and then recalibrating
the scores, something discussed in [92].
More generally, a mass-averaging post processor D̂soft assigns to each possible pair
(s, g) a distribution over possible output scores s′. Such a D̂soft is fully specified by
k ·k′ ·|G| parameters, where k is the number of possible values of s and k′ is the number
of possible values of s′. Given a soft classifier Ŝ and a mass-averaging post processor
D̂soft, the constraint that the resulting APs are equalized across groups is linear in
these parameters. Such classifiers, therefore, may be found by a linear program. We
do not explore the choice of mass-averaging post-processors further.
Note that this method can only “remove” information from the distribution.
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3.4 Results for Negative Predictive Value and continuous,
full support APs
3.4.1 Results for Negative Predictive Value
In Section 3.3, we proved limits on the ability of post-processors to equalize PPV
given a distribution on calibrated scores with finite support. For completeness, in
this section, we give the statements of the analogous limits for equalizing NPV and
for continuous probability density functions with full support [0, 1].
We start with the analogous statement of Proposition 3.3.2.1 for NPV instead of
PPV.
Proposition 3.4.1.1. Fix two disjoint groups g1 and g2 with respective base rates
BR1 and BR2 such that BR1 6= BR2. Then there exists a soft-valued classifier Ŝ that
is groupwise calibrated, but for which there is no post-processor D̂ : [0, 1]×G → {0, 1}
such that D̂ ◦ Ŝ equalizes NPV, unless Pr[D̂(BRi, gi) = 0] = 0 for i = 1 or 2.
The nontriviality condition ensures that the NPV is well-defined on both groups
(which can be compared to the nontriviality condition in Proposition 3.3.2.1, which
ensures that the PPV is well-defined on both groups). The proof is essentially identical
to the proof of Proposition 3.3.2.1: the fraction of predicted 0’s in group gi that are
true 0’s is 1− BRi, as the post-processor has no other information by which to make
its decision, and hence the NPV remains unequal due to the differing base rates.
We now proceed to give the NPV analogs of our results on threshold post-
processors in Section 3.3. We start with the analogous statement for Proposi-
tion 3.3.4.2 - that there is a class of simple group blind threshold post-processors
that equalizes the NPV across groups.
Proposition 3.4.1.2. For every nice groupwise calibrated soft classifier Ŝ and for
every group blind threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ) such that τ(g) = min(Supp(P̂g)) and
ρ(g) < 1 for all g, the composed classifier D̂ ◦ Ŝ equalizes NPVs across all groups.
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The existence of the threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.4.1.2 follows from
the assumed finiteness of the range of the soft classifier. In the case where the range
of the soft classifier is infinite, such post-processors may not exist (as there may be
no minimum element of the support). The proof is once again analogous to the proof
of Proposition 3.3.4.2: these classifiers only ever output 0 on the minimum element
of the support of P̂g, and hence the NPV is simply 1 minus the smallest element of
the support for each group.
However, much like the case for PPV, other group blind threshold post-processors
cannot possibly equalize NPV.
Proposition 3.4.1.3. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a nice
AP for which no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor, other than the ones
in Proposition 3.3.4.2, can equalize NPV across groups.
The example of the groupwise-calibrated soft classifier is the exact same one that
shows the statement for PPV. Indeed, we can see this in the following way. We can
make the example in the proof of Proposition 3.4.1.3 have equal base rates across
groups, in which case it follows from Proposition 3.3.4.3 due to Claim 3.3.4.10.
When we turn to threshold post-processors that are not group blind, we again get
analogous results for NPV.
Proposition 3.4.1.4. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifier Ŝ with a nice
AP P̂ such that Ŝ is groupwise-calibrated over G and |Supp(P̂g)| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G,
there exists a (non-group blind), non-trivial threshold post-processor D̂(τ,ρ) that is
not one of the group blind post-processors in Proposition 3.3.4.2, such that the hard
classifier Ŷ = D̂(τ,ρ) ◦ Ŝ equalizes NPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the NPV of all the groups is an arbitrary value
in (smin,mini BRgi), where mini BRgi is the minimum base rate among the groups and
smin is the minimum score in the support of P̂gi.2
Again the proof of this follows via the same kind of continuity argument as we
used to prove Proposition 3.3.4.5. By definition, each group has base rate at least
2For the case where the support of P̂gi is infinite, smin should be the infimum of scores.
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mini BRgi , and so if the post-processor always says 0 on some group i, then NPVgi =
BRgi ≥ mini BRgi . Hence, for each group, we can start with the always-0 classifier
and slide down the threshold until the desired NPV is reached.
Finally, the socially unsatisfying example also generalizes to NPV. A privileged
group will have higher scores than a disadvantaged group in general, and hence if
they are given the same threshold, the NPV will be lower on the privileged group. To
rectify this, the threshold for the disadvantaged group will have to moved higher, to
decrease the NPV. But then, the disadvantaged group is being subjected to a harsher
standard.
Finally we note that Claim 3.3.4.7 also can be written with NPV instead of PPV,
where the proof follows from using the characterization of NPV given in Proposi-
tion 3.3.1.1:
Claim 3.4.1.5 (Continuity of NPV). Fix a soft classifier Ŝ and a corresponding AP
P̂, as well as a group g. Let D̂1 and D̂2 be two post-processing algorithms. Let P̂g,D̂1
be the expected conditional AP that results from starting with the AP P̂g over scores
in group g and then conditioning on the scores that D̂1 sends to 0, and define P̂g,D̂2
similarly. If dTV (P̂g,D̂1 , P̂g,D̂2) < ǫ, then |NPVg,D̂1◦Ŝ − NPVg,D̂2◦Ŝ| < O(ǫ).
We omit the proof of Claim 3.4.1.5, which resembles the proof of Claim 3.3.4.7
and follows from Proposition 3.3.1.1.
3.4.2 Results for continuous, full support APs
In this section, we briefly address how to extend our results on thresholds in Sec-
tion 3.3 to the setting where every AP P̂ is a continuous probability distribution with
Supp(P̂g) = [0, 1] for all g ∈ G - that is, the support equals the entire interval [0, 1]
for each group g ∈ G. Note that this automatically makes P̂ a “nice” AP, and hence
rules out the general counterexample we came up with in Proposition 3.3.2.1. For
the purposes of this section, call such an AP that 1) P̂g is a continuous probability
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density function for every g ∈ G and 2) Supp(P̂g) = [0, 1] for all g ∈ G a very nice
AP. As the name suggests, we can extend the remaining results in Section 3.3 to the
setting of very nice AP. We give the results for equalizing PPV as done in Section 3.3:
extending these results to equalizing NPV in the setting of continuous, full support
AP can be accomplished by combining the statements here with the modifications
described in Section 3.4.1.
First, we note that a threshold post-processor can be described much more easily
in the continuous setting than in the setting where the AP has finite support on
each group. Indeed, in the setting where P̂g is a continuous density function for all
g ∈ G, the post-processor can truly be a threshold, with no question of how to classify
the score that is exactly equal to the threshold τ . This is because the score τ has
probability 0 under the density P̂g.
Hence, Proposition 3.3.4.2 has no true analog in this setting. This follows because
the maximum element of the support in this case is 1, and a threshold at τ = 1 sends
every score (outside of a measure 0 set) to 0.
This allows us to strengthen Proposition 3.3.4.3 accordingly.
Proposition 3.4.2.1. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a very
nice AP for which no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor can equalize
PPV across groups.
This follows from a nearly identical stochastic domination argument to the one
used for Proposition 3.3.4.3 - in fact, the natural generalization of the distributions
given for the proof of Proposition 3.3.4.3 to the continuous and full-support setting
can be used in this proof.
A non group blind threshold can still always equalize PPV for very nice APs.
Proposition 3.4.2.2. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifier Ŝ with a very
nice AP P̂ such that Ŝ is groupwise-calibrated over G, then there exists a non group
blind, non-trivial threshold post-processor such that the hard classifier equalizes PPV
across G.
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This holds even if we require that the PPV of all the groups is equal to an arbitrary
value in (maxi BRgi , 1), where maxi BRgi is the maximum base rate among the groups
gi ∈ G.
This follows from the same continuity approach as the proof of Proposition 3.3.4.5,
by sliding the threshold continuously down from 1 until the PPV reaches the desired
value v ∈ (maxi BRgi , 1).
The socially unsatisfying example generalizes in the natural way - Example 3.3.4.8
consists of one group having a monotonically increasing PMF and another one having
a monotonically decreasing PMF. We can skip the discretization step in the definition
of these PMFs and have them be continuous PDFs, and the example still goes through.
We cannot equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously in general, just like in the finite
support case (Proposition 3.3.4.9).
Proposition 3.4.2.3. Fix groups g1 and g2. There exists a soft classifier Ŝ with a
very nice AP P̂ such that no threshold post-processor can simultaneously equalize PPV
and NPV between groups g1 and g2.
The proof we give of Proposition 3.3.4.9 for finite support naturally generalizes
to this case - in fact, we can simply use the same proof but without discretizing
the probability distributions. The necessary lemmas about monotonicity of PPV and
being able to express the base rate as a convex combination of PPV and NPV still
hold.
It is unsurprising that the result in Section 3.5 on using thresholds with deferrals
to equalize PPV and NPV also goes through for very nice AP.
Proposition 3.4.2.4. Let Ŝ be groupwise calibrated for the n groups g1, . . . , gn, and
suppose that Ŝ has a very nice AP. Then there exists a nontrivial threshold decision
rule such that the hard classifier Ŷ = D̂ ◦ Ŝ equalizes PPV and NPV for G.
Again, the explanation is very similar to the one for Proposition 3.4.2.2. PPV and
NPV change continuously when we slide the respective thresholds, and unlike the case
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without deferrals, we can change the PPV without changing the NPV, by keeping the
“0” threshold still and sliding the “1” threshold (and deferring in the middle). Hence,
we can simply continuously slide the two thresholds on each group until they reached
the desired values.
3.5 Post-processing calibrated classifiers with deferrals
In the first part of the paper, we considered the problem of post-processing calibrated
soft classifiers, which output a score s ∈ [0, 1], into fair hard classifiers, which output
a decision in ŷ ∈ {0, 1}, subject to a number of group fairness conditions. In the
remainder of this work, we reconsider this problem, but with one important change:
we allow classifiers to “refuse to decide” by outputting the special symbol ⊥. We
call such classifiers deferring classifiers, borrowing the nomenclature from [217]. The
output ⊥ is the deferring classifier’s way of refusing to make a decision and deferring
to a downstream decision maker. For example, a risk assessment tool might aid a
parole board to make a decision by categorizing an individual as high risk or low risk,
or it might output ⊥, providing no advice and deferring to the judgment of the board.
We now modify our notation appropriately. Instances x are still associated with
a true type Y (x) ∈ {0, 1} and a group G(x) ∈ G. A deferring hard classifier Ŷ is a
randomized function Ŷ : X → {0, 1,⊥}. A deferring soft classifier is a randomized
function Ŝ : X → [0, 1] ∪ {⊥}. A deferring hard (resp. soft) post-processor is a
randomized function D̂ : [0, 1]∪ {⊥}×G → {0, 1,⊥} (resp. D̂soft : [0, 1]∪ {⊥}×G →
[0, 1] ∪ {⊥}) that takes as input the output of a deferring soft and post-processes it
into a deferring hard (resp. soft) classifier. We also introduce new versions of the FPR
and FNR, conditioned on not deferring.
Definition 3.5.0.1. The conditional false positive rate and conditional false negative
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rate of a deferring hard classifier Ŷ for a group g are, respectively:
cFPRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0, Ŷ (Xg) 6= ⊥]
cFNRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 0 | Y (Xg) = 1, Ŷ (Xg) 6= ⊥].
We additionally consider a version of the accuracy profile conditioned on not
deferring, which we call the conditional AP. For non-deferring soft classifiers, Defini-
tions 3.5.0.2 and 3.2.2.1 coincide.
Definition 3.5.0.2. The conditional AP P̂g of a classifier Ŝ for a group g is the PMF
of Ŝ(Xg), conditioned on not outputting⊥. That is, for s ∈ [0, 1], P̂g(s) = Pr[Ŝ(Xg) =
s | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥]. Note that the conditional AP is undefined if Pr[Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥] = 0.
Abusing notation, we denote by P̂ the collection {P̂g}g∈G, and call it the condi-
tional AP of Ŝ.
The conditional error rates are applicable generally, but they can be difficult to
interpret. The consequences of using the conditional FPR and FNR are discussed
further in Section 3.7 along with a discussion of different deferral models. They are
also amenable to the consideration of additional goals which we will briefly address.
For example, one could seek to minimize the total deferral rate, equalize the deferral
rate among groups, or prefer deferrals on positive instances.
3.5.1 Thresholding with deferrals
We return now to the problem of post-processing of calibrated soft classifiers, but
now with the extra power of deferring on some inputs. We revisit the two approaches
discussed in Section 3.3: thresholding and equalizing APs.
Proposition 3.3.2.1 stated PPV and NPV cannot both be equalized across groups
in general when using only a single threshold per group. By using two thresholds per
groups and deferring on some inputs, PPV and NPV can always be equalized across
groups.
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We post-process using two thresholds per group as follows: return 0 when s is
lower than the first threshold, return ⊥ between the thresholds, and return 1 above
the second threshold, as shown in Figure 3·4. This buys us more degrees of freedom
when equalizing binary constraints, and it has the useful property that we say ⊥ on
the instances where we are the least confident about the predicted type.
We adapt our notation as follows:
Definition 3.5.1.1 (Deferring Threshold Post-Processor). A deferring threshold
post-processor D̂(τ0,τ1,ρ0,ρ1) assigns to each group g two thresholds τ0(g), τ1(g) ∈
Supp(P̂g), and two probabilities ρ0(g), ρ1(g) ∈ [0, 1], with the following requirements:
1. for all g ∈ G, τ0(g) ≤ τ1(g)
2. for all g ∈ G for which τ0(g) = τ1(g), ρ1(g)+ρ0(g) ≤ 1. This corresponds to the
case where the two thresholds are the same, and therefore individuals with that
score must be mapped to 1 with probability ρ1(g), and to 0 with probability
ρ0(g), with the remainder mapped to ⊥.

































1 s > τ1(g)
0 s < τ0(g)
⊥ τ0(g) < s < τ1(g)
1 w.p. ρ1(g), else ⊥ s = τ1(g)
0 w.p. ρ0(g), else ⊥ s = τ0(g)
1 w.p. ρ1(g), 0 w.p. ρ0(g), else ⊥ s = τ0(g) = τ1(g)
⊥ s = ⊥
Using two thresholds allows the equalization of both PPV and NPV across groups
in general, whereas without deferrals we could only equalize one or the other. We
first demonstrate the existence of post-processors that are fairly limited, analogously
to those defined in Proposition 3.3.4.2.
Proposition 3.5.1.2. Let Ŝ be a soft classifier with a nice AP for a set of groups
G. Then every threshold post-processor D̂(τ0,τ1,ρ0,ρ1) satisfying the following properties
137
Figure 3·4: For threshold post-processors with deferrals, defer between the thresh-
olds.
equalizes both the PPV and NPV for all groups in G of the composed classifier Ŷ =
D̂(τ0,τ1,ρ0,ρ1) ◦ Ŝ:
1. τ0(g) = min(Supp(P̂g)) for all g
2. ρ0(g) > 0 for all g.
3. τ1(g) = max(Supp(P̂g)) for all g
4. ρ1(g) > 0 for all g.
Notice that these classifiers cannot be trivial, because we defined ρ0 and ρ1 in a
way that prohibits the possibility that the composed classifier never returns 0 or 1.
For the cases where the range of soft classifier outputs is infinite and there is no max
or min element, these classifiers do not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1.2. The reasoning is similar to the non-deferral case for
equality of PPV alone. The thresholds only allow one score s to map to 0 and
one score to map to 1. Thus, PPV for both groups is equal to the largest score in
the support and NPV for both groups is equal to 1 minus the smallest score in the
support.
Now, much like in Proposition 3.3.4.5, which showed the existence of meaningful
non-trivial threshold post-processors that equalized PPV across groups, we show the
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existence of meaningful, nontrivial deferring threshold post-processors that equalize
PPV and NPV across groups.
Proposition 3.5.1.3. Let Ŝ be a soft classifier with a nice AP that is groupwise
calibrated for a set of groups G. Suppose that |Supp(P̂g)| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G. Then there
exists a non-trivial threshold post-processor D̂(τ0,τ1,ρ0,ρ1) that is not one of those defined
in Proposition 3.5.1.2, such that the hard classifier Ŷ = D̂(τ0,τ1,ρ0,ρ1)◦Ŝ equalizes PPVg
and NPVg for all g ∈ G.
The main idea of the proof of this proposition is to use Proposition 3.3.4.5 twice:
once for getting thresholds to equalize the PPV, and once for thresholds to equalize
the NPV. These thresholds may be invalid because there may be a group g for which
τ0(g) > τ1(g). We use Claims 3.3.4.6 and 3.3.4.7 to allow ourselves to push the PPV
thresholds toward 1 and the NPV thresholds toward 0 until they no longer overlap,
while still maintaining equalization of PPV and NPV for the other groups.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1.3. Recall by Claim 3.3.4.6 that the PPV of Ŝ on a group
g monotonically increases as τ1(g) increases and, if τ1(g) is constant, as ρ1(g) in-
creases. By Claim 3.3.4.6, NPV monotonically increases as τ0(g) decreases, and, if
τ0(g) is constant, as ρ0(g) increases. Recall by Claim 3.3.4.7 that if the total variance
distance between conditional APs (conditioned on being post-processed to a result
of 1) for different groups is at most ǫ, then the PPV difference for these groups is
bounded by O(ǫ). Thus, PPVg is continuous and monotonically increasing with re-
gard to (τ1(g), ρ1(g)). Similarly, NPVg is continuous and monotonically increasing
with (−τ0(g), ρ0(g)).
We know by Proposition 3.3.4.5 that there exists a non-group blind threshold
rule (without deferrals) that equalizes the PPV among the groups. By the analogous
Proposition 3.4.1.4, there exists a (different) non group blind threshold rule that
equalizes the NPV among the groups. For both of these, we know that they are not
the classifiers from Proposition 3.5.1.2.
If the thresholds meet the conditions of being a deferring post-processor listed
in Definition 3.5.1.1, then the statement is proven. If they do not meet the condi-
tions because the thresholds “overlap,” we repeat the following procedure until the
conditions are met:
139
1. Let g be a group for which the conditions are not met, i.e. either τ0(g) > τ1(g),
or τ0(g) = τ1(g) and ρ0(g) + ρ1(g) > 1.
2. If τ0(g) > τ1(g), define t
′ = τ0(g)+τ1(g)
2
. Let t = argmins∈Supp(P̂g) |s − t′|. Notice
that t ≤ τ0(g) and t ≥ τ1(g), but because by assumption τ0(g) > τ1(g), t
cannot be equal to both thresholds. Set the new value for both thresholds to t:
τ0(g) = τ1(g) = t(g).
3. If ρ0(g) + ρ(g) > 1, then do the following:
(a) If τ0(g) remained unaltered in the previous step, then keep ρ0(g) the same,
and set ρ1(g) = 1− ρ0(g).
(b) If τ1(g) remained unaltered in the previous step, then set ρ1(g) the same
and set ρ0(g) = 1− ρ1(g).
(c) If neither of these is true, then let r = ρ0(g)
ρ0(g)+ρ1(g)
. Set ρ0(g) = r and
ρ1(g) = 1− r.
4. These thresholds are no longer overlapping, but they altered PPVg and NPVg.
Notice that, by the monotonicity properties described above, the threshold rules
were changed in ways that can only increase PPVg or NPVg:
(a) τ1(g) has increased or remained constant
(b) if τ1(g) remained constant, then ρ1(g) also remained constant
(c) τ0(g) has decreased or remained constant
(d) if τ0(g) remained constant, then ρ0(g) remained constant
The new PPV and NPV for g may now be higher than those of the other groups.
5. For all other groups g′ 6= g, by the Intermediate Value Theorem and the conti-
nuity of NPV, there exists some (τ0(g
′), ρ(g′)) that sets NPVg′ = NPVg, and by
the monotonicity of NPV, this threshold is lower than the old one. Similarly,
there exists some (τ1(g
′), ρ(g′)) that sets PPVg′ = PPVg and it is higher than
the old one. By the monotonicity of PPV and NPV, we know that this process
will not cause non-overlapping thresholds to become overlapping.
The ultimate effect of these steps was to reduce the number of overlapping thresh-
olds by at least one. We can repeat this process up to 2|G| times until none of the
thresholds overlap.
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Notice that this classifier is not one of the ones from Proposition 3.5.1.2 - if we did
not have to correct for “overlapping,” then this is true by assumption, and if we did
do the correction process, then τ0(g) = τ1(g) for at least one g, and by assumption
we had |Supp(P̂)| ≥ 2.
Thus, we have created valid a post-processor D̂(τ0,τ1,ρ0,ρ1) that equalizes PPV and
NPV for all groups simultaneously and is not one of the ones in Proposition 3.5.1.2,
proving the claim.
The following example demonstrates that it is sometimes possible to equalize PPV,
NPV, FPR, and FNR using deferrals, but without equalizing the APs themselves:
Example 3.5.1.4 (Equalizing PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR with Thresholds). This
example is presented with continuous support [0, 1] for simplicity. Consider two APs,
one for group g1 and one for g2. Let the AP for g1 be uniform (with density give by
the line P̂(s) = 1), and let the AP for group g2 have density given by the parabola
P̂(s) = 6s(1− s), as shown in Figure 3·5.
Consider the post-processor D̂soft(τ0,τ1). (Note that in the case where the distributions
are continuous, the randomization values that determine what happens when the
result is on the threshold, ρ0 and ρ1, are meaningless because Pr[s = τ0(g)] = Pr[s =
τ1(g)] = 0∀s.) Let τ0(g1) = τ0(g1) = 0.5, let τ0(g2) = 16(5 −
√





7) as shown in Figure 3·5.
The PPV and NPV of both groups is 3
4
, and the cFPR and cFNR of both is 1
4
, thus
equalizing all four values.
This example is somewhat unsatisfactory because the base rates are equal in the
two groups. We did not find a similar example without equal base rates.
3.5.2 Equalizing APs with deferrals
As with Claim 3.3.5.1, equalizing the conditional APs between groups renders trivial
the task of downstream decision-making subject to equality of PPV, NPV, cFPR, and
cFNR. Importantly, unlike in Section 3.3.5, equalizing the conditional APs between
groups does not require the groups to have equal base rates, greatly increasing the
applicability of this approach.
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Figure 3·5: This threshold post-processor equalizes PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR
as described in Example 3.5.1.4.
Claim 3.5.2.1. If the conditional APs are equal for two groups, then PPV, NPV,
cFPR, and cFNR are equalized (or simultaneously undefined) by any hard deferring
post-processor D̂ satisfying (1) group blindness and (2) D̂(⊥, g) = ⊥ (∀g).
The additional condition that D̂ defers on input ⊥ is necessary: if D̂ output 1
on all inputs (even on ⊥), then PPV would remain unequal as long as the base rates
differed. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 3.3.5.1.
Proof of Claim 3.5.2.1. We prove only that PPV is equalized; the remaining prop-
erties may be proved similarly. Let Ŷ = D̂ ◦ Ŝ. All probabilities below are over
Xg ∼ Xg, and the coins of Ŝ and D̂.
PPVŶ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŷ (Xg, g) = 1]
=
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥]





Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s] · Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥]
· Pr[D̂(s, g) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1]
)
Each factor in this product is equal across groups by the assumptions. Namely,
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥] is equalized by calibration and equalized APs;
Pr[Ŷ (Xg, g) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥] by group blindness and equalized APs; Pr[D̂(s, g) =
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1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1] by group blindness; Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Ŝ(Xg) = s] by
calibration; and finally Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥] by equalized APs.
Deferrals are a powerful tool for manipulating, and thereby equalizing, conditional
APs. Consider a function Q : (s, g) 7→ [0, 1]








⊥ if s = ⊥
⊥ w.p. Q(s, g), else s otherwise
If Ŝ is a calibrated classifier, the soft deferring classifier Ŝ ′ := D̂softQ ◦Ŝ is still calibrated.
For a group g, let P̂g be the AP of Ŝ and P̂ ′g be the AP of Ŝ ′. There is a simple








By appropriate choice of Q, any conditional AP can be transformed into almost
any other conditional AP.
Theorem 3.5.2.2. Let P̂g be a conditional AP of a soft classifier Ŝ on group g, and
let P̂∗ be any probability mass function such that Supp(P̂∗) ⊆ Supp(P̂g). Then there
exists Q for which the calibrated AP P̂ ′g of D̂softQ ◦ Ŝ is equal to P̂∗.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2.2. Let ∆ = 1−mins∈Supp(P̂g)
P̂g(s)
P̂∗(s)
. For all s ∈ Supp(P̂g), let















and hence ∆ is defined as in Equation 3.7, where we used the fact that
∑ P̂g(s) =
∑ P̂∗(s) = 1 in the last line. Plugging into the earlier formula for P̂ ′g (Equation 3.7)
completes the proof.
Together, Theorem 3.5.2.2 and Claim 3.5.2.1 suggest a general framework for
using deferrals to post-process a soft, possibly deferring classifier Ŝ which is groupwise
calibrated into a hard deferring classifier which simultaneously equalizes PPV, NPV,
cFPR, and cFNR across groups, as follows.
For each g ∈ G, let P̂g be the conditional AP of Ŝ for group g. Let P̂∗ be
any conditional AP such that Supp(P̂∗) ⊆ ∩g∈GSupp(P̂g). Use Theorem 3.5.2.2 to
equalize the conditional APs for all groups g ∈ G. Then use any hard post-processor
D̂ satisfying the requirements of Claim 3.5.2.1 to make the ultimate deferring hard
classifier. This method is shown in Figure 3·6.
This framework allows for enormous flexibility in the choice of both P̂∗ and D̂,
even when considering just two groups g1 and g2. In Figure 3·10, we illustrate the
first step of the framework on a COMPAS dataset using min{P̂g1 , P̂g2} as P̂∗, where
g1 is African-Americans and g2 is Caucasians. In Figures 3·8 and 3·9 in Section 3.6,
we also use P̂g1 and P̂g2 as P̂∗.
One can design P̂∗ to achieve additional goals. For example, the choice P̂∗ =
min{P̂g1 , P̂g2} results in equal deferral rate across each group (equal to the total
variation distance between the two initial conditional APs). The framework can
be further expanded by combining deferrals with other methods for manipulating
conditional APs, including the mass-averaging discussed in Section 3.3.5. A better
understanding of these techniques is left for future work.
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Figure 3·6: Choosing deferrals cleverly allows transforming one AP into another
(conditional) AP. In this example, the solid orange line is the original AP P̂g =
Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s]. By deferring at the rates indicated by the shaded region, the resulting
conditional AP P̂ ′g = Pr[Ŝ(Xg) = s | Ŝ(Xg) 6= ⊥] is represented by the dark blue
line. The area of the shaded region is ∆.
3.6 Experiments on COMPAS data
We test our methodology on the Broward County data made publicly available by
ProPublica [11]. This data set contains the recidivism risk decile scores given by
the COMPAS tool, 2-year recidivism outcomes, and a number of demographic and
crime-related variables on individuals who were scored in 2013 and 2014. We restrict
our attention to the subset of defendants whose race is recorded as African-American
or Caucasian. These will form the two groups with respect to which we wish to
examine different fairness criteria. After applying the same data pre-processing and
filtering as reported in the ProPublica analysis, we are left with a data set on n =
5278 individuals, of whom 3175 are African-American and 2103 are Caucasian.
It has been shown that the COMPAS scoring mechanism is an approximately
calibrated soft classifier with 10 possible outcomes [81, 124]. We note here that the
distribution of the COMPAS scores differs significantly across the two groups. In
particular, the scores for Caucasians are more evenly distributed as opposed to the





deferrals will be with this method.
3.7 Models of deferring
Whether or not a classifier is thought of as promoting fairness depends on the con-
text; this is true for both deferring and non-deferring classifiers. In addition to the
myriad considerations present for non-deferring classifiers, deferring classifiers and
downstream decision makers introduce some additional axes for consideration.
Cost to the individual. Even though it is not intended to be a final decision, a
deferral may impose burdensome costs to an individual being classified. It may mean
that a defendant remains in jail while additional hearings are scheduled, that invasive
and expensive medical tests are ordered, or that continued investigation engenders
social stigma. These costs may not be borne equally by all individuals, and may
depend on their group membership, their true type, or other factors. For example, a
delay in granting a loan to an applicant may overly burden poorer applicants, even
those very likely to repay.
Clear-cut answer. Some classification tasks have relatively clear-cut answers. Im-
age classification (e.g. for content moderation) often has a relatively simple “true”
answer as to whether the image contains a certain object or not. The more “factual”
the question, the more clear-cut the answer (e.g. “does this image contain nudity”
has a clearer-cut answer than “is this image offensive.” However, even the murkiest
image classification task is still more clear-cut than a prediction question. Recidivism
prediction tools tend to identify a group of people where a certain percentage go on
to recidivate later. This is no longer a matter of interpretation, it is now a matter of
prediction. Even though a calibrated tool will likely return accurate percentages over
a period of time, it is difficult to attribute that score to every person that has it, and
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furthermore if the circumstances change, the prediction is no longer valid.
Cost to the decider. Allowing deferrals might make the decision process more
cost-effective: Given that in most cases making a determination is cheap, one may
now invest more in the deferred cases. For instance, a team of trained moderators
might be hired to manually review content on which an automated content filter
defers, or an expensive investigation might be required to adjudicate insurance claims
that are not cut-and-dry.
Accuracy of downstream decision. One reason to defer is to introduce a delay
that will allow for a more accurate decision. Thus the usefulness of allowing a classifier
to defer depends on the accuracy of the downstream decision maker. Additional
medical tests might allow for highly accurate diagnoses. But a judge deciding bail
will be prone to a variety of errors and biases.
“Fairness” of downstream decision (and of composed classifier). Similar
to the above, the fairness of the downstream decision maker (however one wants to
interpret that) will impact our interpretation of the deferring classifier. Here one
should take into account also the “procedural” aspect of the two-step evaluation;
here it is important that the downstream classifier will be deemed as “more fair” and
“more knowledgeable” than the first stage. Exploring fairness criteria for systems
of deferring classifiers and downstream decision-makers, e.g. as done in [57] did for
non-deferring classifiers, is an interesting direction for future work.
Scale and scope of classification algorithm. Is the same algorithm being used
across many different locales (e.g. image classification by large social media compa-
nies)? Or are many different algorithms being used for small settings (e.g. judges
will judge differently from each other)?
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Frequency of decisions. In many settings, the deferring classifier is a fast, auto-
mated test (e.g., automated risk assessment) while the downstream decision maker
is a slow, manual process (e.g., parole board). However, we anticipate situations in
which there may be repeated deferring classifiers chained together which comprise
the complete decision making pipeline. For example, a doctor might have a sequence
of diagnostic tests at her disposal as needed, or a bank might allow many rounds of
appeal for loan applications, but with lengthy delays. Some applications might even
permit hundreds or thousands of near-continuous deferring classifiers. As an example,
consider a live video streaming platform that passively monitors streams for inappro-
priate content in real time. The automated passive monitor might decide the content
is inappropriate, and shut it down; appropriate, and continue passive monitoring; or
suspicious (by deferring), and begin active monitoring by devoting more computing
resources or bringing in a human moderator.
3.7.1 Technical implications of deferral model
The contextual considerations discussed above directly impact the appropriate ap-
plication of a deferring classifier and its goals. An obvious goal is to minimize the
overall rate of deferrals while maintaining the best possible FPR, FNR, PPV, and
NPV for the classifier conditioned on not deferring, and without considering the dis-
tribution of deferrals. However, one might desire very different properties from the
distribution of deferrals in different contexts. The deferrals may be distributed differ-
ently among individuals with different true type, group membership, or soft classifier
scores, while the burden imposed by deferrals and errors may differ greatly between
different populations.
In a medical diagnosis scenario, a false negative (i.e., failing to diagnose a disease)
may have serious consequences, and deferring to run additional non-invasive and
inexpensive additional tests may be generally acceptable. On the other hand, an
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insurance provider may prefer to minimize expensive investigations by paying out
more false claims.
The context may also affect the way one defines the deferral analogues of FPR and
FNR. While calibration, PPV, and NPV apply directly to deferring classifiers, it is
not clear how best to generalize the definitions of error rates. For example, consider
false positive rate: by Definition 3.2.3.1, the false positive rate of a non-deferring hard
classifier Ŷ for a group g is FPRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0].
The approach we take in Section 3.5 is to condition on not deferring (Defini-
tion 3.5.0.1). A deferring classifier Ŷ that output 1 on half of true negative instances
(within a g) would have conditional false positive rate as low as 0.5 (if it never output
⊥ on true negatives) or as high as 1 (if it never output 0 on true negatives). The
conditional false positive rate is agnostic towards the downstream decision maker. It
codifies no value judgements as to whether a deferral is desirable or undesirable as an
individual nor whether deferrals ultimately result in accurate or inaccurate decisions.
(This is itself a value judgement.)
A second approach is to leave the original definition unchanged. The same defer-
ring hard classifier as above would have unconditional false positive rate 0.5. This
would be true regardless of whether Ŷ output 0 or ⊥ on the other half of true negative
instances. We call this the unconditional false positive rate. The unconditional false
positive rate effectively categorizes deferrals as correct outputs. This may be appro-
priate if the downstream decision maker has very high accuracy. If, for example, a
doctor orders an additional, more accurate diagnostic test in response to a deferral,
the unconditional false positive rate might be appropriate.
Finally, a third approach is to base our measure of inaccuracy on true negatives
instead of false positives, a reverse of the above.
Just as in the case of non-deferring classifiers, the relationships among these con-
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trasting group statistics, their meaningfulness in different settings, and their applica-





This section is based on joint work with Yaron Gvili and Mayank Varia [157], and
with Yaron Gvili, Julie Ha, Mayank Varia, Ziling Yang, and Xinyuan Zhang [155].
4.1 Introduction
As we described in §1.2.3, the work in this chapter is not inherently interdisciplinary,
instead it focuses on improvements to the proof size of two zero-knowledge arguments
of knowledge. We provided several uses of zero-knowledge proofs in both the legal
setting and a more typical setting in §1.2.3 which described how the improvement
of these protocols is a meaningful step forward in scenarios where these proofs are
used. We will first describe the myriad of uses zero-knowledge proofs have found
in both legal settings and more traditional cryptography settings, then we briefly
summarize the main methods for creating zero knowledge proofs and their tradeoffs,
and then finally we describe our two specific zero-knowledge proof improvements for
the remainder of the chapter.
Uses of zero-knowledge proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs have transformed from a theoretical idea to a highly practical,
widely-used cryptographic primitive. Today they find uses in delegated computa-
tion [17, 73, 82], verifiable computation on secret data [94, 121, 243], digital signature
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schemes [28, 188], identification schemes [67], malicious-secure multi-party compu-
tation protocols [22, 38, 142, 190, 213], anonymous credentials and proofs of iden-
tity [27, 68, 116], digital watermarking [2, 3, 97], voting [151, 236], and a wide vari-
ety of roles in distributed computation blockchain, and anonymous cryptocurrency
applications [33, 34, 225,244,321].
Beyond these typical use cases, they have also found more specialized roles in
various legal areas, which we proceed to describe in this section.
Glaser et al. [141] propose a zero-knowledge proof for nuclear armament verifi-
cation. Under some nuclear arms-control agreements, international inspectors must
inspect individual nuclear warheads to verify that they are of the type claimed, i.e.
they contain specific quantities of various materials. However, states generally do not
want to reveal detailed classified information about the warheads themselves to the
inspectors. Glaser et al. propose a zero-knowledge proof for verifying the substances
in a warhead, taking advantage of the fact that two warheads containing the same
contents would result in similar “radiographs”: patterns of neutron transmission and
emission counts when irradiated with high-energy neutrons (aside from statistical
noise), whereas changing the contents of the warhead would yield a different “finger-
print.” Rather than revealing the fingerprint itself, inspectors would use a device to
measure the noisy “difference” between the expected and actual radiographs. If the
warheads are of the type they say they are, then the inspector will see random noise
(and learn nothing about the highly classified radiograph of the warhead itself). How-
ever, if the warhead actually contains different material than is claimed, the inspector
will see a large value: the difference between the expected and actual radiographs.
This will inform them that the materials in the warhead are different than its owner
claimed. This example demonstrates the potential for use of zero-knowledge proofs
even in highly sensitive and political situations.
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Fisch et al. [122] provided a zero-knowledge protocol for proving non-matches of
DNA with crime scene evidence while keeping the genome itself private, and one for
proving a parent-child relationship in DNA. Their methods address the privacy of not
only the abstract DNA-comparison process itself, but also the physical preparation
of samples.
A number of works propose zero-knowledge proof-based methods for cryptograph-
ically enforcing rules governing data surveillance or warrants [126, 147, 204]. This
number grows further if you liberally consider “zero-knowledge” to include multi-
party computation, private information retrieval, or private set intersection-based
approaches [186, 265]. The goal of these methods is to verify cryptographically that
policies are actually being followed, since the normal transparency that would allow
easy auditability is not present in these classified or otherwise secret contexts.
A whole host of functionalities have been proposed to be performed as “smart
contracts” [277], contracts that consist of a block of code that executes when various
conditions are met, typically enabled by a blockchain of some kind (see [227] for
a general overview, and see [16] for Bitcoin-specific smart contracts). Most smart
contracts make significant use of zero-knowledge proofs; a typical contract would be
for Alice to transfer some funds to Bob if and only if Bob proves (in zero knowledge)
that he has fulfilled the terms of the contract.
Bamberger et al.’s work on “verification dilemmas” [19] is an interdisciplinary work
that describes four particular areas of law in which zero-knowledge proofs would be
particularly helpful. The first is identity verification, where zero-knowledge proofs
would provide an appealing alternative to high amounts of aggregated data about in-
dividuals being used as a surrogate attempt at verification. “Anonymous credentials”
are a classic zero-knowledge use case [67], for instance proving your age, address,
citizenship, or other properties, all without disclosing your identity. However, as a
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practical matter, the key management and other infrastructure that would be re-
quired to enable this sort of interaction is unlikely to garner the political support
needed for its adoption in America anytime soon. The one exception is in finance,
where e- and cryptocurrency have warmed people to the idea of proving that one
has the funds to execute a transaction without revealing any other information. The
second verification dilemma involves the buying and selling of information, avoiding
Arrow’s fundamental paradox that in order to sell information to a potential buyer,
a seller must first describe that information, but doing so gives up the information
and nothing remains to sell (modulo external legal protection of the information, e.g.
intellectual property law). As the authors note, much information of this style is “not
easily digitized,” however there are good opportunities here for multiple companies
to determine what portion of their user base overlaps, prove the efficacy of a propri-
etary machine learning algorithm or a training dataset, or show that an algorithm is
“novel” by showing that it is different from other algorithms. Their third category is
cryptographic verification of government oversight, similar to the examples described
earlier but focusing more on tax auditing by the IRS. Last, since in order to accuse
an organization of trade secret violation, the plaintiff would have to reveal some in-
formation about their secret information to the courts or the other company (which
is required so as to allow the defendants to adequately defend themselves), many
potential plaintiffs choose not to sue at all, since revealing the information may be
more costly than whatever they would recover from the defendant. Zero knowledge
proofs might be used to demonstrate some property of the information without being
forced to disclose the information itself, potentially avoiding needing to reveal the
trade secret to the court in order to prosecute.
We hope these examples demonstrate that there is a good deal of interest in
improving zero-knowledge proofs for use in the legal setting. We next proceed to
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provide an introduction to zero-knowledge proofs in general, and then describe the
two specific proof improvements we created as part of this work.
The landscape of zero-knowledge proofs and arguments
As described in the last section, zero-knowledge proofs are a useful cryptographic
primitive for verifiable yet confidential computing. Both the interactive [144, 146]
and non-interactive [52, 105] variants of zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs (respectively,
arguments) allow an unbounded (resp., polynomially-bounded) prover P to convince
a verifier V that a relation C is satisfiable while hiding the witness to this fact. Our
work in §4 focuses on ZK arguments.
There have been substantial advances over the past decade to improve the effi-
ciency of ZK arguments along several metrics. We categorize these advances into
three groups based on their tradeoffs between proof size (or total communication for
interactive protocols), RAM requirements, and whether the proofs are verifiable to
the general public or a single designated verifier.
First, ZK-SNARKs and ZK-STARKs offer sublinear proof size and verification
time (between logarithmic and square root of the circuit size |C|) but require the
prover to use enormous amounts of memory. There is a long line of research into ZK
succinct interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs), building upon the work of
Killian [197]. Initial constructions required superlinear prover time and per-circuit
structured setup [34, 37, 44, 55, 94, 101, 136, 152, 153, 214, 243], and subsequent work
achieved linear prover time and permitted universal structured setup [56,80,130,131,
154, 218, 324]. The newest ZK-SNARKs and ZK scalable transparent arguments of
knowledge (STARKs) leverage ideas from interactive oracle proofs [36, 252] or the
sumcheck protocol [79, 215] to remove structured setup altogether but have slightly
higher proof size [10, 35, 42,64,65,267,268,312,328].
Second, there exist ZK arguments that scale to large statements due to their
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moderate RAM requirements (approximately security parameter × circuit size) and
linear prover and verifier runtime, but that sacrifice public verification because they
need a designated verifier to maintain secret randomness. ZK proofs based on privacy-
free garbled circuits [127,133,163,182,326] require a designated verifier to garble the
circuit and keep the wire labels hidden until the end of the protocol. A separate line of
research [24,316] uses vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE) [60,61,232] to build
proofs with a highly efficient (and optionally non-interactive) online phase, after a
one-time interactive preprocessing phase is used to establish correlated randomness
between the prover P and verifier V .
Organization of this chapter
In §4.2-§4.6, we provide a concrete proof size improvement in the MPC-in-the-head
paradigm of Ishai et al. [177]. In §4.7-§4.11, we describe a concrete proof size im-
provement based on Ligero [10].
4.2 Introduction to TurboIKOS
We begin with our improvement in the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. Our construc-
tion TurboIKOS, like most MPC-in-the-head proofs, has low RAM requirements, is
publicly verifiable, has transparent setup, has linear prover and verifier runtime in
the circuit size |C|, and can be made non-interactive in the Random Oracle Model
via the Fiat-Shamir transform [120].
We present two variants of TurboIKOS. The first variant (§4.4.3), for large fields,
improves Baum and Nof’s [25] protocol based on sacrificing Beaver triples, and reduces
the number of field elements sent per multiplication gate from 4 to 3. The second
version (§4.4.4) reduces the number of field elements per multiplication gate further,
from 3 to 2, and may be used in smaller fields.
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4.2.1 The MPC-in-the-head paradigm
MPC-in-the-head is a method to construct a zero knowledge proof from a secure
multiparty computation (MPC) protocol. Given an NP relation encoded as a circuit
C, the prover P runs all parties in a secure computation of C beginning with a sharing
of the witness, and the verifier V challenges P to open some of the views. Zero
knowledge follows from the privacy of the MPC protocol, and soundness is achieved
because a malicious P must have created inconsistent views and V finds them with
noticeable probability. The seminal work of Ishai et al. [177] demonstrated that this
transformation works for any MPC protocol. Subsequently, a line of works designed
specific protocols with increasingly better proof size: ZKBoo [138], ZKB++ [76], Katz
et al. [188], and Baum-Nof [25].
Table 4.1 shows proof sizes for MPC-in-the-head constructions in which the prover
P runs R iterations of an MPC protocol, each of which involves N parties securely
evaluating a circuit C with I input wires, O output wires, and M multiplication
gates. When using an ordinary MPC protocol like SPDZ [100], a multiplication gate
requires all parties to broadcast one message that is stored in the resulting proof,
yielding in a proof size of Ω(MNR). To do better, MPC-in-the-head constructions
make optimizations that are not acceptable for “normal” MPC protocols: they design
circuit decompositions that look like MPC party views, yet can only be computed
when a single entity P knows the inputs of all MPC parties. In circuit decompositions,
the emulated MPC parties don’t communicate to compute the views, but rather only
to check their consistency.
We briefly survey the main ideas in each construction and the impact they have
on the proof size per multiplication gate, which tends to be the largest contributor
to the proof size.
• ZKBoo [138] and ZKB++ [76] are based on the N = 3 party replicated secret
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Protocol Proof size Soundness error
IKOS+SPDZ [100,178] R · (6MN + (I +O)N) (1/N)R
ZKBoo [138] R · (2M + 2I + 2O) (2/3)R
ZKB++ [76] R · (M + I) (2/3)R
Katz et al. [188] R · (2M + I + logN + logR(P )) max0≤i≤R
(P−R+iP−R )
( PP−R)N i
Baum-Nof [25] R · (4M + I + logN) (1/N)R
ΠTurboIKOS (this work) R · (3M + I + logN) (1/N)R
Π̃TurboIKOS (this work) R · (2M + I + logN +NU) See Theorem 4.5.0.3
Table 4.1: Proof size (in # of field elements) and soundness error (for large fields)
for several MPC-in-the-head protocols. Some lower-order terms are omitted for
legibility. N is the number of parties, M is the circuit size (number of multiplication
gates), I and O are the number of input and output wires for the circuit, respectively,
and R is the number of times the protocol is repeated. Note that ZKBoo and ZKB++
are only constructed for N = 3. P is a parameter specific to [188] indicating how
many Beaver triples are committed to in advance. U is a new parameter introduced
in §4.4 of this work.
sharing MPC protocol of Araki et al. [13]; they do not generalize to arbitrary
choices of N . All data is secret shared using 3-out-of-3 additive sharing, and
addition can be done locally. Multiplication requires sending 3 messages, each
of which is a function of a different subset of 2 of the 3 shares of the input wires.
The verifier V receives two shares, and therefore can verify 1 of the 3 messages
sent during each multiplication.
• ZKB++ and all subsequent works sample shares pseudorandomly. Given a
seed σp for each party p, to share a value vw on wire w, only the offset ew =
vw+
∑
p PRF(σp, w) is recorded in the proof, reducing the cost per multiplication
gate but requiring a (cheap) initial setup to distribute seeds.
• Katz et al. [188] extends MPC-in-the-head to accommodate MPC protocols
with preprocessing. They build Beaver triples using a cut-and-choose approach,
where some triples are opened and checked during preprocessing. The proof size
(R logR(P )) required to assist V in the preprocessing step is independent of the
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circuit size. The remaining Beaver triples are assumed to be valid and used to
verify the real execution.
• Baum-Nof [25] also uses pseudorandom shares and Beaver triples in a variant
of the SPDZ MPC protocol, but avoids cut-and-choose in favor of sacrificing
one Beaver triple to check the validity of each multiplication gate.
For each multiplication gate: ZKB++ requires 1 field element to represent the offset
ew for the output value (but requires more repetitions than the rest), Katz et al. re-
quires 1 more field element to represent the offset for the Beaver triple value, and
Baum-Nof requires 2 more field elements to test whether the sacrificed Beaver triple
and the circuit values are consistent. In this work, we introduce two new sacrificing-
based MPC-in-the-head constructions that require 1 and then 0 field elements to
perform this consistency test; the latter introduces an additive overhead that can be
smaller than that of Katz et al. for some parameter settings. See Table 4.1 for more
details about the proof size for each protocol.
4.2.2 Overview of our construction
The simplest way to describe our first protocol variant is that we combine the tech-
niques used in the Baum-Nof ZK proof with the Turbospeedz MPC protocol [31] so
that sacrificing a Beaver triple costs only one field element instead of two, while pre-
serving the soundness error. Our second variant replaces the remaining field element
per multiplication gate with some prover advice about the overall circuit, reducing
the proof size so that it is competitive with Katz et al. [188] but with a different set of
parameter tradeoffs. In this section, we briefly describe the Turbospeedz construction
and explain the challenge when integrating it into MPC-in-the-head.
SPDZ and Turbospeedz. The SPDZ line of works [38, 100, 237] is a popular
family of MPC protocols that offloads the (expensive) generation of Beaver triples
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into a preprocessing phase so that the online phase has free additions and only requires
broadcasting 2 elements per multiplication gate (1 per input wire). Turbospeedz [31]
saves 1 element per multiplication gate by exploiting a redundancy: when generating
shares of an input wire w pseudorandomly such that the shares of the value are
[vw] = ew+[λw], the public offsets ew can also serve “for free” as the broadcast values
for the input wires, and the only effort required is to create the new offset for the 1
output wire.
The challenge of TurboIKOS. When SPDZ is used in MPC-in-the-head to check
a multiplication gate whose input and output wires are claimed to be a Beaver triple
〈vx, vy, vz〉, it suffices to use the semi-honest protocol without MAC checks, and for
the prover P to cheaply generate an independent Beaver triple 〈λ̂x, λ̂y, v̂z〉. However,
with Turbospeedz there is a problem: the protocol transmits 2 field elements in the
preprocessing stage, in addition to the 1 field element in the online stage. This is fine
from an MPC perspective where preprocessing work might be viewed as “free,” but is
unacceptable for MPC-in-the-head where all elements add equally to the proof size.
To overcome this issue, we turn to another member of the SPDZ family: Overdrive
[190]. The Overdrive protocol includes a clever method for generating a partially-
correlated Beaver triple 〈λx, λ̂y, v̂z〉 where the shares [λx] for the first element of the
Beaver triple are the same as the shares for the true value vx. With a common element
between the two Beaver triples, all of the setup calculations become linear steps
that can be computed locally by the parties. Integrating Turbospeedz’s function-
dependent preprocessing with Overdrive’s Beaver triple generation mechanism is one
of the accomplishments of our TurboIKOS protocol.
Implementing Picnic digital signatures. We provide an open source implemen-
tation of our protocol [156] and evaluate our proof size when using a variant of the
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Picnic post-quantum digital signature scheme [224] that uses AES as its block cipher,
following the techniques introduced by BBQ [104]. Picnic signatures are based on an
MPC-in-the-head proof of knowledge of a secret key k such that AESk(x) = y, where
the corresponding public key is (x, y). As we show in §4.6.1, our protocol returns the
smallest proof size among streaming- and memory-friendly systems using less than 32
emulated MPC parties. Our signature sizes are also competitive with those of Ban-
quet [23], an independent recent work that involves a memory-intensive polynomial
interpolation over the entire circuit.
4.3 Preliminaries
4.3.1 Notation
Throughout this work, P denotes the prover and V denotes the verifier. We let C
denote an arithmetic circuit corresponding to an NP relation with a canonical output
message corresponding to logical true (i.e., the witness satisfies the relation). We use
ADD, MUL to denote addition and multiplication gates, respectively.
The circuit has a set of gates G of which a subset M are MUL gates, as well as a set
W of wires, of which there are subsets I of inputs to the circuit and outputs of MUL
gates. O ⊆ W denotes the output wires for the circuit. By abuse of notation, we use
the same variables to denote the size of each set; for instance, we let M denote the
number of multiplication gates when it is clear from context that we are describing
an integer rather than a set.
We consider an MPC-in-the-head protocol execution with N parties that is re-
peated R times. If a single iteration of a protocol has soundness error δ, then we can
run R = ⌈ κ
log(1/δ)
⌉ independent iterations to reduce the soundness error to 2−κ (where
all logarithms are taken base-2 in this work).
For computation and equations, we use F to refer to a finite field and F∗ to refer
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to the units of that field. We generally use κ as our security parameter and [v] to
refer to an additive secret sharing of a value v among the N parties.
We say a party is p.p.t. to denote that it is probabilistic polynomial time.
4.3.2 Definitions
Pseudorandom Functions and Commitments. We require the existence of a
pseudorandom function PRF and a computationally hiding commitment scheme Com
in our security analysis in §4.5. Our implementation uses hash-based commitments
that model the hash function as a random oracle and assume that AES acts as a
PRF. Below we give the formal definitions for PRF and Com:
Definition 4.3.2.1 (Pseudorandom Function). Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗
be an efficient, length-preserving, and keyed function. F is a pseudorandom function
with soundness κ if for all adversaries A that run in at most q time steps, A’s advantage
AdvPRF(A) = |Prk[AF(k,−) = 1] − PrH [AH = 1]| at distinguishing the pseudorandom
function from a random oracle H is at most q/2κ.
Definition 4.3.2.2 (Commitment). A commitment scheme is a protocol between
two parties S and R with the following algorithms:
• Com(m; r): The sender S has an input message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and security param-
eter 1n. The algorithm Commit outputs a public commitment c to the receiver
R and stores the private randomness r.
• Decom(c,m, r): the sender S sends (c,m, r) to the receiver R, who then either
accepts and outputs m or rejects.
A computationally secure commitment scheme satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: If (c, r) = Com(m; r), then in Decom(c,m, r) the receiver R
accepts and outputs m.
• (Computational) Hiding: For any two message pairs m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, any
receiver R∗ running in q time cannot distinguish their respective commitments
AdvCom(R∗) = |Pr[R∗(Com(m; r)) = 1]−Pr[R∗(Com(m′; r′)) = 1]| except with
probability at most q/2κ.
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• (Computational) Binding: No adversarial sender S∗ running in at most q time
has more than probability q/2κ of outputting c,m,m′, r, r′ such that m 6= m′,
and Decom(c,m, r) and Decom(c,m′, r′) both accept.
While our main construction can support arbitrary commitment schemes, in this
work we focus on the hash-based commitment scheme in the random oracle model, in
which Com(m; r) = H(m, r) feeds the input message and randomness into the random
oracle and Decom(c,m, r) = (m, r) provides the preimage to the hash. The binding
of this scheme follows from a birthday bound analysis: if a random oracle has 2κ
bit output length and an adversary makes at most q queries to this oracle, then the
probability that the adversary finds a collision in the oracle is at most q2/22κ, and a
collision is necessary to break the binding property of the commitment scheme. The
hiding property can be proved similarly.
There are a few optimizations that prior works have used here to save space. First,
when committing to a list of messages 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mℓ〉, the sender can provide a
succinct commitmentH(Com(m1, r1), . . . ,Com(mℓ, rℓ)) to the entire list, again thanks
to collision resistance. Second, if m is already known to the receiver, then it suffices
to send only r during decommitment. Third and most ambitiously, because we will
only commit to strings that already have min-entropy κ, when generating a signature
scheme we can go further and remove the randomness r from the Com and Decom
algorithms to create a deterministic scheme in which decommitments are free when
m is already known to the receiver. This strategy breaks the hiding property of the
commitment and thus the zero knowledge property of the schemes we will construct,
but it will suffice for our signature construction; we refer readers to Katz et al. [188,
§3.1] for details.
Honest Verifier Zero-knowledge Argument of Knowledge. Next, we formally
define the notion of ZK arguments over an NP-relationR(x, w) as a two-party protocol
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involving two p.p.t. algorithms, a prover P and a verifier V . Both parties have the
same NP statement x, and only the prover receives its corresponding witness w. The
parties interact to determine whether R(x, w) = 1 without revealing the witness. We
restrict our attention to the honest verifier setting in which V never deviates from the
protocol.
Definition 4.3.2.3. The protocol (P , V) is an honest verifier ZK argument for the
relation R(x, w) if it satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: If P and V are honest and R(x, w) = 1, V always accepts.
• Soundness: For any malicious and computationally bounded prover P∗, there
is a negligible function negl(·) such that a statement x is not in the language
(i.e., R(x, w) = 0 for all w), then V rejects on x with probability ≥ 1−negl(|x|)
when interacting with P∗.
• Honest verifier computational zero knowledge: Let V iewV(x,w) be a ran-
dom variable describing the distribution of messages received by V(x) from
P(x, w). Then, there exists a p.p.t. simulator Sim such that for all x in the
language, the distributions of Sim(x) and ViewV(x,w) are computationally indis-
tinguishable.
In this work, we will construct a ZK argument of knowledge, which provides a
stronger knowledge soundness guarantee that if a bounded-time malicious prover P∗
can make the verifier accept a statement x with non-negligible probability, then there
exists an extractor EP
∗
(x) that can output a witness w such that the relation holds
R(x, w) = 1.
Additionally, we restrict our attention to honest verifier ZK in this work because
our protocol TurboIKOS is also public coin and constant round, so it can be trans-
formed into a non-interactive argument using the Fiat-Shamir transform.
Secure Multi Party Computation (MPC). An MPC protocol allows N players
to jointly compute a function of their respective inputs while maintaining the privacy
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of their individual inputs and the correctness of the output. In addition, the protocol
should prevent an adversary who may corrupt a subset of players, from learning
additional information or harming the protocol execution. A party’s view in MPC
contains that party’s input, randomness, and any messages received by that party.
For use in MPC-in-the-head, secure computation protocols must satisfy t-privacy,
meaning that the view of any subset t < N of the parties can be simulated (see [177]
for a formal definition).
4.4 Construction
In this section we describe the two versions of our protocol. ΠTurboIKOS has size
roughly 3M and is described in Figures 4·1 and 4·2. Π̃TurboIKOS has size roughly 2M
and is described in Figures 4·1 and 4·4. We start by describing the Baum-Nof [25]
SPDZ-like protocol and the Turbospeedz MPC protocol [31]. Then, we show how to
incorporate Turbospeedz into the MPC-in-the-head paradigm to reduce the amount
of communication per MUL gate, creating protocol ΠTurboIKOS. Last, we show how
the prover can provide a different commitment to some of the proof components,
removing another element per MUL gate and yielding protocol Π̃TurboIKOS.
4.4.1 Starting point: SPDZ and Baum-Nof
We use the MPC-in-the-head paradigm introduced by Ishai et al. [177] combined with
a semi-honest version of the (N − 1)-private SPDZ MPC protocol [100] as a starting
point for our zero-knowledge proof using MPC-in-the-head protocol. In IKOS, a
prover simulates an MPC protocol for all parties and commits to a view for each
party containing the party’s randomness, input, and messages received. To save proof
space, an additional “broadcast channel” is committed to for messages that are sent
to all parties, rather than writing the same value in all party views. Then the verifier
chooses a subset of the parties and challenges the prover to open the committed views
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of these parties. The verifier then confirms that the views of the opened parties are
consistent, that is, the message party i sent to party j is the same in views of both
those parties. For N -party MPC protocols that only send broadcast messages and do
not contain any private messages between parties, the verifier opening T parties will
have a T
N
chance of catching a prover who cheats by creating inconsistent views: the
“receiving” half of the message is always revealed in the broadcast channel, and these
are checked for consistency with the revealed parties’ “sent” messages. By repeating
this process R times with fresh randomness, the verifier can shrink the probability of
error by a power of R.
We start with the variant of semi-honest SPDZ [100] used by Baum-Nof [25]. Let
N denote the set of parties and M denote the set of multiplication gates in the circuit
C. The parties hold sharings of the inputs [xm] and [ym] for each MUL gate m ∈M ;
since this MPC protocol is being emulated by a prover who knows the value on the
wire, the parties additionally have (and commit to) a sharing of the gate’s output
[zm]. The prover generates a random multiplication triple, 〈am, bm, cm〉, which will
be “sacrificed” to check a multiplication constraint in a MUL gate. The verifier will
send a random challenge εm ← F. Each party does the following:
1. Broadcast [fm] = εm[xm] + [am] and [gm] = [ym] + [bm]
2. Use the recombined f and g to compute
[ζm] = εm[zm]− fmgm + fm[bm] + gm[am]− [cm]. (4.1)
Baum and Nof show that if either 〈am, bm, cm〉 or 〈xm, ym, zm〉 is not a valid multipli-
cation triple, this value ζm will be nonzero with probability at least 1−1/|F| over the
choice of εm. We will prove similar claims for different values, and linear combinations
thereof, in Lemmas 4.4.3.1-4.4.3.2.
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To save proof space, rather than broadcasting the ζm values for each MUL gate
m, an additional challenge variable ε̂m ∈ F is sent by the verifier V and the prover
P responds by sending a linear combination [Z] =∑m∈M ε̂m[ζm] of the secret values
and public coefficients. If the prover is honest then Z = 0. Baum and Nof show
(Proposition 1 of [25]) that Z will be nonzero if at least one MUL gate constraint is
violated with probability at least 1 − 2/|F|. Later in Lemma 4.4.3.2 of this paper
we will improve this bound for a batched set of ζm values to a 1/|F| error using a
very-slightly different batching technique.
If 1/|F| does not yield sufficient soundness error, we can reduce this error by doing
multiple batched checks. To do so, we reveal linear combinations [Z1], . . . , [ZU ], all
over the same [ζm] shares, but using different random ε̂m choices provided by the
verifier. Let U be the number of these checks.
Naively, this protocol broadcasts (2M+U)N elements since each party broadcasts
their f shares and g shares for each multiplication gate, plus [Z1], . . . , [ZU ]. Later in
this work we will show multiple ways to reduce this size with different tradeoffs, by
taking advantage of the fact that V has corrupted N − 1 parties. We emphasize that
all parties’ shares must still be committed to before P knows which party will remain
uncorrupted.
To compress the parties’ views, we can generate the shares of all values pseudo-
randomly, with only one public “offset” value per wire. Then, for each multiplication
gate, the prover only needs to broadcast the offset values for f and g, along with the
offsets of the true output wire z and the Beaver triple product c. Hence, the proof
contains 4 field elements per multiplication gate, as shown in Table 4.1.
4.4.2 Introducing Turbospeedz
Turbospeedz [31] generally shows how to have only one broadcast per multiplication
gate instead of two in normal SPDZ by adding a function-dependent preprocessing
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step where the circuit to be computed is known, but the input to the circuit need not
yet be known. The idea is to add a sharing of a “mask” on each wire, propagated
additively (but not multiplicatively) during preprocessing. Then, the masks of the
input wires can serve as the first two elements of a Beaver triple, which is also gen-
erated during the preprocessing. Let x and y denote the input wire and z denote the
output wire of any gate. Let vx, vy, vz denote the real values on the wires. In the
preprocessing phase, the prover performs the following:
1. For each party, the prover generates random “masking shares” [λw] for each
input wire and the output wire of each MUL, w.
2. The prover homomorphically computes the mask shares for each ADD gate
internal output wire, [λz] = [λx] + [λy].
3. For each wire w, the prover computes external value, ew = λw + vw. In MPC,
these external values are public to all parties. In MPC-in-the-head, P will give
them to V in the clear.
In Turbospeedz, given ex, ey, and a Beaver triple 〈am, bm, cm〉, each party computes
their share of MUL gate m’s output wire by locally computing
[vz] = exey − ey[am]− ex[bm] + [cm]
= (vx + am)(vx + bm)− (vy + bm)[am]− (vy + am)[bm] + [cm]
= [vxvy].
The parties then proceed to compute and open [ez] = [vz] + [λz]. Note that this relies
on the parties already possessing a sharing of a valid Beaver triple 〈am, bm, cm〉 in
advance.
The upshot of this method is that multiplication gates can be computed using
only one opening (ez) instead of two (f and g in the previous section).
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4.4.3 Adapting Turbospeedz into sacrificing-based MPC-in-the-head
Input: The prover P and verifier V receive an input circuit C comprising a set of gates G
of which a subset M are MUL gates, along with a set of wires W with subsets of input and
output wires I and O, respectively. P is the sole recipient of a witness. Both parties also
receive constants R and N (the latter of which we equate with the set {1, . . . , N} by abuse of
notation). The prover P and verifier V run R independent executions of the following protocol
in parallel.
Function-dependent preprocessing: P pseudorandomly derives shares [λw] for each wire
w ∈W and a Beaver triple for each multiplication gate as follows.
1. Generate a random master seed σ∗. Pseudorandomly derive a binary tree with root σ∗
until there are as many leaves as parties. Assign the pth leaf as party key σp.
2. For each input wire w ∈ I and party p ∈ N , pseudorandomly derive share [λw] from key
σp.
3. Go through C layer by layer, starting at the input layer. For every g ∈ G, do the
following on gate Cg with input wires x, y and output wire z.
• If Cg is an ADD gate: assign [λz] := [λx] + [λy].
• If Cg is a MUL gate:
– Derive [λz], [λ̂y,g], and [λ̂z] for every p ∈ N from σp. (Note that y can be an
input to many MUL gates, hence the two indices in [λ̂y,g].)
– Set êz := λx · λ̂y,g + λ̂z, which creates a Beaver triple 〈λx, λ̂y,g, êz − λ̂z〉.
Interactive phase: Once P receives the witness, the parties interact as follows.
1. (P → V) P executes the circuit to determine the value vw of each wire w ∈ W , and
assigns the offset ew := vw + λw for each wire w ∈W . It sends to V:
• Offsets ew for input wires w ∈ I, and offsets ez and êz for the outputs of MUL
gates. (The remaining offsets can then be computed.)
• A commitment to all shares [λw] for all output wires w ∈ O.
• A commitment to the seeds σp for all parties p ∈ N .
2. (V → P) V randomly selects two elements εm, ε̂m ← F for every MUL gate m ∈M .
[There are two ways to complete this protocol, shown in Figures 4·2 and 4·4.]
Figure 4·1: Beginning of an interactive zero knowledge protocol between prover
P and honest verifier V, given a relation represented as an arithmetic circuit with
ADD and MUL gates over a field F. All verifier messages are public coins, so the
protocol can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transform. There are
two different endings to this protocol, given in Figures 4·2 and 4·4.
In this section, we incorporate a modified version of the Turbospeedz method from
Section 4.4.2 into the SPDZ-based MPC-in-the-head framework described above from
Section 4.4.1. For large field sizes, the resulting MPC-in-the-head protocol ΠTurboIKOS
will require only 3 field elements per multiplication, rather than the 4 elements used
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Interactive phase, continued from Fig. 4·1:
3. (P → V) P sends all αm values and commits to P commits to all [αm] and [Z] shares.
These variables are computed as follows.
• For every MUL gate m ∈M , assign [αm] := εm[λy] + ε̂m[λ̂y,m].
• For every party p ∈ N , assign [Z] := ∑m∈M [ζm], which is the sum of all [ζm] :=
εmez − εmexey + ε̂mêz + (εmey − αm)[λx] + εmex[λy]− εm[λz]− ε̂m[λ̂z].
4. (V → P) V randomly selects a set T = N \ {i∗} of N − 1 parties to corrupt.
5. (P → V) P reveals the log(N) seeds from preprocessing step 1 that suffice for V to
recompute σp for all corrupted parties p ∈ T , but not the remaining seed σi∗ .
Verification. V accepts only if all of the following are true:
• The output values (vw for w ∈ O) provided by P correspond to logical true.
• The commitments in rounds 1 and 3 are consistent with the opened keys σp for corrupted
parties, and with the shares of [Z], [αm], and [λw] for output wires for all parties. V
can compute N − 1 shares of these from its seeds, and the remaining shares from the
revealed αm values and the known values for Z and output wires.
Figure 4·2: End of the interactive zero knowledge protocol ΠTurboIKOS between
prover P and honest verifier V, given a relation represented as an arithmetic circuit
with ADD and MUL gates over a field F. See Figure 4·1 for the beginning of this
protocol.
in Baum-Nof [25].
Committing to all wire values. The first step of converting Turbospeedz into
an MPC-in-the-head protocol is to replace the step of opening shares of ez by having
the P simply provide ez in the clear. However, unlike Turbospeedz, we do not wish
to have a costly preprocessing process in which the verifier becomes convinced of the
validity of all Beaver triples in the circuit; instead we wish to use ζm values as in
Eq. 4.1. In order to do this without reusing masks on multiple values, we must make
some subtle changes to the original Turbospeedz protocol.
To save space, most shares held by an emulated party will be pseudorandomly
derived from a party-specific seed. To generate the party-specific seeds themselves,
we follow the same method as Katz et al. [188], namely, to derive the party seeds
pseudorandomly from a master seed via a binary tree with the parties’ seeds at the
leaves. This reduces the cost of sending the seeds from N to logN .
173
P will generate all λw values for all wires in the circuit the same as in original
Turbospeedz, but by generating each party’s share pseudorandomly using the party-
specific seed. We take advantage of the external value e as an offset: the value on
wire w is defined as simply vw = ew − λw. Additionally, for each MUL gate m, the
prover will generate additional pseudorandom shares [λ̂y,m] and [λ̂z]. P computes
êz = λxλ̂y,m + λ̂z, forming a correlated Beaver triple 〈λx, λ̂y,m, êz − λ̂z〉 that will be
sacrificed. The double index on [λ̂y,m] is due to the fact that wire y may be reused in
several different MUL gates m, each of which must define their own Beaver triple for
the prover’s privacy. (For legibility, we sometimes omit this double-subscript when
the gate under consideration is clear from context.)
Creating a test for consistency of all gates. The largest change is in how ζm is
calculated for eachMUL gatem. We begin similarly to the Baum-Nof challenge: V will
send random challenges εm, ε̂m ← F. Our αm values are defined slightly differently,
for a reason we will explain shortly. The prover will send αm = εmλy + ε̂mλ̂y. Then,
the parties compute:
[ζm] = εmez − εmexey + ε̂mêz + (εmey − αm)[λx] + εmex[λy]− εm[λz]− ε̂m[λ̂z]. (4.2)
First, we wish to show that this ζm serves a similar purpose to Baum-Nof’s,
assuming (for the moment) that the prover P honestly computes all αm values from
the parties’ shares. For each MUL gate m ∈M , define:
∆z,m = (ez − λz)− (ex − λx)(ey − λy) and ∆̂z,m = (êz − λ̂z)− λxλ̂y.
Observe that if P is honest, then 〈ex − λx, ey − λy, ez − λz〉 and 〈λx, λ̂y, êz − λ̂z〉 are
both valid Beaver triples and therefore ∆z,m = ∆̂z,m = 0.
Lemma 4.4.3.1. Fix a MUL gate m ∈ M . If εm and ε̂m are chosen uniformly
randomly from F, and if either ∆z,m 6= 0 or ∆̂z,m 6= 0 (or both), then ζm 6= 0 with
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probability at least 1− 1/|F|.
Proof. Observe that
ζm = εmez − εmexey + ε̂mêz + (εmey − αm)λx + εmexλy − εmλz − ε̂mλ̂z
= εmez − εmexey + ε̂m(λxλ̂y + ∆̂z,m) + (εmey − αm)λx + εmexλy − εmλz
= εmez − εmexey + ε̂m∆̂z,m + (εmey − εmλy)λx + εmexλy − εmλz
= εmez − εmλz − εmexey + εmexλy + εmeyλx − εmλyλx + ε̂m∆̂z,m
= εm((ez − λz)− (ex − λx)(ey − λy)) + ε̂m∆̂z,m
= εm∆z,m + ε̂m∆̂z,m.
Now, consider the probability that ζm = 0 over the uniform choice of εm and ε̂m
from F. The only way for this to occur is if εm∆z,m = −ε̂m∆̂z,m. If ∆z,m = 0, this
happens if and only if ε̂m = 0, which occurs with probability 1/|F|. If ∆z,m 6= 0, then
for any choice of ε̂m there exists a single option for εm = −ε̂m∆̂z,m∆−1z,m that makes
ζm = 0, so again we arrive at a probability of 1/|F|. These two cases are mutually
exclusive, which yields the desired bound.
Similar to Baum-Nof, we check the consistency of all these values with one ran-
dom linear combination Z to test the values in Eq. (4.2) for all multiplication gates at
once. However, because we defined ζm to already include two different random coeffi-
cients on the different ∆ values, these coefficients already suffice to serve as challenge
coefficients for this linear combination. As we show in Lemma 4.4.3.2, the upshot is




Lemma 4.4.3.2. If εm and ε̂m are chosen uniformly randomly from F for all multi-
plication gates in the circuit, and if there exists at least one MUL gate m̄ ∈ M such
that ∆z,m 6= 0 or ∆̂z,m 6= 0, then Z 6= 0 with probability at least 1− 1/|F|.
Proof. Consider Z =
∑
m∈M ζm = (εm̄∆z,m̄ + ε̂m̄∆̂z,m̄) + Z
′, where Z ′ is the sum of
all other terms in the formula and m̄ ∈ M is the gate where the sum is guaranteed
to be nonzero; without loss of generality, suppose that ∆z,m̄ 6= 0. Then, Z = 0 if and
only if εm̄ = ∆
−1
z,m̄ · (−Z ′ − ε̂m̄∆̂z,m̄), which occurs with probability 1/|F|.
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Completing the consistency test. Rounds 3-5 of the protocol provide a method
for the verifier to check whether Z = 0, up to 1/N soundness error. We will describe
two ways to perform this task: a base protocol ΠTurboIKOS described in this section
(shown also in Figure 4·2) and an improved protocol Π̃TurboIKOS in Section 4.4.4. Both
techniques involve providing some ‘advice’ in the form of the non-privacy-sensitive
αm value for each MUL gate that assists the verifier in its computation of Z.
In round 3 of the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS in this section, the prover provides
for each MUL gate m ∈ M . Importantly, the prover also commits to all shares
[αm] = εm[λy] + ε̂m[λ̂y], and analogously for all [Z] shares. There are three claims
that the verifier must check:
• The committed [αm] and [Z] are consistent with the parties’ individual views,
at least for the N − 1 emulated parties that the verifier can open.
• The committed [αm] shares in round 3 collectively sum to the provided αm
value. That is, the prover provided the public αm ‘advice’ value correctly.
• Assuming the advice is correct, then the [Z] shares committed in round 3 sum
to Z = 0. That is, the prover passes the test posed in Lemma 4.4.3.2.
After the prover reveals seeds for N−1 parties in round 5, the verifier can check these
claims as follows. First, V can compute the remaining party’s [αm] by subtracting
the known shares from the public αm value, and then check whether these shares
together constitute a valid opening of the commitment in round 3. This checks (most
of) the first two claims simultaneously. The final claim is verified similarly; the key
observation here is that if the prover is honest, then the value Z = 0 is publicly known.
So, the V computes N − 1 shares of Z, calculates what the remaining party’s share
must be in order for the overall value Z = 0 as required, and then checks whether
these shares together constitute a valid opening of the commitment.
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Putting it all together. Our protocol ΠTurboIKOS is described in detail in Figures
4·1-4·2. The prover P and verifier V interact in a 5-round protocol, and if all consis-
tency checks pass then the verifier believes that the output wire labels derived from
the circuit evaluation is correct.
Completeness is a straightforward consequence of the fact that the honest prover
computes the desired circuit (many times, in fact). We prove the privacy and knowl-
edge soundness of our ZK argument of knowledge in Section 4.5.
Compared to Baum-Nof [25], we reduce communication per multiplication gate
from 4 to 3 field elements. Concretely, for each multiplication gate, Baum-Nof must
send the f and g values described in §4.4.1. Their protocol must also send a Beaver
triple offset (analogous to êz) as well as the offset for the output wire of the MUL
gate (similar to ez). By using the Turbospeedz approach, we reduce communication
to only 3 field elements: ez, êz, and αm.
Algorithmic optimizations. There are a few optimizations that we can apply to
the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS to save space even further. Some of these optimizations
are deliberately omitted from Figures 4·1 and 4·2 for brevity; they are simple to add,
and they are built into our implementation described in §4.6.
Our first optimization saves on the cost of commitments. Recall that we need to
commit to values in each of the prover steps (rounds 1, 3, and 5), and also that the
entire procedure from Figs. 4·1-4·2 is repeated R times. It suffices to build a single
commitment per round across all repetitions: that is, just 2 commitments in total for
the entire proof.
Second, we described the SPDZ-style MPC protocol by considering pseudorandom
values for each party plus a public offset. Following prior works, we save space by
integrating the offset into a single party’s value (say, party 1). While this party no
longer has pseudorandom value, the upshot is that we only need to reveal the êz
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values within party 1’s view, or in other words we don’t need to reveal these values
for the 1/N fraction of repetitions in which party 1 is the unopened party. (Note that
we still need to publish the ez and αm values on all repetitions because V needs this
information to perform its consistency check.)
Third, if the circuit has a single known value that represents ‘logical true’ (say,
the value 0), then we can save on the cost of opening the output wire shares [λw]
for all parties (i.e., including the unopened party). Instead, we can follow a similar
trick as we described above for [αm] and [Z]. In round 1 of the protocol, the prover
P commits to all output wire mask (λ) shares. Once the verifier V learns the seeds
to reconstruct N − 1 of these shares for itself, it assumes that the output wires
collectively reconstruct to logical true and calculates the remaining share accordingly
as [λ]i∗ = e − vexpected −
∑
i 6=i∗ [λ]i, where vexpected is the expected value on the wire.
Finally, V checks that all shares match P ’s commitment.
4.4.4 Constructing smaller consistency tests
In this section, we describe an improved protocol Π̃TurboIKOS that reduces the cost
per multiplication gate from 3 field elements down to 2. Specifically, we show a new
method to check the consistency of Z in rounds 3-5 without revealing an αm element
for each MUL gate. The motivation for this change is twofold. The first reason is
obvious: reducing the number of field gates required per MUL gate shrinks the proof
size. The second and more subtle reason is to improve the performance of TurboIKOS
on smaller fields, such as the field GF(256) used in AES, without blowing up the size
of the protocol with additional zero-checks.
We will explain this second motivation at a high level here; for more detail see the
soundness analysis (Theorems 4.5.0.2 and 4.5.0.3) in §4.5. A cheating prover must
have a sufficiently low chance of getting a set of coefficients εm, ε̂m where Z = 0 even
though at least one MUL constraint is violated. For small fields, a malicious prover
178
has a decently-high probability of passing a single zero-test Z by pure chance (one in
the size of the field). While one could overcome this issue by increasing the number
of repetitions R, there is an alternative solution: run several Z = 0 tests using fresh
random εm and ε̂m coefficients for each, but the same wire shares λz and offsets ez
and êz. Concretely, we create a new parameter U denoting the number of checks to
run.
This alternative method doesn’t fare well in the original protocol ΠTurboIKOS be-
cause our method requires revealing an αm value per MUL gate for each test, so each
additional Z value used to improve the soundness error would reveal an additional
field element per MUL gate, making the proof size much larger. Thus, our goal in
this section is to show how to consistency-check multiple zero-tests Z1, . . . , ZU with-
out transmitting additional information proportional to the number of MUL gates
beyond the two field elements ez and êz we already transmitted in round 1.
Recall that for a single MUL gate m,
[ζm] = εmez − εmexey + ε̂mêz + εmey[λx]− αm[λx] + εmex[λy]− εm[λz]− ε̂m[λ̂z]
is a sharing of ζm = εm∆z,m + ε̂m∆̂z,m = 0 for an honest prover. Observe that each
party can calculate most of the terms in this sum even without receiving αm. Specif-
ically, for each MUL gate, define φm := ζm + αmλx. Each party has the information
to compute its own share [φm] using information already available: the public εm and
ε̂m values, the known offsets e, and the corrupted shares [λ].
Also, recall from the original protocol that the parties never test each [ζm] directly,
but rather they only test that the sum Z =
∑
m∈M ζm equals zero. We can rewrite
the shares of this test in the following way. (We add a subscript m to the wire values
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The corrupted parties can compute their shares for the left sum. However, the





is problematic because it seems to require each αm to be known in the clear to calculate
the sum. This is where the original protocol ΠTurboIKOS revealed all αm, so that each
party could compute their share of β as
∑
m∈M αm[λm,x].
We proceed to show a different way that the prover can commit to and provide
the shares for [β], which we also describe pictorially in Fig. 4·3. Let [x]i denote the
ith share of x. The crucial observation is that all shares [αm] can be revealed without
a loss in privacy; our only objective here is a performance improvement to avoid











































We will take advantage of the MPC-in-the-head structure of our proof to create a
sharing where each party essentially holds a “column” of these values: that is, party
j’s share of β is
∑N
i=1 βi,j. In a normal MPC protocol, each pair of parties i and j
could collaborate to compute βi,j. In MPC-in-the-head this is mostly unnecessary,
because V has corrupted N − 1 of the parties, it has N − 1 of these [αm]i shares and
therefore can compute βi,j for all corrupted parties i, j ∈ T . It is missing only βi∗,j,
where i∗ is the remaining, uncorrupted party.
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it corrupted and also the commitment hj to the concatenation of the elements in each
column. V does not get the missing share [β]i∗; instead, it is given hi∗, the missing
commitment. Using all these, it can check ĥ to ensure the corrupted party views are
consistent with the commitment to the βi,j.
Interactive phase, continued from Fig. 4·1:
3. (P → V) P commits to all βi,j by sending ĥ and commits to all [Z] shares. These
variables are computed as follows.
• For i ∈ N , for j ∈ N , βi,j =
∑M
m=1[αm]i[λm,x]j .




εmem,z − εmem,xem,y + ε̂mêz +
εmey[λm,x] + εmem,x[λm,y]− εm[λm,z]− ε̂m[λ̂m,z]
)
−∑i∈N βi,j .
4. (V → P) As before, V samples a set T = N \ {i∗} of N − 1 parties to corrupt.
5. (P → V) P opens commitments to V in the following way:
• As before, reveal log(N) seeds from preprocessing step 1 that suffice for V to
recompute σp for all corrupted parties p ∈ T , but not the remaining seed σi∗ .
• Reveal βi∗,j for all j 6= i∗ and reveal hi∗ .
Verification. V accepts only if all of the following are true for all executions:
• The output values (vw for w ∈ O) provided by P correspond to logical true.
• The commitments in rounds 1 and 3 are consistent with the opened keys σp for corrupted
parties, with the βi,j opened, and with the shares of [Z] and [λw] for output wires for all
parties. V computes these using the party seeds, the remaining βi∗,j values it is given,
and the known Z and output values.
Figure 4·4: Ending of the improved zero knowledge protocol Π̃TurboIKOS between
prover P and honest verifier V, given a relation represented as an arithmetic circuit
with ADD and MUL gates over a field F. See Figure 4·1 for the beginning of this
protocol. Compared to Fig. 4·2, step 3 is new, and this change affects the opening
and checking of commitments in step 5 and verification; the remainder of the pro-
tocol is unchanged from before. If multiple zero tests are desired, then steps 2, 3,
and 5 are repeated with independent εm and ε̂m, Z, and βi,j values.
Second, as in the other version of this protocol, the shares to Z are also committed
to, but where the β component of Z is shared using this method. V checks that Z = 0
by recomputing the N − 1 shares it corrupted, and then computes the last share by
subtracting those shares from 0. The recomputed shares are checked against the
commitment to the [Z] shares from round 3.
This portion of the proof sends (N − 1) field elements (the shaded elements) and
one commitment (hi∗) per repetition; the additional commitments to the shares of Z
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and the ĥ need only use one commitment for the entire proof, across all repetitions.
It bears repeating that this method was able to check the consistency of all multi-
plication gates without revealing an additional αm value per MUL gate. This allows
us to add additional fresh zero-tests independently of the number of MUL gates as
well. If there are U of these tests, our communication per repetition becomes about
(2M+UN) field elements, which can outperform Katz et al. [188] when the number of
parties N is small. The description of this version of the protocol is given in Fig. 4·4.
4.5 Security analysis
In this section we prove the honest-verifier zero-knowledge and knowledge soundness
properties of the two protocols constructed in §4.4. For each property, we first analyze
the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS, and then we describe how the analysis changes for the
improved protocol Π̃TurboIKOS.
Theorem 4.5.0.1. When instantiated with a pseudorandom function PRF and a com-
putationally hiding commitment scheme Com, both the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS and
improved protocol Π̃TurboIKOS run with N parties and R repetitions is honest-verifier
computational zero knowledge with distinguishing bound at most R·(AdvCom+AdvPRF).
Proof. We focus here on the privacy argument for the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS.
The privacy of the improved protocol Π̃TurboIKOS then follows immediately from the
fact that it provides strictly less information to the verifier than the base protocol
ΠTurboIKOS does.
Additionally, we prove the statement for a single repetition of the base protocol
ΠTurboIKOS, from which the theorem follows by a union bound over the independent
repetitions.
Let I and M ′ represent the set of input wires and MUL-gate-output wires respec-
tively. Consider a simulator that follows the following steps during the interactive
protocol.
1. The simulator samples all verifier challenges uniformly at random: all εm, ε̂m in
round 2, and a party i∗ ∈ N in round 4 to be the “uncorrupted party” whose
key will not be revealed to V .
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2. Choose keys σp for all parties p ∈ N uniformly at random, honestly following
step 1 of preprocessing.
3. For all corrupted parties, derive all shares [λw] for all wires w from the keys
honestly, as in step 3 of the preprocessing.
4. For the output wires w ∈ O, choose the ew values uniformly at random, and set
party i∗’s share of λw such that vw = ew − λw represents logical true.
5. Now, work backward through the circuit in reverse topological order.
(a) For ADD gates, choose a random setting of the ex and ey values on the
input wires to the ADD gate, conditioned on meeting the linear constraints
induced by all ADD gates at this layer.
(b) For a MUL gate with input wires x and y and output wire z, the values
of ex, ey, and the corrupted shares of λ̂y, λ̂z, and êz must all be simulated.
Note that ex, ey, or both may already be set by an existing constraint (e.g.
if the wire was reused in a later layer or used in multiple gates).
i. Generate λ̂y and initialize the λ̂z shares honestly for the corrupted
parties from the party keys (leaving it unspecified for party i∗).
ii. Generate êz uniformly (and also ex or ey, if they are unspecified).
iii. Let ∆z be the difference between the value on the output wire z and the
product of the value on the input wires xy. That is, ∆z = vz− vxvy =
ez − exey − λz + exλy + eyλx− λxλy. Let ∆̂z be the difference between
(êz− λ̂z) and λxλ̂y; that is, ∆̂z = êz− λ̂z−λxλ̂y. For an honest prover,
∆z = ∆̂z = 0, but the simulator is not honest so these values are likely
to be non-zero. Using the foreknowledge of εm and ε̂m, alter party i
∗’s
share of λ̂z so that ζ = εm∆z + ε̂m∆̂z equals 0 (or alter λz if ∆̂z = 0
but ∆z 6= 0).
6. In round 1, commit honestly to all parties’ keys σp and all parties’ shares [λz]
for all output wires z ∈ O. Also, send the offsets ez for all z ∈ I ∪M ′.
7. In round 3, commit to all shares [αm] and [Z], where [Z] is computed correctly
from the already-manipulated ζ shares from above.
8. In round 5, honestly open the key commitments for all parties except i∗. Also,
honestly reveal party i∗’s shares [Z], [αm], and [λw] for output wires.
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It is straightforward to confirm that the simulated proof passes all verification
checks. It remains to show that the simulated proof is computationally indistinguish-
able from a real one. As a stepping stone, we consider a hybrid proof H that is
constructed like the real one, except using an ideal commitment scheme Com (where
it is impossible to recover an un-opened key) and a truly random function in place
of PRF. The distinguishing probability between the real game and H is at most
AdvCom +AdvPRF.
In the hybrid world, we claim that all of the information provided by P to V
throughout the proof is meaningless. The commitment to σi∗ is now useless, values
like the output wires or Z are publicly known to V beforehand, and the remaining
information (ew for all wires w ∈ W , êz and αm values for all MUL gates, and the
shares [Z]) contains masks that hide the real values from V .
• On each wire w, the revealed ew = vw + λw does not reveal anything about the
value on the wire vw because it is masked by party i
∗’s share of λw.
• For each MUL gate m ∈M , information in αm is masked by i∗’s share of λ̂y.
• For each MUL gate, êz hides info about λxλ̂y by masking it with party i
∗’s share
of λ̂z.
• Party i∗’s share of Z reveals no information because it can be computed as
−∑p∈T [Z] (leveraging the fact that Z = 0 is public knowledge), and the cor-
rupted parties’ shares of Z are only a function of their own data.
All of these masks are truly random in the hybrid world. Observe that ew, êz and
αm all have the uniform distribution in the simulated world as well. Therefore, the
distance between the hybrid and simulated games is 0, which completes the proof for
the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS.
Next, we examine the soundness of the base protocol ΠTurboIKOS. We focus on its
security for the non-interactive version of the MPC-in-the-head construction using
the Fiat-Shamir transform using a random oracle H with 2κ bits of output, so that
finding a collision has 2κ cost. (The interactive version of the protocol has even better
soundness because the prover cannot rewind the verifier.)
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Theorem 4.5.0.2. Consider the non-interactive version of the base protocol
ΠTurboIKOS over a large field |F| = 2κ and instantiated with a random oracle H with
2κ output length. Then, Protocol ΠTurboIKOS with R =
κ
log2(N)
+ 1 repetitions provides
knowledge soundness with error at most 1/2κ.
Proof. We focus here on proving the traditional soundness property. The stronger
knowledge soundness claim immediately follows by applying the analysis from Katz
et al. [188, §3.1] in order to build an extractor that recovers a witness by observing
the inputs to the random oracle-based commitment scheme on a single execution.
The reduction is tight because the extractor never needs to rewind.
To prove soundness, consider a malicious prover P∗ that is attempting to prove a
false statement. Since an honest execution of the circuit would return logical false,
the prover must deviate from the protocol on each repetition. There are effectively
four different places where the malicious prover P∗ can deviate from the protocol in
order to gain an advantage:
1. In round 1 of the protocol, P∗ can change the offsets for one or more MUL gates,
so that the ∆z or ∆̂z values on these gate(s) are non-zero. (We presume it is
simple for the prover to determine a sufficient set of gates to tamper in order
to cause the circuit to return logical true.) P∗ will learn in round 2 whether
V catches this deviation or whether P∗ has successfully evaded detection. By
Lemma 4.4.3.2, the prover is successful with probability 1/|F|.
2. In round 3, P∗ can change one party’s [αm] and [Z] shares so that the verifier
reconstructs a Z value of 0. The success of this attack is revealed in round 4,
and P∗ evades detection with probability 1/N .
3. In rounds 1 or 3, P∗ can attempt to break the binding property of the commit-
ment scheme and open it later to different values.
4. In round 1, P∗ can change one party’s share of the final output so the result
becomes logical true. P∗ will learn in round 4 whether V catches this deviation
or whether P∗ has successfully evaded detection (this occurs with probability
1/N).
(Observe that the pseudorandom function has no impact on soundness. It only exists
to ‘compress’ each party’s share of each wire label [λw], and any tampering of these
wire labels is equivalent to tampering the corresponding offset ew.)
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The key observation in this proof is that item 1 is strictly better for P∗ than item
3 and that item 2 is strictly better than item 4. The first part of this claim follows
from the observation that items 1 and 3 both require the prover to deviate in round
1 and the first has better probability of success since the commitment scheme has
soundness κ. The second part of this claim is true because the attacks in items 4 and
2 both give the same probability of success and are both revealed in round 4, yet the
alteration of [αm] and [Z] occurs later. Delaying the start of the attack is strictly
better for P∗ because it can wait to see if the attack on wire offsets in round 1 was
successful, and only attempt this attack if necessary.
Concretely, we use the same proof technique as several recent analyses of non-
interactive zero knowledge proofs that apply the Fiat-Shamir transform to protocols
with more than three rounds [23, 41, 185]. We consider all attacker strategies (r1, r2)
in which the prover P∗ changes wire offsets in round 1 until r1 repetitions happen
to have Z = 0 anyway, and then P∗ attacks the remaining r2 = R − r1 repetitions
in round 3 by altering αm and Z. In general, the cost of any multi-round attack
strategy is given by C = 1/p1+1/p2, where p1 and p2 denote the probability that the
first and second parts of the attack succeed, respectively. To achieve κ soundness, we
must choose a sufficiently large number of repetitions R so that any attacker strategy
(r1, R− r1) has a total cost C ≥ 2κ.
In this case, one attacker strategy dominates the rest: r1 = 1 and r2 = R − 1.
In more detail, the malicious prover P∗ changes the wire offsets for all repetitions in
round 1, and rewinds until finding an input that evades detection from the verifier’s
round 2 challenge on r1 = 1 instance. Because each instance evades detection only
with probability 1/|F| = 1/2κ, the malicious prover P∗ can only expect to evade
detection on r1 = 1 instance in time less than 2
κ. Even succeeding on 2 instances
is exceedingly unlikely in the adversary’s runtime, and the P∗ gains no benefit by
foregoing an attack on round 1 altogether. Thereafter, P∗ must complete the attack
on the remaining r2 = R − 1 repetitions by altering [αm] and [Z]. This change is
undetected by the verifier with probability 1/N independently for each repetition.
Hence, the overall probability of success for the second repetition is (1/N)r2 , and
thus its cost exceeds 2κ when R = κ
log2(N)
+ 1.
Theorem 4.5.0.3. Consider the improved protocol Π̃TurboIKOS that is instantiated
with a random oracle H with 2κ output length and executed over the field F with
N parties, R repetitions, and U tests per repetition. Then, the protocol satisfies
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Proof. Once again, we focus on proving traditional soundness, after which we can
build an extractor for knowledge soundness using the same technique as before. Ad-
ditionally, the analysis from Theorem 4.5.0.2 about the options for a malicious prover
P∗ to deviate from the protocol holds here too. The prover’s dominant strategy
remains to change the offsets for one or more MUL gates in a way that causes the
remainder of the circuit (computed honestly) to return logical true; note that this
will also cause the corresponding ∆z or ∆̂z values to be nonzero. For each repetition
independently, there are two ways for the malicious prover P∗ to evade detection by
the verifier:
1. Based on the verifier’s U independent random choices of εm and ε̂m in round
2, there is a (1/|F|)U probability that all of the Z tests happen to equal 0 (by
Lemma 4.4.3.2).
2. If even a single Z value is non-zero, then P∗ can commit to erroneous βi,j values
to ‘fix’ this error. Note that P∗ can only inject erroneous data in one row of
the table in Fig. 4·3 because the verifier can check the remaining N − 1 rows
directly. This attack evades detection only if the verifier chooses in round 4 to
leave this row as the uncorrupted party, which happens with probability 1/N .
As before, we can analyze the malicious prover P∗’s probability of success by
analyzing all attacker strategies (r1, r2) that operate as follows. First, the prover
P∗ rewinds round 1 until at least r1 repetitions have the property that the verifier’s
choice of εm and ε̂m are such that all of the Z tests within these repetitions equal 0.
Second, P∗ rewinds round 3 until the remaining r2 = R − r1 have been tampered in
the locations chosen by the verifier in round 4.
To achieve κ soundness, we must select enough repetitions R so that any attacker
strategy (r1, R−r1) has a total cost C ≥ 2κ. Here, the cost of this multi-round attack
strategy is given by C = 1/p1 + 1/p2, and p1 and p2 denote the probability that the
first and second parts of the attack succeed, respectively.
Because we consider an arbitrary field size in this theorem, the cost analysis here
is more complicated than in Theorem 4.5.0.2. Our argument is very similar to that
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of Banquet [23]. The first probability boils down to the chance that the attacker has
r1 successes out of R trials, where each trial succeeds with probability (1/|F|)U . This









· (1/|F|)Ui · (1− 1/|F|)U(R−i). (4.6)
The second probability is simply p2 = (1/N)
r2 because the malicious prover must
succeed on all remaining repetitions of the protocol. Combining the costs of both
parts of the attack results in Eq. (4.5), completing the proof of the theorem.
κ N U
1 2 4 6 9
8 66 53 47 45 44
128 16 54 41 36 34 33
31 47 35 30 28 27
8 99 79 70 68 66
192 16 81 62 54 52 50
31 71 53 45 43 41
8 132 106 95 91 89
256 16 108 83 73 69 67
31 95 71 61 57 55
Table 4.2: Valid parameter settings for F28 . The body of the table shows the
number of repetitions R based on the soundness parameter κ, number of parties N ,
and number of tests per repetition U .
The goal here is to find the “minimum” choices of N , R, and U that yield a desired
soundness parameter κ for a circuit with a given field size |F|. While it is challenging
to write a closed-form version of Eq. 4.5 that connects the five parameters, it is easy
to find satisfying tuples empirically. In Table 4.2, we show several such choices for the
field F28 . We include a computer program that calculates valid parameter settings
within our open source repository [156].
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4.6 Performance and prototype implementation
In this section, we compare our Π̃TurboIKOS system’s performance against other MPC-
in-the-head based systems, and we describe our prototype Python implementation of
ΠTurboIKOS.
4.6.1 Performance analysis
To evaluate our performance, we measure our signature size when computing a vari-
ant of the Picnic signature scheme [224]. Picnic uses MPC-in-the-head (specifically, a
variant of the Katz et al. protocol [188]) and LowMC [6], a block cipher with few mul-
tiplications that is designed to be efficient in secure computation. Picnic is currently
an “alternate candidate” in round 3 of the NIST post-quantum crypto competition [5].
BBQ [104] introduced the idea of using AES in Picnic-like signatures and showed that
the signature sizes could be competitive with those using LowMC. To achieve this,
rather than evaluating the binary circuit for AES, they used an arithmetic MPC-in-
the-head system over F28 ; this facilitates proving constraints about inverses in F28 ,
the non-linear component of the AES S-box. They also show how each field inversion
can be reduced to a single multiplication gate (without testing for the case in which
the input and output are both equal to 0) with very small reduction in the soundness
of the resulting system (less than 3 bits of security). We follow their approach in this
section.
Table 4.3 shows the proof sizes of Π̃TurboIKOS when computing signatures using
AES at different security levels. We compare against the following systems:
• BBQ [104]: The figures are taken directly from their paper, except the number
of parties is not listed. We make an educated guess that they use approximately
N = 64 parties; for lower N their proof size will be larger.
• Katz et al. [188]: We calculate the proof size using the formula in [188], assuming
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that a field inversion constraint can be verified with two field elements per MUL
gate like in this work. Also, our calculations use 32 parties rather than 31; this
result should be a conservative smaller estimate of the actual proof size when
N = 31.
• Baum-Nof [25]: We calculate a conservative underestimate of the proof size
using the formula in [25], assuming that only a single zero-check is needed per
repetition. However, this is unlikely to be the case in F28 for the same reason
as in our work.
• Banquet [23]: The figures are taken directly from their paper.
Scheme N
Protocol (all sizes in KB)
BBQ [104] Katz et al. [188] Baum-Nof [25] Π̃TurboIKOS Banquet [23]
AES-128
(L1)
8 | 26.7 37.3 23.8 |
16 31.6 22.4 29.4 20.6 19.8
31 | 19.8 24.8 19.8 17.5
AES-192x2
(L3)
8 | 76.3 110.8 66.7 |
16 86.9 63.1 87.4 56.3 51.2
31 | 54.9 73.4 52.2 45.1
AES-256x2
(L5)
8 | 122.6 179.9 109.3 |
16 133.7 101.9 140.7 90.4 83.5
31 | 89.1 118.0 82.8 73.9
Table 4.3: Signature size comparison for the Picnic signature scheme at different
security levels for different systems. All signature sizes are shown in kilobytes (KB).
AES-128 has (M, I) = (200, 128), AES-192x2 has (M, I) = (416, 192), and AES-
256x2 has (M, I) = (500, 256).
Banquet [23] is independent recent work that reduce the size of AES-based Pic-
nic signatures using very different techniques based on polynomial interpolation in
extension fields of F28 [54,93] that are not directly applicable to general fields. They
achieve a smaller proof size than all competitors, including us. However, this advan-
tage comes with two downsides relative to our scheme and prior ones. First, perform-
ing polynomial arithmetic in extension fields would be costly on embedded devices
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whose CPU architectures typically have a small word size. Second, the polynomials
are proportional to the entire circuit size, making their system more memory-costly
than traditional MPC-in-the-head based methods like ours where the memory is only
proportional to the circuit width (i.e., the memory required to compute the circuit).
4.6.2 Prototype implementation
We created a prototype implementation for ΠTurboIKOS in Python. We did not opti-
mize the runtime or memory usage of our code, thus, we will likely not win on prover
runtime with other MPC-in-the-head approaches written in C or C++, e.g. [25,188].
That having been said, our protocol is amenable to all of the optimizations made by
the recent Reverie software [288] implementing the protocol of Katz et al. Our code
currently achieves runtimes about twice as long as Reverie for the same size circuit.
In this section we briefly describe our implementation.
Our Python implementation [156] supports both Bristol fashion circuits1 and
Prover Worksheet (PWS) format2 as input. The circuit is parsed into a list of Gate
objects, found in gate.py, and initializes a Wire data structure, found in wire.py, that
takes in a list of dictionaries containing the values on each wire.
Dictionaries are used extensively to manage information. Circuit information such
as the number of various types of gates are stored in a dictionary. Values on each
wire such as e and λ are also stored in a dictionary. Each wire has a dictionary of
values, resulting in a list of dictionaries with length of the number of wires. This list
of dictionaries is later used as the input to the Wire object, found in wire.py, which
defines functions to access values on the wire.
On the Prover side, P calculates all the parties as she parses through the circuit,




one party to leave unopened and reconstructs the other N − 1 views from the seeds
given by P . We generate the shares λ, λ̂y, and λ̂z pseudorandomly using AES as a
PRF with the party’s seed as the key and the concatenation of the (fixed-length) wire
index and type of value as the message.
The prover is required to send a commitment in Round 1 and Round 3. As
discussed in §4.3, when committing to values with sufficient min-entropy, we simply
use Com(m) := H(m), thus decommitments are “free” aside from the cost of m itself.
This remains computationally hiding as long as m has sufficient min-entropy and H is
a random oracle. We use SHA2 from hashlib for our instantiation of H. To achieve
non-interactivity via the Fiat-Shamir Transform [120], the random messages sent by
the Verifier in Round 2 and Round 4 are replaced by a call to H on the info sent by
P in all previous rounds.
4.7 Introduction to BooLigero
In this work, we focus on and improve Ligero [10], a protocol that achieves a balance
between proof size and prover runtime.
4.7.1 Related work
As we described in §4.1, zero knowledge proofs are evaluated for performance on
three metrics: proof/argument size, prover runtime, and verifier runtime. There is a
spectrum of zero-knowledge proof/argument systems.
On one extreme of the spectrum, large, fast proofs construct ZK proofs from
various flavors of MPC: the garbled-circuit based approach of ZKGC [182] (with
improvements from [201]) or approaches that use the GMW [142] paradigm (e.g. [177],
improved in [138] and [76]). All of these are fairly quick to compute, but they incur
a linear proof size (except the very recent work of [316], which cannot be made non-
interactive, and is therefore not usable in most blockchain scenarios).
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On the other extreme, we have “succinct” sublinear-size arguments. The smallest
arguments are constant size, but generally suffer from two problems – assumptions
and trusted setup. Many of these arguments use unfalsifiable assumptions (e.g.,
[34,37,94,136,153,214,243]) and this is inherent at a certain level [137]. Others require
a trusted setup step performed by a central authority or a trusted committee operating
a costly multiparty computation (e.g. [33, 34, 44, 80, 131, 136, 153, 154, 218, 243, 324]),
both being undesirable or even unacceptable in many financial use cases.
In the middle, there exist transparent protocols that achieve sublinear (but not
constant) size without the need for trusted setup. A number of these protocols
use assumptions that render them vulnerable to quantum attacks (e.g. [55, 169, 267,
312]). There are three different approaches to sublinear transparent protocols with-
out trusted setup that are plausibly post-quantum secure: Ligero [10], Stark [32], and
Aurora [35].
Compared to Ligero and BooLigero, Stark’s proof size is asymptotically smaller
(O(log2 s) instead of O(
√
s) for circuit size s), but concretely larger for circuits smaller
than approximately 106 gates, as shown in [312]. Its prover runtime is more expensive
than Ligero’s both asymptotically by a log s factor, and is also concretely longer. For
circuits with repeated sub-circuits, Stark has significantly improved verifier runtime,
but there is no asymptotic difference for circuits without this property.
Aurora [35] also has a significantly smaller proof size than Ligero and BooLigero
(O(log2 s) instead of O(
√
s)) and the same asymptotic prover and verifier runtime.
However, its interactive version has a O(log s) round complexity compared to Ligero
and BooLigero’s O(1), and its prover runtime is concretely higher than Ligero’s.
Moreover, without a certain unproven conjecture involving Reed-Solomon codes, it
becomes much less efficient (see discussion in [267]).




sλ log3 s) asymptotically, but its concrete performance remains unknown (see
discussion on p. 6 of Ben-Sasson et al. [35]).
4.8 Preliminaries
Notation. We use F to refer to a finite field, and GF(2w) to refer to a finite field
with order 2w. We also often use w to refer to the “word size” and refer to elements
of GF(2w) as “w-words” when we use their w-bit representations.
For operations, we use ⊕ for bitwise XOR and & for bitwise AND, over bits or
w-words depending on context. We use ∗ to denote Galois field multiplication, and ·
for element-wise multiplication of vectors.
Bit indexing, denoted with square brackets, always begins at 1. Bitstrings are
always shown in big endian. Thus, if x = 0001, then x[1] = 1 is the least significant
bit of x.
Zero knowledge IOPs. A ZKIOP is an interactive oracle proof (IOP) [36] that is
additionally zero-knowledge. Let P and V be probabilistic polynomial-time interac-
tive Turing machines. An interactive oracle protocol between P and V occurs over
several rounds. P reads messages sent by V fully, but V queries random parts of P ’s
message rather than reading them entirely. At the end, V either accepts or rejects.
Let 〈P(x, w),V(x)〉 refer to the output of V(x) when executing an interactive oracle
protocol with P(x, w). Let R be a relation for language L so that (x, w) ∈ R if w is
a witness for x’s membership in L.
Definition 4.8.0.1 (Zero knowledge interactive oracle proof). 〈P ,V〉 is a zero knowl-
edge interactive oracle proof system for R with soundness error δ if:
• Completeness : For any (x, w) ∈ R, 〈P(x, w),V(x)〉 = 1.
• Soundness : If x /∈ L, then for all P∗, Pr[〈P∗,V(x)〉 = 1] ≤ δ
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• Perfect honest-verifier zero knowledge: Let ViewV(P ,V , x, w) be the view of V
upon completion of 〈P(x, w),V(x)〉. The protocol is perfect honest-verifier zero
knowledge if there exists a probabilistic poly time simulator S such that for all
(x, w), the distribution of S(x) equals the distribution of ViewV(P ,V , x, w).
The IOPs we deal with in this paper are also public-coin, meaning that V ’s mes-
sages to P are always chosen randomly from a known distribution, and V ’s queries
to P depend only on messages that have already occurred and that P has seen. Zero
knowledge IOPs can be converted to zero knowledge arguments in a standard way
using the Fiat-Shamir transform [36].
4.9 Ligero background
In this section we provide relevant background from [10]. We start with some back-
ground on Interleaved Reed-Solomon codes.
Definition 4.9.0.1 (Reed-Solomon Code, [10] Defn. 4.1). For positive integers n
and k, finite field F, and a vector η = (η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ Fn of distinct field elements, the
code L = RSF,n,k,η is the [n, k, n−k+1] linear code over F that consists of all n-tuples
(p(η1), . . . , p(ηn)) where p is a polynomial of degree < k over F.
Definition 4.9.0.2 (Interleaved Code, [10] Defn. 4.2). Let L ⊂ Fn be a [n, k, d]
linear code over F. We let Lm denote the [n,mk, d] (interleaved) code over Fm whose
codewords are all m× n matrices U such that every row Ui of U satisfies Ui ∈ L.
Definition 4.9.0.3 (Encoded message, [10] Defn. 4.5). Let L = RSF,n,kη be an RS
code and ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζℓ) be a sequence of distinct elements of F for ℓ ≤ k. For u ∈ L
we define the message Decζ(u) to be (pu(ζ1), . . . , pu(ζℓ)) where pu is the polynomial
(of degree < k) corresponding to u. For U ∈ Lm with rows u1, . . . , um ∈ L, we
let Decζ(U) be the length-mℓ vector x = (x11, . . . , x1ℓ, . . . , xm1, . . . , xmℓ) such that
(xi1, . . . , xiℓ) = Decζ(u
i) for i ∈ [m]. Finally when ζ is clear from context, we say the
U encodes x if Decζ(U).
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4.9.1 Proof size of Ligero.
Ligero [10] is a zero-knowledge argument that achieves O(
√
s) proof size, where s is
the size of the verification circuit.
Ligero encodes the witness using an Interleaved Reed-Solomon code, which can
be considered an m-vector of Reed-Solomon (RS) codewords. Each RS codeword can
itself be considered a vector of n elements which encode ℓ unencoded elements, for
n = O(ℓ). Thus, the overall interleaved Reed-Solomon code can be considered an
m× n matrix encoding m× ℓ variables.
Ligero achieves O(
√
s) proof size by being clever about how the verifier checks
constraints on this matrix. Roughly speaking, the communication will consist of
some (linear combinations of) rows and some columns of the matrix, with simplified
complexity O(n + m). Thus, one can balance m against ℓ and set both to O(
√
s)
to achieve a proof size of O(
√
s). Specifically, m is set to O(
√
s/κ) and ℓ is set to
O(
√
sκ), where κ is a security parameter.
We let L = RSF,n,k,η be a Reed-Solomon code with minimal distance. L
m refers to
the interleaved code, which has codewords that are simply m codewords of L. Lm is
best understood as a matrix where the m rows are L-codewords.
Tests in Ligero. As a zero-knowledge IPCP between the prover P and verifier V ,
the prover begins by encoding its witness as a Lm codeword – anm×nmatrix encoding
m × ℓ variables in the witness. Ligero creates three tests for constraints over this
matrix: Test-Interleaved ([10] §4.1), Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS ([10] §4.2),
and Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS ([10] §4.3). Each of these tests consists of
two phases:
1. Oracle phase: P creates an oracle to the Lm-encoded witness (possibly with
some additional info).
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2. Interactive testing phase: P and V interact with each other. P sends some
linear combinations of rows of the matrix. V makes queries to the oracle to
obtain columns of the Lm codeword (without receiving any L codeword “rows”
fully). After the interaction, V checks whether the linear combinations given to
it by P match the columns it queried, and either accepts or rejects.
When used as a zero-knowledge argument (instead of a ZKIPCP), the oracle is
replaced with a commitment. Before the interactive testing phase, P commits to all
columns of its encoded witness as the leaves of a Merkle tree that uses a statistically
hiding commitment scheme. To make the proof non-interactive, the verifier’s messages
can be replaced with a random oracle call on the prover’s messages up to that point.
Boolean circuits in Ligero. Ligero is presented for arithmetic circuits over a
prime field. It is possible to use Ligero for a Boolean circuit as well, but this has two
downsides.
The first downside is that one must use an entire field element to represent a single
bit. This causes a blowup of log |F| in the number of witness elements, which causes
a blowup of O(
√
log |F|) in the proof size.
How small of a field can we use? There is a minimum requirement that |F| ≥ ℓ+n
([10] §5.3), which is required so that there are sufficient evaluation points for L.
Furthermore, if the field gets too small, one must repeat the protocol several times
in order to achieve the desired soundness. At very small field sizes, the costs of
the commitments (log s times a constant hash output length) also start growing in
comparison to the rest of the proof. Concretely, testing out different field sizes for
Boolean circuits on the order of 106 to 109 gates tends to yield optimal field sizes of
about 14-20 bits. This suggests that there is approximately a 3.7-4.4x gain to be had
by packing the bits efficiently.
The second downside is that this costs additional constraints. First, each extended
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witness element e must be proven to be 0 or 1 by adding a quadratic constraint that
e2−e = 0. Second, XOR and AND are also both quadratic constraints: the constraint
e1 + e2 = a0 + 2 · a1, along with bit constraints on all variables, enforce that a0 is the
XOR of e1 and e2, and that a1 is the AND of e1 and e2. Computing only one or the
other necessitates the creation of a dummy variable for the other, and enforcing bit
constraints on all. Hence, the number of constraints is twice the maximum number
of AND and XOR gates combined.
Unlike linear constraints, which can be evaluated using only an encoding of the
witness itself, evaluating quadratic constraints like x ∗ y = z requires providing en-
codings of x, y, and z, separately from (but related to) the encoding of the witness
itself. Although the number of quadratic constraints will asymptotically be O(s), this
suggests that there may be concrete room for improvement by reducing the number
of quadratic constraints.
4.10 BooLigero techniques
We make one minor change and two major changes to Ligero [10], which we described
in §4.9.
The minor change is that we use GF(2w) instead of the prime field GF(p). Ligero’s
methods work for any finite field, where addition and multiplication now use opera-
tions in the new field. Since we are still using Interleaved Reed-Solomon codes, we
can directly reuse Ligero’s Test-Interleaved, Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS, and
Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS. The latter two now test bitwise XOR/NOT
constraints and GF(2w) multiplication rather than arithmetic addition and multipli-
cation. We lose the ability to natively check linear arithmetic constraints in mod 2w,
but we gain the ability to cheaply check XORs. We can still check linear arithmetic
constraints in power-of-two moduli by building an adder out of the constraint tests
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we have.
The following two larger changes to Ligero are the focus of our work:
Change 1: Additional constraint tests that reveal variables directly. We
add a number of tests for additional constraints. These new tests operate differently
than the Ligero tests, and in fact the new tests rely on the Ligero tests in order to check
linear and quadratic constraints. In the new tests, the prover modifies and extends
the witness with additional variables, some of which are based on a “challenge” sent
by the verifier. As part of the proof oracle, the prover sends some (masked) elements
of the witness to the verifier directly, and the verifier must check to see whether
the revealed elements have a certain property. These tests can be nested inside other
tests – e.g., our Test-And-Constraints procedure involves invoking Test-Pattern-
Zeros-Constraints, as described in §4.10.3.
Most of our tests use only linear constraints and cost O(κ) (a security parame-
ter) in the proof size, independent of the circuit size and the number of constraints.
Our Test-And-Constraints involves adding approximately 3
√
wN hidden variables,
where N is the number of AND gates. This is still an improvement over the approxi-
mately wN added elements that are required to represent wN Boolean wires in plain
Ligero for w ≥ 9. We describe our constraint tests in §4.10.3.
Change 2: Two oracles/rounds of commitment. Unlike original Ligero, many
of the tests we add require verifier input in order to choose which constraints we will
check – generally, the verifier will pick a random linear combination of the variables to
use in constraints. However, for this to be sound, the original variables must already
have been available in an oracle (or been committed to). This necessitates splitting
the proof oracle in two: one that presents an encoding of the “original” witness, and
one that is parameterized by the verifier’s random choices and returns an encoding
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of the added variables. We call the first oracle the “initial oracle” and the second
the “response oracle”. Thus, whereas Ligero had two phases of procedures – the
oracle phase and the interactive testing phase – we have four: initial phase (creation
of initial witness to be provided as oracle or commitment), challenge phase (verifier
sends random bits as challenge), response phase (creation of witness extension to be
provided as a second oracle or commitment), and the interactive testing phase We
describe each of these phases in §4.10.1. This process is based on the circuit sampling
idea of Baum and Nof [25].
4.10.1 Test procedures
In original Ligero, each test consists of an oracle and an interactive test procedure
which will ensure that the oracle is valid. In our protocol, each test consists of
two oracles, separated by a verifier challenge, and followed by an interactive test
procedure. The second oracle is the response to the challenge. We describe each of
our constraint test procedures in four phases:
1. Initial phase: P adds elements to the witness, encodes it, and provides the
columns of the encoding as the first proof oracle.
2. Challenge phase: V sends random bits to P , which will be required to generate
the second proof oracle.
3. Response phase: Based on the bits received in the challenge, P adds more
elements to the witness, and adds additional constraints. P encodes the exten-
sions to the witness, and provides the encoding (which can be combined with
the first oracle’s output) as well as the revealed variables.
4. Interactive testing phase: P and V run an interactive testing protocol.
At the end, V has acceptance criteria for determining whether to accept or
201
reject the proof. Our tests augment the original Ligero acceptance criteria with
additional checks on properties of the revealed variables.
In slightly more detail, the variables in the witness consist of:
• v0 original variables
• v1 added hidden variables in the initial phase
• v2 added hidden variables in the response phase
• v3 added revealed variables in the response phase
P and V first set ℓ, m1, m2, and m3 so that ℓm1 ≥ v0 + v1, ℓm2 ≥ v2, and ℓm3 ≥ v3.
P creates the initial witness encoding Uw1 ∈ Lm1 from the v0 original variables and
v1 added hidden variables in the initial phase, and sets this as the initial oracle. After
receiving V ’s challenge, it creates the response witness encoding Uw2 ∈ Lm2 from the
v2 newly added hidden variables. As in original Ligero, it also creates encodings U
x,
Uy, and U z ∈ Lm′ needed for testing quadratic constraints (where m′ is set so that
m′ℓ is at least the number of quadratic constraints). P sets the response oracle as
the vertical concatenation of Uw2 , Ux, Uy, U z, along with all revealed variables in
the clear.
When doing the interactive testing phase, P also creates Uw3 ∈ Lm3 which con-
tains the revealed variables added in the response phase. During this phase, P treats
its witness encoding Uw as the vertical concatenation of Uw1 , Uw2 , and Uw3 . The
verifier will do the same with the revealed variables.
Our new BooLigero tests rely on executing the interactive testing phase of Ligero
tests on Uw. (The encodings of x, y, and z needed forTest-Quadratic-Constraints-
IRS are also built relative to the full w.) They also add additional linear and
quadratic constraints to be tested in this way. These tests may be useful in frame-
works outside BooLigero as well.
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Adding linear constraints. Ligero’s Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS checks
whether an encoding of a secret vector x is a solution to linear equation Ax = b,
where A is a public matrix and b is a public vector. In the context of testing the
protocol in a full circuit, x is the witness vector, b is the all 0s vector, and A is set
so that the jth row of Ax equals in1 + in2 − out, where the jth addition gate in the
circuit computes out = in1 + in2. To add an additional linear constraint, we simply
add an additional row to A along with an additional element to b. Doing so does not
affect the proof size.
Adding quadratic constraints. Ligero’s Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS
tests whether encodings of vectors x, y, z meet the condition that x·y+a·z = b, where
· represents element-wise multiplication in F. When using the protocol for testing a
circuit, the x, y, z vectors are built so that their jth entries are in1, in2, out, where
the jth multiplication gate in the circuit computes out = in1 ∗ in2. These vectors are
constructed in a public way from the witness, i.e. P and V both construct Px such
that x = Pxw. Unlike the linear constraint test, separate encodings of x, y, and z
must be provided to the verifier; thus, increasing the number of quadratic constraints
increases the proof size.
4.10.2 Testing linear operations that yield zero over bits
We first define a useful class of tests that can be batched very efficiently.
Let ℓ1 and ℓ2 be positive integers, and let t1 = ℓ1w and t2 = ℓ2w. Let T ∈
{0, 1}t2×t1 be a public t2 × t1 binary matrix. Then T defines a test on x ∈ {0, 1}t1
which checks whether Tx = ~0, where ~0 is of length t2.
To incorporate this into Ligero, we observe that one can represent a vector of
Ligero variables x ∈ GF(2w)ℓ1 as a vector in {0, 1}t1 of t1 = ℓ1w bits. Adding two
variables in one of these representations exactly corresponds to adding the variables
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in the other representation. So, we abuse notation and treat the vector x ∈ GF(2w)ℓ1
as vector in GF(2)t1 .
Observe that, given a ∈ {0, 1}t1 (which can also be represented by a vector in
GF(2w)ℓ1) such that Ta = ~0, this implies that T (x + a) = ~0 if and only if Tx = ~0.
In the full protocol, rather than guaranteeing that Ta will be 0, we will write a test
that will check whether both Ta and Tx are 0 simultaneously. This is the same idea
as sacrificing in multi-party computation.
To achieve privacy, we blind any Ligero variables we wish to test with T . P
will generate a random a subject to the constraint that Ta = ~0 and then open the
variable (x+a) directly to the verifier, who can independently check that T (x+a) = ~0.
Figure 4·5 shows a construction for a perfect zero-knowledge protocol between P and
V to test T for a batch of N variables with low soundness error. Observe that the
communication complexity for this batched test of N ℓ1-tuples is only the size of one
tuple: ℓ1 elements of GF(2
w). Note that it is also independent of t2; it depends only
on t1 and w.
We will embed this construction into BooLigero to test properties discussed in
§4.10.3, such as rearranging bits in a “pattern,” checking whether certain bits are
zero, or both at the same time.
Note that the test itself is not sound without the additional tests provided by
Ligero – the soundness of the main part of the test depends on the revealed variables
being well-formed. We ensure that the all variables are well-formed by using Test-
Linear-Constraints-IRS and Test-Interleaved, and ensuring that the initial el-
ements are provided in an oracle (or committed to) before receiving the challenge.
Note also that sometimes T itself will reveal certain information about x – for ex-
ample, that x is 0 at certain bit locations. But the protocol will not reveal anything
about x other than the fact that Tx = ~0, which is already true if P is honest.
Lemma 4.10.2.1 (Security of Test-T ). The protocol described in Fig. 4·5 is com-
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Test-T (κ,F; x1 = (x11, . . . , x1t), . . . , xN = (xN1, . . . , xNt))
Auxiliary input: Soundness parameter κ. Field GF(2w) Positive integers ℓ1
and ℓ2; let t1 = wℓ1 and t2 = wℓ2. Binary matrix T ∈ {0, 1}t2×t1 .
Inputs: A batch ofN secret variables in GF(2w)ℓ1 held by P , x1 = (x11, . . . , x1ℓ1),
. . ., xN = (xN1, . . . , xNℓ1) ∈ GF(2w)ℓ1 . where P claims that (abusing notation
and treating each xi as a binary t1-vector) Txi = ~0 for all i ∈ [N ].
Protocol:
1. Initial phase: For j ∈ [κ], P picks and adds hidden variable a(j) ∈ GF(2w)ℓ1
such that Ta(j) = ~0 to the witness.
2. Challenge phase: V sends Nκ bits: r(j)i for i ∈ [N ] for j ∈ [κ].
3. Response phase: P adds








for j ∈ [κ] (a total of ℓ1κ elements) as revealed elements to the witness. P
and V add the κ instances of Eqn. 4.7 to the list of linear constraints to
check.
4. Interactive testing phase: P and V run Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS
and Test-Interleaved. V accepts if both tests pass and additionally (abus-
ing notation and treating each u(j) as a binary t1-vector) Tu
(j) = ~0 for all
j ∈ [κ].
Figure 4·5: Test construction for any binary matrix T
plete, perfect zero-knowledge, and has soundness error 1/2κ + δ1 + δ2, where δ1 is the
soundness error of Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS and δ2 is the soundness error
of Test-Interleaved.
Proof. We prove each property in turn:
Completeness: If the prover is honest, then Txi = 0 for all i ∈ [N ], and Ta(j) = 0




xi) = 0 for all j ∈ [κ] as
desired.
Honest verifier zero-knowledge: We know by [10] Lemma 4.13 that aside from the
added revealed variables u, the remainder of the protocol is honest-verifier perfect
zero knowledge. Consider the additional u variables. Each of these is “masked” by a
random element a which is known only to P . Thus, u will have the same distribution
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as a fresh random binary vector for which Tu = 0. Thus, a simulated version of the
protocol which returns a random v for which Tv = 0, which accurately simulates the
real execution which returns u.
Soundness: Suppose the prover is lying and there exists at least one i ∈ [N ] for
which Txi 6= ~0. Without loss of generality, let i = 1 be one such index. If the
Ligero matrix itself is malformed, this will be caught with probability 1− δ2 by Test-
Interleaved. Assuming it is not malformed, if any of the u(j) values are not equal to
those given in Equation 4.7, then a linear constraint has been violated and this will
be caught with probability 1 − δ1 by Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS. We assume





xi (note the indexing beginning
at 2). Thus, for the remainder of this proof, we assume u is well-formed. If r
(j)
1 = 0,
then c(j) = u(j). If r
(j)
1 = 1, then c
(j) = u(j)⊕x1. Consider Tc(j). There are two cases:
Case 1. Tc(j) = ~0. If r
(j)
1 = 0, then Tu
(j) = Tc(j) = ~0 and the prover successfully
cheats. If, however, r
(j)
1 = 1, then Tu
(j) = T (c(j) + x1) = ~0 + Tx1 6= ~0. So V
correctly rejects in this case.
Case 2. Tc(j) 6= ~0. If r(j)1 = 0, then Tu(j) = Tc(j) 6= ~0 so V correctly rejects.
If r
(j)
1 = 1, then Tu
(j) = T (c(j) + x1). This may equal 0, so the prover may
successfully cheat.
In each case, the prover is caught cheating with probability 1/2 over the choice of
r
(j)
1 . Note that this continues to hold regardless of how many indices within [N ] the
prover chooses to cheat on. Repeating this for κ choices of r1, the chance that the
prover successfully cheats in all of them is 1/2κ. Union bounding this with the chance
of failure of Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS and Test-Interleaved, the soundness
error of this protocol is 1/2κ + δ1 + δ2, as desired. 
4.10.3 New constraint tests
In this section, we describe our added tests for BooLigero. Each of these calls
one of the original Ligero tests Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS or Test-Quadratic-
Constraints-IRS. The later tests additionally call on the earlier BooLigero tests as
well.
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Properties tested by Test-T . We proceed to name two useful properties (and
their conjunction) that can be tested using the construction from the previous section.
As described in the previous section, they can test the property on arbitrarily many
input variables for only a constant overhead over the cost of the variables themselves.
Since we will reuse them later, we name each of these special cases of Test-T .
• Test-Zeros-Constraints: This tests whether particular bit locations in the
input are 0. Let Z ⊆ [t2] be a set of indices to be zero-tested. Formally, let TZ
be a square matrix with 1s on the diagonal for indices in Z, and 0 for all other
elements. Observe that TZx = ~0 if and only if x is 0 at the Z indices.
• Test-Pattern-Constraints: We informally define a “pattern” as a relationship
between (ti = t1 − t2) “input bits” and t2 “output bits.” The pattern property
enforces that each “output bit” is an XOR of some subset of the input bits.
In general, pattern matrices Tπ are defined as a matrix that is a concatenation
between a matrix π ∈ {0, 1}t2×ti and a t2 × t2 identity matrix. Several useful
functions can be defined as patterns:
– Masking. Suppose we wished to show in Ligero that x&µ = y for some
public mask µ, for Ligero variables x, y ∈ GF(2w)ℓ2 and mask µ ∈ {0, 1}t2 .
Let M be the t2-square matrix with µ comprising the diagonal and zeros
elsewhere. Then we can test whether x&µ = y using the pattern Tµ =









which, for diagonal matrix M , implies that Mx = y.
– Even parity. Suppose we wished to show that y ∈ GF(2w) is the parity of
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which will check that the least significant bit of y equals a sum of all bits
of x. Even-parity can be batch-tested by using Zeros, testing the parity of
many variables simultaneously.
• Test-Pattern-Zeros-Constraints: Notice that a Zeros test can be performed
on the same revealed values as a pattern test, if the blinding variables are chosen
to meet both constraints. We will often perform these tests on the same revealed
variables to save space.
Bitwise AND test. Next, we describe our test for bitwise AND. Note that AND
cannot be tested using the method in the previous section, since it is not a linear op-
eration. Instead, we write a new test that calls Test-Pattern-Zeros-Constraints.
As a first step, one way to test AND would be to fully bit-decompose our single
w-bit element into w elements each representing a single bit. This would let us use
quadratic constraints directly to show AND constraints. However, doing so is expen-
sive. This method would yield roughly the same proof size as original Ligero, since it
uses an entire w-bit element to represent a single bit. Instead, we exploit the nature
of Galois field arithmetic to compute the AND of w0 = ⌊
√
w⌋ bits simultaneously in
a w-bit element using a GF multiplication. We then use our Pattern test to convert
between the original variables and the w1 decomposed variables, where w1 is the min-
imum integer such that w0w1 ≥ w. Each of these w1 “split” variables contains w0
bits of the original element (except the last, which may contain fewer if w0 6 |w).
Suppose we have elements x, y ∈ GF(2w), and want to find z = x&y. We start by
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using a Pattern to split x into w1 variables x̂1, . . . , x̂w1 , and to split y into w1 variables
ŷ1, . . . , ŷw1 . First, consider the x variables. Each split variable x̂h will consist of w0
chunks of w0 bits each. (Recall that by construction w
2
0 ≤ w.) The least significant
bit of each chunk will be a bit of x, and all other bits will be 0. This is illustrated
in Equation 4.8. The y variables will be split differently: each ŷh will consist of a
single chunk of w0 bits from y, starting with the least significant bit. This is shown
in Equation 4.9.
We then set ẑh = x̂h∗ ŷh. The effect of multiplying x̂h by ŷh is that the chunk of w0
bits in ŷh is “copied” to each of the w0 chunks of output for which the corresponding
chunk of x̂h was 1. Thus, in order to figure out which bits were shared between x and
y, we go to the kth bit of the kth chunk of ẑh. This will equal the kth bit of ŷh times
the LSB of the kth chunk of x̂h. This is shown in Equation 4.10. Recomposing from
the ẑh variables back to z by using Pattern once again, we have exactly computed
the bitwise AND of x and y.
Figure 4·6 shows an example of how to split (x, y, z), where z = x&y. The full
Test-And-Constraints procedure is shown in Figure 4·7. The patterns πx, πy, and
πz, described formally in Figure 4·7 step 1(d).
Lemma 4.10.3.1 (Security of Test-And-Constraints). The protocol described in
Fig. 4·7 is complete, perfect zero-knowledge, and has soundness error 3(1/2κ) + δ1 +
δ2 + δ3, where δ1 is the soundness error of Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS, δ2
is the soundness error of Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS, and δ3 is the soundness
error of Test-Interleaved.
Proof. We must show that Test-And-Constraints is complete, zero-knowledge,
and sound up to error 3(1/2κ) + δ1 + δ2 + δ3, where δ1 is the soundness error
of Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS, δ2 is the soundness error of Test-Linear-
Constraints-IRS, and δ3 is the soundness error of Test-Interleaved.
Completeness: If P is honest, then all variables are well-formed. We must show
that following the process described in step 1(b) of Fig. 4·7 will lead to computing
bitwise AND. Elements in GF(2w) are polynomials over GF(2) of degree at most (w−
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1), and multiplication in GF(2w) is polynomial multiplication modulo an irreversible
polynomial. As in step 1(a), let w0 = ⌊
√
w⌋. Fix i ∈ [N ].
By construction, the polynomial representations of all ŷi,h variables (for h ∈ [w1])
have degree at most w0 − 1. They can be written as
∑w0−1
k=0 ckv
k, where v is the
polynomial variable and c is the coefficient (either 0 or 1).
Further, the x̂i,h variables are of the form
∑w0−1
k=0 dkv
kw0 (now using d as the
coefficient).
Thus, if we multiply x̂i,h ∗ ŷi,h, the result can be written as:
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First, notice that the degree of this polynomial is at most w20 − 1, so by construction,
this polynomial will not need to be reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial. Next,
notice that the coefficient ek of v
k can be written as ek = d⌊k/w0⌋c(k mod w0). But
remember that the c and d coefficients correspond to the bits of x̂i,h and ŷi,h, which in
turn correspond to the bits of xi and yi. So if we wish to know the AND of ck′ and dk′ ,
we can look at the coefficient of vk, for the k for which k′ = ⌊k/w0⌋ = (k mod w0),
This will occur at k = k′w0 + k
′. Thus, each ẑi,h can be used to find the AND of w0
bits. For k′ ∈ {0, . . . , w0 − 1}, bit ẑi,h[1 + k′ + k′w0] is the AND of x̂i,h[1 + w0k′] and
ŷi,h[1 + k
′].
Zooming back out to zi, we find that each bit of zi can be found as zi[k] =
ẑi,⌊ k+1
w0
⌋[1 + ((k − 1) mod w0) + w0((k − 1) mod w0)]. Since the ẑi,h variables were
formed correctly from the x̂i,h and ŷi,h variables, which were formed correctly from xi
and yi, zi will be the AND of xi and yi for all i ∈ [N ], as desired.
Zero-knowledge: The hidden variables are zero-knowledge for the same reason the
original witness variables are. The revealed variables added as part of Test-Pattern-
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Zeros-Constraints in step 3 can be simulated perfectly with random sets of elements
that meet Rx, Ry, and Rz, as described in Test-Pattern-Zeros-Constraints.
Soundness: Suppose P is cheating, that is, there is at least one (xi, yi, zi) triple
for which zi 6= xi&yi. Without loss of generality, let i = 1 be an index on which the
prover cheats.
If the Ligero matrix is not well-formed, Test-Interleaved will fail with probability
at least 1− δ3; we assume this is not the case for the remainder of the proof.
If z1 6= x1&y1, then one of the following must be true:
1. There exists an h ∈ [w1] for which ẑ1,h 6= x̂1,h ∗ ŷ1,h.
2. The x̂1,h variables were not properly formed from x1. In other words,
Tπx [x1, x̂1,1, . . . , x̂1,w1 , x1]
⊥ 6= ~0.
The same may be true for Tπy on the y variables, or Tπz on the z variables.
If the former is true, then Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS will fail with proba-
bility at least 1−δ1. If the latter is true, then either Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS
will fail with probability at least 1−δ2, or the pattern-checking part of Test-Pattern-
Zeros-Constraints for Rx will fail with probability at most 1/2
κ. Similarly for Ry
and Rz.
Thus, by a Union bound, the overall protocol has soundness error 3(1/2κ) + δ1 +
δ2 + δ3 over the verifier’s coins.
Additionally, the ẑ variables can be used to compute bitwise outer product if
desired.
4.10.4 Range tests
We now show how to do cheap range tests for power-of-two ranges, and how to build
an adder and use it to perform non-power-of-two range tests.
Power-of-two range tests Our Zeros test can be used to very cheaply test range
tests where the range is a power of two, and can be used combined with an Add-with-
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x = 10110→ (x̂w1 = 000
w0









y = 11101→ (ŷw1 = 0000 1, ŷ2 = 000 1 1, ŷ1 = 000 0 1) (4.9)
l l l ẑh = x̂h ∗ ŷh
z = 10100← (ẑw1 = 000
w0









Figure 4·6: Example variable splits for Test-And-Constraints for w = 5, w0 =
2, w1 = 3. Pattern constraints enforce the relationship between x and x̂, and similar
for y and z. The ẑ variables are related to x̂ and ŷ via a quadratic constraint.
modulus gadget (which makes use of AND and Pattern) to make a non-power-of-two
range test.
To check whether a variable x < 2a for some a ≤ w, we simply use the Zeros test
with Z = {k : k > a}, to see whether the higher order bits of x are 0. This scales very
efficiently – to check whether N variables are all less than the same power of 2, the
Zeros test can be applied to all N variables and costs only κ hidden and κ revealed
variables (independent of N).
Note that power-of-two range tests in F2w are especially useful in financial use
cases that require proving numbers are non-negative, i.e. the arithmetic addition or
multiplication of two such numbers never wraps around. The addition case can be
done by showing that the two numbers are each less than 2w−1, and the multiplication
case can be done by showing that the two numbers are each less than 2⌊w/2⌋ (assuming
this is an acceptably loose upper bound).
Non-power-of-two range tests. Suppose we wish to show that x < n for some
non-power-of-two n < 2w − 1. Let a be the integer such that 2a is the smallest power
of 2 greater than n. A range proof to ensure x < n can be done by showing that both
x and (x − n + 2a) have 0 for their w − a MSBs, in other words, they are less than
2a. Here, + and − denote arithmetic addition and subtraction.
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Test-And-Constraints(F = GF(2w), κ;x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN , z1, . . . , zN )
Inputs: Soundness parameter κ. Secret variables x1, . . ., xN , y1, . . ., yN , z1, . . ., zN ∈ F where
P claims that xi&yi = zi for all i ∈ [N ].
Constraint enforced: xi&yi = zi for all i ∈ [N ].
Procedure:
1. Initial phase:
(a) Let w0 = ⌊
√
w⌋. Let w1 be the minimum integer such that w0w1 ≥ w. (Note that
w1 ≤ w0 + 2.)
(b) Add 3Nw1 new variables to the witness as described below.
i. For i ∈ [N ], for h ∈ [w1], add new variable x̂i,h where x̂i,h[(k − 1)w0 + 1] =
xi[((h− 1)w0)+ k] for k ∈ [w0] (if the index is defined), and all other bits are
0. An example is shown in Equation 4.8.
ii. For i ∈ [N ], for h ∈ [w1], add new variable ŷi,h where ŷi,h[k] = xi[((h −
1)w0) + k] for k ∈ [w0] (if the index is defined), and all other bits are 0. An
example is shown in Equation 4.9.
iii. For i ∈ [N ], for h ∈ [w1], add new variable ẑi,h = x̂i,h ∗ ŷi,h, where ∗ denotes
multiplication in GF(2w). Observe that within ẑi,h, each of w0 “chunks” of
w0 bits, the kth bit of the kth chunk is 1 if and only if the corresponding bits
in xi and yi are 1. An example is shown in Equation 4.10.
(c) For all i ∈ [N ], h ∈ [w1], add a quadratic constraint that x̂i,h ∗ ŷi,h = ẑi,h.
Continued in Fig. 4·7b.
(a)
Figure 4·7: Witness modification procedure and costs for Test-And-Constraints
(continued in Fig. 4·7b)
This motivates the creation of an adder. A gadget to add x and y in a power-of-
two modulus of at most 2w−1 can be created by writing constraints on an additional
“carry” variable c based on a ripple-carry adder. AND and Pattern can be combined
to form a carry variable c such that c[i] = Majority(c[i−1], x[i−1], y[i−1]) for i ∈ [w],
and c[0] = 0 by convention. The XOR of c with x and y create the z variable. This
can be used to set up the (x − n + 2a − 1) equation above, and then the Zeros test
can be used to ensure that both that and x are less than 2a.
Our full modifications to the protocol from [10] are shown in Figure 4·8.
4.11 Performance
We primarily evaluate our proof on its size compared to original Ligero, since our
asymptotic prover and verifier runtime should be the same as Ligero. Recall that a
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Continued from Fig. 4·7a
1. Initial phase, continued from Fig. 4·7a
(d) We define patterns πx, πy, πz which describe the relationship between the variables
and their “hatted” versions described in 1(b) and with examples in Equations 4.8,
4.9, and 4.10.
i. Tπx enforces the following on column-vector [xi, x̂i,1, . . . , x̂i,w1 ]:
A. For all h ∈ [w1], x̂i,h is 0 everywhere except at indices (1 + kw0) for all
valid k. Additionally, x̂i,w1 is also 0 at indices where k + 1 > w mod w0.
B. For k ∈ [w], xi[k] = x̂i,⌊ k+1
w0
⌋[1 + w0((k − 1) mod w0)]
ii. Tπy enforces the following on column-vector [yi, ŷi,1, . . . , ŷi,w1 ]:
A. For all h ∈ [w1], ŷi,h is 0 everywhere except at indices 1, . . . , w0. Addi-
tionally, ŷi,w1 is also 0 at indices greater than w mod w0.
B. For k ∈ [w], yi[k] = ŷi,⌊ k+1
w0
⌋[k mod w0]
iii. Tπz enforces the following on column-vector [zi, ẑi,1, . . . , ẑi,w1 ]:
A. For all h ∈ [w1], ẑi,h is 0 at all indices greater than w20. Additionally,
ẑi,w1 is also 0 at indices greater than w0(w mod w0).
B. For k ∈ [w], zi[k] = ẑi,⌊ k+1
w0
⌋[1 + ((k − 1) mod w0) +w0((k − 1) mod w0)]
Run the initial phase of 3 Test-Pattern-Zeros-Constraints tests, one for each
of these predicates, using all of the corresponding variables from 1(b) as input.
That is, do a batch test for Tπx , Tπy , and Tπz for all i ∈ [N ]. Each test’s initial
phase adds hidden (w1 + 1)κ elements, for a total of 3(w1 + 1)κ.
2. Challenge phase: Run the challenge phase of each of the three Test-Pattern-Zeros-
Constraints, which involves picking Nκ bits for each test.
3. Response phase: Run the response phase of each of the three Test-Pattern-Zeros-
Constraints, which will add (w1 +1) revealed variables and some linear constraints on
them.
4. Interactive testing phase: Run Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS on the constraints
described in 1(c), and run the interactive testing phase of Test-Pattern-Zeros-
Constraints, which involves running Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS and ensuring
that Test-Pattern-Zeros-Constraints passes using the revealed variables.
(b)
Figure 4·7: Witness modification procedure and costs for Test-And-Constraints
(continued from Fig. 4·7a)
proof for a Boolean circuit in original Ligero requires using an entire field element
to represent a single bit value on a wire. Like original Ligero, the parameters for
BooLigero can be set so that the proof size is O(
√
s) elements, where s is the circuit
size. If the field size in Ligero is b = ⌈logF⌉ bits, then we would expect BooLigero to
save a factor of O(
√
b) in the proof size. For example, if a Ligero proof used a field
with 18 bits, we would expect a
√
18 ≈ 4.2× improvement in the BooLigero proof
size. For AND gates we require w1 ≈
√
w variables to compute the AND of a single
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Protocol ZKIOP(C,F = GF(2w))
• Input: The prover P and the verifier V share a common input circuit C : GF(2w)ni →
GF(2w) and input statement x. P additionally has input α = (α1, . . . , αni) such that
C(α) = 1.
• Initial oracle: Let v1 be the total number of variables added by P in the initial phase
all BooLigero tests. Let v2 and v3 be the number of hidden and revealed variables added
by P in the response phase all BooLigero tests. The variables themselves cannot be
known until the challenge, but the number is fixed. Let m1,m2,m3, ℓ be integers such
that m1 · ℓ > ni + s + v1, m2 · ℓ > v2, and m3 · ℓ > v3, where s is the number of gates
in the circuit. P generates an extended witness w1 ∈ Fm1ℓ where the first ni + s entries
of w are (α1, . . . , αni , β1, . . . , βs) where βi is the output of the ith gate when evaluating
C(α). The next v1 variables are those for the initial phase section of all BooLigero
tests. Let L = RSGF(2w),n,k,η, and let ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζℓ) be a sequence of distinct elements
disjoint from η1, . . . , ηn. The prover samples random codeword U
w1 ∈ Lm1 subject to
w1 = Decζ(U
w1).
• Challenge: V chooses and sends random bits as described in the challenge phase
section of all BooLigero tests.
• Response oracle: P generates witness extension w2 ∈ Fm2ℓ where the first v1 variables
in w2 are the hidden variables for the response phase section of all BooLigero tests.
P also generates witness extension w3 ∈ Fm3ℓ, where the first variables in w3 are the
revealed variables for the response phase section of all BooLigero tests. Let m =
m1 +m2 and let m
′ = m1 +m2 +m3. Let w ∈ Fℓ be the vertical concatenation of w1
and w2. Let w
′ ∈ F(m1+m2+m3)ℓ be the vertical concatenation of w and all revealed
variables. P deterministically chooses codeword Uw3 ∈ Lm3 . P samples random
codeword Uw2 ∈ Lm2 subject to w2 = Decζ(Uw2) and sets Uw ∈ Lm to be the vertical
concatenation of Uw1 and Uw2 .
Continued in Fig. 4·8b
(a)
Figure 4·8: ZKIOP of [10] with our modifications shown in blue (continued in Fig.
4·8b)
w-bit variable. If the Ligero and BooLigero field sizes require the same number of
bits to represent, BooLigero will use
√
b fewer variables, a proof size improvement of
O(b1/4) for AND-heavy circuits. We also add a small constant up-front cost for the
revealed variables.
Determining the size of the extended witness and proof. If the verification
circuit C consists of only XOR gates, NOT gates, and Galois field multiplications,
then the size of the witness w is simply the number of wires in C, which we call v0 as
described in §4.10.1. If C contains ANDs, or uses any other BooLigero test (e.g. using
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Test-Pattern-Constraints to perform a bit shift), then w is augmented with the
(v1 + v2 hidden and v3 revealed) variables described in §4.10.3. The combined proof
oracle becomes an Lm encoding of the v0 + v1 + v2 hidden variables in the witness,
plus the v3 revealed variables in the clear. Once the extended witness is created, the
process of choosing the parameters proceeds in the same way as original Ligero: the
number of rows m is balanced against the number of variables per row ℓ to achieve
sublinear proof size. For more details, see [10] §5. In the non-interactive version of
BooLigero, the Merkle path part of the proof is doubled since the initial and response
variables were committed to separately. We computed the parameters using our own
optimizer written in SciPy and validated them with an optimizer obtained from [308].
4.11.1 Concrete results
For both SHA-2 and SHA-3, we evaluate our proof sizes compared to Ligero on
proving membership in the list captured by a Merkle tree. This has become a common
benchmark for evaluating the scalability of zero-knowledge proofs to larger predicates.
We compare the proof sizes of Ligero and BooLigero for Merkle trees of increasing
size. For a Merkle tree with M leaves, (2M − 1) hash computations are done.
SHA-3
SHA-3 only uses bit operations, so there is no special benefit from using an arithmetic
system. Both BooLigero and Ligero may do the wordwise rotations for free; they can
be achieved by re-indexing constraints for the next step. Ligero can do the bitwise
rotations for free (since each variable represents only a single bit), but in BooLigero
we must write the additional variable and use Test-Pattern-Constraints to enforce
the constraint.
Using SHA-3 as the hash function in a Merkle tree, each invocation of the hash
function consists of a single call to the f-function.
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SHA-2
SHA-2 contains a mixture of Boolean operations and mod-232 addition. Although the
SHA-2 circuit used in [10] was not provided, we reconstruct a similar circuit using the
same techniques. As described in [10], Ligero computes modular addition by using a
dummy variable. Our SHA-2 circuit for original Ligero tracks 16 32-bit variables (11
main variables plus 5 dummy variables) throughout 64 iterations of the SHA-2 loop.
BooLigero prefers a different strategy. Although we can compute mod-232 addition
in BooLigero by implementing an adder, it turns out that a standard 135840-wire
Boolean circuit for SHA-2 leads to a smaller proof size since it uses far fewer ANDs.
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Continued from Fig. 4·8a
• Response oracle (continued from Fig. 4·8a): Let m′′ be an integer such that
m′′ℓ is greater than the number of multiplication gates plus additional quadratic con-
straints in BooLigero tests. P constructs vectors x, y, z ∈ Fm′′ℓ where the jth entry
of x, y, z contains the values βa, βb, βc corresponding to the jth multiplication gate in
w. The following entries of x, y, z contain the values for additional constraints added
in BooLigero tests. P and V construct matrices Px, Py, Pz ∈ Fm
′′ℓ×m′′ℓ such that
x = Pxw
′, y = Pxw
′, z = Pzw
′. P constructs matrix Padd ∈ Fm
′′ℓ×m′′ℓ such that the jth
row of Paddw equals βa+βb−βc where βa, βb, and βc correspond to the jth addition gate
of the circuit in w, and the subsequent rows correspond to additional linear constraints
added in BooLigero tests. It also samples Ux, Uy, Uz ∈ Lm′′ subject to x = Decζ(Ux),
y = Decζ(U
y), and z = Decζ(U










h be auxiliary rows sampled
randomly from L for every h ∈ [σ] where each of uxh, uyh, uzh, uaddh encodes an indepen-
dently sampled random ℓ messages (γ1, . . . , γℓ) subject to
∑
c∈[ℓ] γc = 0 and u
0
h encodes
0ℓ. P sets the combined oracle as (U ∈ Lm+3m′′ , R) where U is set as the vertical juxta-
position of the matrices Uw ∈ Lm, Ux, Uy, Uz ∈ Lm′′ , and R is the set of all v3 revealed
variables. When the combined oracle is queried on Q ⊂ [n], the response will be the
columns of U that are in Q, as well as R sent in the clear.
• The interactive protocol:
1. For every h ∈ [σ], V sends the first verifier message of the testing process for Test-
Interleaved, Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS applied to A = Padd, b = ~0 on U
w,
and Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS applied to Ux, Uy, Uz.
2. For every h ∈ [σ], P responds with the appropriate next step of the testing process
for Test-Interleaved, Test-Linear-Constraints-IRS, and Test-Quadratic-
Constraints-IRS.
3. V picks a random set Q ⊂ [n] of size t, and queries U [j] that is the vertical jux-
















h[j], j ∈ Q. It
also receives R, the list of revealed variables. It uses the same deterministic process
as P to generate Uw3 and appends this to the bottom of the queried columns for
testing. It accepts if all acceptance criteria for Test-Interleaved, Test-Linear-
Constraints-IRS, Test-Quadratic-Constraints-IRS, Test-Pattern-Zeros-
Constraints and Test-And-Constraints are met.
(b)
Figure 4·8: ZKIOP of [10] with our modifications shown in blue (continued from
Fig. 4·8a)
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Figure 4·9: BooLigero and Ligero absolute and relative proof sizes for SHA-3
Merkle trees




Interdisciplinary cryptographic and legal
research: challenges, opportunities, and
future work
It is my privilege to study at the intersection of two fields that each individually
have enough of their own exciting challenges to last multiple lifetimes. Law and
cryptography share several key qualities: an emphasis on adversarial thinking, a
notion of “convincing” a third party via a proof or logical argument, and a desire for
rigor and consistency. Moreso than most other computer science fields, cryptography
pays more than a little attention to social principles: privacy, autonomy, non-non-
repudiation, deniability, and so on.
Although codes and ciphers have been used for over 3,000 years [184, p. 72],
this practice only began to modernize with the advent of radio in World War I and
intensive code making and breaking efforts on both sides of the war in World War
II [109]. Subsequently, cryptography grew into the field we know it as today in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, after information theory and computational complexity
had matured. Several highly influential developments emerged which would set the
tone for the next 50 years: the call for proposals for (and eventual invention of) the
Data Encryption Standard [235], Diffie and Hellman’s New Directions in Cryptogra-
phy [108] and the RSA algorithm [253] which introduced public key cryptography,
Chaum’s work on mix-nets [78] that emphasized practical privacy concerns about not
only the content of electronic communications but also the metadata, Goldwasser
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and Micali’s Probabilistic Encryption [145] which brought the rigor of computational
complexity to cryptography by basing all cryptography on problems proven to be
computationally “hard,” and the birth of zero-knowledge proofs due to Goldreich,
Micali, and Wigderson [143]. Diffie and Landau describe an additional revolution in
cryptography in the new millennium, with deregulation that led not to major adop-
tion of cryptography in every natural setting, but in specific areas such as protecting
intellectual property and the introduction of Trusted Platform Modules to ensure the
integrity of the software on computers [109]. We can add HTTPS to that list; the
majority of web browsing has been encrypted on Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome
since 2017 [118]. In any case, as old as cryptography’s goals are, many of its methods
and impacts on society are still new.
Law, on the other hand, has always been a central part of human society, even
though the mechanisms and rules change drastically from culture to culture, from
time to time, and from place to place. Modern democratic legal systems include
methods for resolving disputes between members of the society and to address prob-
lems with the governing body. In America, law has always been a key component in
ensuring rights and freedoms; as the Constitution was being drafted, it was recog-
nized that without an independent judiciary, “all the reservations of particular rights
or privileges would amount to nothing” [160]. The American legal system, for all its
flaws, has kept America afloat for almost 250 years.
However, new technologies bring new challenges and shine new light on older chal-
lenges in the design, application, and interpretation of the law. Modern cryptography
in particular poses many new legal challenges, second only to perhaps the rise of ma-
chine learning and automated decision making more broadly. Cryptography, instead
of being used only by militaries and for secret correspondence of state leaders, is now
deployed by most companies with a digital product, and now touches every aspect
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of life on the internet or on a device. The new capabilities enabled by cryptography
directly lead to new questions of law: How should old rules apply to new technolo-
gies? What new actions can we take with these new capabilities? How, if at all, must
we restrict the use of these new methods? What principles should guide us toward
answers?
Modern data analysis is also inextricably tied to cryptography at this point, via
debates over online privacy. Cryptography is one of the most reliable methods for
obscuring information about oneself. For the last several years we have been in a
perpetual debate over what information about the average person will be revealed,
and to whom. It is telling that “statistics,” a word originally referring to “the science
dealing with data about the condition of a state or community” such as a state would
collect [275, p. 1128] is a science now performed routinely not just by governments,
but by companies, academics, and anyone who can get their hands on large datasets.
In this chapter, I argue for the benefits of joint technology-law research and de-
scribe why I believe it will lead to better and more timely outcomes than performing
siloed research in both fields. I first describe the challenges in bringing cryptographic
methods to bear on legal issues, and respond to those challenges and describe why
I believe joint research is important despite the barriers (§5.1). I then describe spe-
cific laws that are heavily affected by aspects of cryptography and statistics and how
research in the two areas can inform each other §5.2. I end the section with a discus-
sion of what I see as some promising paths for interdisciplinary research in law and
computer science both generally (§5.3) and in specific cryptographic research areas
(§5.4).
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5.1 In favor of joint research
Feigenbaum and Weitzner [117] describe common problems when seeking to perform
socio-technical research. Citing prominent legal scholar Ronald Dworkin [113], they
describe the difference in law between rules and principles : rules “can be understood
as logical propositions that are expected to yield answers about what is and is not
permitted using formal reasoning capabilities.” Principles, on the other hand, are
values that guide decisions, but will likely not yield an “unambiguous outcome.”
Principles are the only guide when rules fail us – indeed, many cases that rise to the
level of the U.S. Supreme Court do so because the topic is at an edge case of the
rules, and so are decided on principles alone.
A common criticism that technologists face when venturing into the realm of the
socio-technical is that it is difficult to logically formalize the deliberately-vague prin-
ciples and policies that guide policymakers, lawmakers, and judges. The vagueness of
these principles is valuable to the long-term stability of society, in concert with the
equal application of any hard-and-fast rules. I agree with this criticism – computer
scientists who try to transmute principles into rules do so at their peril.
However, even beyond attempts to convert principles into rules, some remaining
aversions to interdisciplinary research remain. Technologists are often wary of enter-
ing the legal sphere for fear of losing neutrality, although in my opinion this fear is
exaggerated: there is plenty of space for descriptive research to measure or predict
the effects of a technology. Even when venturing into making normative claims, there
is an important need for recommendations backed by legitimate technical evidence.
There is resistance to considering “tech law” or “cyberlaw” its own field on the
legal side as well. Most famously, Judge Frank Easterbrook, a Seventh Circuit judge,
deemed cyberlaw similar to “Law of the Horse” and claimed that law was at its best
when it studied general rules and institutions that could be applied to specific cases
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like cyberspace [114]. His criticism was specifically aimed at lawyers who were likely
to make claims about new technologies that were either false outright, or would be
outdated in five years. As he said, “put together two fields about which you know
little and get the worst of both worlds.”
There have been numerous responses to this critique, most notably from Lawrence
Lessig [209] who essentially claims that some general principles can be unearthed from
the study of the specific law of cyberspace. Lessig was talking about questions like
whether law should adapt in response to specific landscapes, or if it should try to
alter the landscape so as to be more regulable under existing law, or to what extent
the code itself supplants law in certain scenarios.
Although I respect Easterbrook’s note of caution, I find myself agreeing more
with Lessig’s point that sometimes new general points are unearthed by the study
of specifics. Although Lessig’s examples of this principle in the early days of the
Internet included things like authenticating age (often easy enough in the real world,
difficult over the Internet) and the invisibility of tracking, I see similar occurrences
in algorithmic fairness. Algorithmic fairness brought to light issues that are not new.
In some sense, though the field’s name is “algorithmic” fairness, there is nothing
“algorithmic” about the issues studied there at all – human decision makers would
be subject to the exact same statistical constraints. It is only because of the scale
of algorithms, general discomfort with passing control over a person’s life and well-
being over to an algorithm, and a suspicion of the naive promise that algorithms
could not reinforce bias, that we noticed these problems existed in the first place.
New technologies, sometimes by virtue of their power or scale, illuminate broader
issues that now must be addressed.
Thus, I reject the separation of cryptographic research from law. For one thing,
the separation has become less maintainable as technology has become more and more
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widespread. Laws must deal with technology, whether specifying legally punishable
behavior on the internet or establishing rules about autonomous weapons. So too
must technology deal with laws, though this is truer when creating products than
when performing academic research. And though technology rarely offers a complete
solution to a non-technical problem, it would be ridiculous to suggest that it can never
help. Furthermore, even the most die-hard technophobe would surely recommend
researching what negative impacts technology could have on the situation at hand,
so as to know how best to establish good practices.
5.1.1 Laws, policies, ethical codes, or societal goals?
Before moving on, let us briefly pause to describe six different sets of potential goals
for interdisciplinary research: will the research inform laws, policies, standards, best
practices, or ethical codes, or merely improve society in a broad way? We expect this
style of research to be beneficial to all six. However, the interdisciplinary researcher
benefits from understanding the differing effects and strengths of each of these objects,
so as to better determine which type is most in need of what information.
By laws, I mean stated rules which govern a populace under penalty of punish-
ment if not obeyed, and the processes by which those laws are enforced and challenged.
Laws in America, at least those that stand the test of time, are generally narrower,
and stronger, than policies and ethical codes. As a result, conducting research that
has impact on a law has strong consequences for a narrow set of circumstances. Good
examples include the fight over the census and the Appropriations Act mentioned
in the previous section, research on the GDPR in Europe, and the analysis on the
foregone conclusion doctrine presented in the next chapter of this work. As far as
research goes, a primary benefit of examining laws and lawsuits are that they are gen-
erally explicitly written, and in America have an explicit goal of self-consistency, with
a hierarchic error-correction structure built into the court system to resolve conflicts.
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These works have a good starting point in the form of reading the relevant statutes
and case law, then attempting to form formal definitions and “test” the definition
on existing legal cases. A reasonable ending point would be a recommendation to
amend or create a law, an amicus brief on a court case describing the finding, and
in some cases, a technical finding. In some cases, the legal finding may lead to ad-
ditional technical research, such as in §2 which introduces a new security definition
and constructs protocols to meet it, where the security definition was a response to
the legal finding made earlier.
Policies are formal procedures by which decisions are made. These could be
created and used by a government, or by a company or other organization. A policy
can be created in order for a company to determine how it is to comply with a law,
or set up a default set of allowable actions, or any other formal procedure short of
a law. Modifications to policies can be farther reaching, and in many cases just as
impactful as modifications to laws themselves. Interdisciplinary research in this area
can measure the general landscape of policies, whether by scraping privacy policies
or by intensely investigating one particular organization. Statistical research such as
that described in §3 should guide policies (or laws) by showing how to achieve various
statistical goals, or by showing that some different goals are incompatible with each
other.
Somewhat like a cryptographic “ideal functionality,” standards describe the de-
sign, operation, and requirements of protocols or devices. Standards tend to be
maintained by a specific organization, especially the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, or the Internet Engineering Task Force. Technical research is heavily
involved in the creation and improvement of standards, as it should be. My prior work
on the Sender Policy Framework for email, for instance, showed a mismatch between
the clear intention of the standard, and its actual implementation which allowed a
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potential denial of service vector by sending an email to a target mail server [260].
We see the primary roles of interdisciplinary research toward standards as being mea-
surement (i.e. measuring the extent to which a standard is adhered to) and finding
ways to push the state of the art forward in areas where the standard seems to be in
tension with a societal need (for example algorithmic fairness research).
Best practices are weaker than policies in that they are not generally binding.
However, they can be legally important: by adhering to an explicit shared list of best
practices, an entity can claim that it “did the best it could” and should therefore not
be held liable for any problems that occurred while following it. Within cryptography,
best practices are relevant in the context of content moderation, security, and end-
to-end encryption. Like standards, technical research already makes many rolling
changes to best practices lists, especially in security. Interdisciplinary research may
wish to go beyond the technical role in places where the best practices are having
unintended adverse effects on whatever they are governing, or to see the extent to
which various parties are following the best practices, or to tease out gray areas in
the best practices where the principles did not align properly with the rules, similar
to standards.
Ethical codes are adopted by many professional societies or companies. They
are sometimes binding (under the punishment of exile from the organization) and
sometimes not. Cryptography research itself has few intersections with ethical codes,
aside from ethical codes that set general boundaries of what is considered accept-
able research practices. In security research, this primarily consists of guidelines for
responsible disclosure, and what systems are considered valid targets for research-
ing attacks. However, in the other direction, ethical codes are beginning to encode
privacy, security, and algorithmic fairness requirements. Google’s “Responsible AI
practices” contain not only general recommendations but also specific recommenda-
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tions for fairness, interpretability, privacy, and security [148].
Finally, some research has the explicit goal of pursuing some societal improvement.
Some researchers, especially those who distrust the motives of powerful governments
or corporations laying down laws or policies, prefer to conduct research that they
believe will directly improve society, rather than focusing on improving specific codes
or laws. Of course, I would hope all research would be carried out with this ethic of
responsibility, as Rogaway would put it [254], which has been an important part of
science since at least the Russell-Einstein manifesto [255]. Moreover, if one takes a
very liberal definition of “improving society,” then nearly all research improves soci-
ety in some way. It is not the case that seemingly-theoretical research will never lead
to societal improvement. Although much theoretical research is never directly imple-
mented or used, some theoretical research has tremendous societal impact decades
after its original publication, and one cannot often tell which is which for years af-
ter its publication. However, in this case, I am referring to research whose results
would create some immediate form of societal change. These research problems are
a good candidate for interdisciplinary research, and I expect all the same criticisms
and advice for successful law-CS research would apply to social-CS research as well.
5.2 Examples of cryptography in the legal regime
In this section, I describe several recent laws which have overlap with cryptography,
privacy, or algorithmic fairness. The purpose of this section is not to be an exhaustive
list of every law that mentions cryptography, but rather to demonstrate the fact that
such laws are now fairly numerous, and show that a joint technical-legal understanding
of these laws is beneficial. Urs Gasser has described three general patterns of legal
responses to technological change [135]: subsumption, in which old rules are applied
to new technologies; innovation, in which new laws or doctrines are created to deal
228
with the new technology; or gradual adaptation of society and law to deal with the
new problem without any specific intervention. We will categorize these recent laws
accordingly.
The key aspect shared among all these examples is that there is some pressure
to come to a timely decision on matters at the intersection of technology and law.
Sometimes a lawsuit comes up, and it must be decided where a technology fits into
the landscape of the law. Sometimes a new technology is invented that is so impactful
that its negative affects must be negated or mitigated, or its positive affects must be
adopted and mandated. Oftentimes, the issue is forced before an understanding of
the technical and legal issues at hand can be gained naturally by policymakers, and
interdisciplinary research becomes an invaluable tool to resolve the quandary in a
timely manner.
5.2.1 Examples of subsumption
In this section I describe cases of subsumption, where existing laws were adapted to
fit new technological challenges.
Federal privacy law The United States’ laws on privacy tend to be centered on
specific applications. Most notably, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA) protects the privacy of educational records [63], the Privacy Act
of 1974 describes allowed uses of records about individuals by federal agencies [183],
Title 13 provides additional requirements on Census data [293], the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 creates a privacy rule for health infor-
mation [14], and the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (GLBA) requires
financial institutions to create and adhere to privacy policies [150]. These regulations
have inspired a fair amount of research and development, especially in the health
care setting (e.g. [8, 202, 249]) though these works tend to apply existing techniques
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rather than invent new ones. In order to create such techniques, one must have an
understanding of both the legal restrictions and the technical security goals.
An 1807 lawsuit: Aaron Burr’s secretary. Against the odds, there is actually
a very early example of an American legal case involving a cipher. Orin Kerr provides
an in-depth modern take on the case in a recent paper [195]. In the facts of the case,
Aaron Burr was under trial for treason in 1807. Some letters, written in code, came to
light; the court wished to know if Burr was sending encrypted messages to partners in
crime. At the time, having knowledge of a treasonous plot (not necessarily your own),
and concealing that plot, was itself a crime, known as “misprison of treason.” Burr’s
secretary, Charles Willie, was eventually asked whether he understood the contents
of the paper. He refused to answer, citing his 5th Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. His right to do so was more complicated than it sounds. As examined
in much greater detail in §2, the modern interpretation of the 5th Amendment only
provides a privilege against self -incrimination, and only if the requested response is
compelled, incriminating, and testimonial. In this case, the request was clearly com-
pelled (the government was forcing Willie to answer) and testimonial (the government
sought an oral response to a yes/no question regarding Willie’s knowledge); Willie’s
lawyers argued that Willie’s response would incriminate himself for misprison of trea-
son. A lengthy and complex debate ensued among the lawyers and judge of the case.
Eventually, it was determined that since only his current knowledge of the cipher was
being asked, the government would have no way of knowing whether Willie would
have been capable of reading the letter earlier, and therefore there was no risk of
Willie incriminating himself for misprison of treason. This is a reassuring case, as we
study the 5th Amendment in a different encryption scenario, as we have a test that
shows that both the general 5th Amendment principles, and specific court doctrines,
can be subsumed to apply to encryption technologies as well. We explore technical
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and legal issues of compelled decryption in much greater detail in §2; these issues
remain challenging in both fields to this day.
Privacy in the census. For the 2020 census, the Census Bureau adopted differ-
ential privacy in order to prevent attacks that would allow reconstruction of many
individuals’ census responses as a result of the numerous statistics published by the
Census. This poses a question of how to determine how new technological methods
should be treated under existing laws. The Census is a particularly interesting exam-
ple of a function that has strict requirements that tug in different directions: on the
one hand, it must maintain the confidentiality of individual responses for 72 years;
on the other hand they provide the most accurate count of people in the country,
which is most notably used to draw districts and apportion seats in the House of
Representatives. These goals in tension with each other require a high level of tech-
nical sophistication for the Census Bureau. Moreover, previous attempts it has made
at changing their method have been explicitly prohibited by law: section 195 of the
Census Act prohibited the “statistical sampling” method the Census sought to use in
2020 [240]. Now, in 2021, after the adoption of differential privacy, a key lawsuit [285]
was brought by the state of Alabama (representing several states) challenging the use
of differential privacy. Among other claims, it calls differential privacy a “statistical
method” that can be challenged; in this context, the 1998 Appropriations Act defines
statistical method as a “statistical procedure... to add or subtract counts to or from
the enumeration of the population as a result of statistical inference.” This then
passes the buck down to asking what exactly the definition of statistical inference is.
This question of law has clearly become a question of mathematics. This case, along
with many others, demonstrates the need for timely specialized research by computer
scientists that is relevant to questions of law and policy.
231
5.2.2 Examples of innovation
This section describes new laws which were innovated to deal with new technologies.
Determining the boundary of this section with the gradual adaptation category is
challenging – many new laws propose a small change, especially to limit the use of a
new technology, however these changes are usually narrow changes rather than sweep-
ing new innovations. For now, our criterion for being an “innovation” rather than a
“gradual adaptation” is a relative measure rather than an absolute one: I have called
more drastic changes “innovations” and small adjustments “gradual adaptations.”
In Europe: the GDPR The most obvious recent example of a cryptography-
adjacent law is the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Not only
did GDPR bring in sweeping new privacy laws that companies all over the world
scrambled to adhere to, it also brought specific (non-technical) definitions of several
types of deanonymization, including singling out, linking, and inferring. In addition,
a working party created an influential list of guidelines describing whether several
anonymization techniques such as pseudonymisation, noise addition, substitution, k-
anonymity, l-diversity, hashing, and differential privacy, provided adequate defense
against each of the three types of attacks. Each of these techniques requires a math-
ematical analysis to determine whether or not it meets the new security definitions.
These analyses were later further refined in a technical paper by Cohen and Nis-
sim [84]. The GDPR also stipulates that “the controller shall have the obligation
to erase personal data without undue delay” leading to technical works meant to
determine how, exactly, to erase data that has already been incorporated into some
kind of framework like a machine learning model [134]. Finally, the GDPR has also
encouraged people to apply known techniques such as multi-party computation and
homomorphic encryption to new problems, especially in health care, e.g. [128,262].
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Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). BIPA is an Illinois law enacted
in 2008. It is most famous for requiring companies to collect consent each time
a biometric (fingerprint, iris/retina scan, voiceprint, facial/hand scan) is disclosed.
Additionally, it also grants individuals the right to sue in the State of Illinois if
this is violated. This law rose to prominence again in the late 2010s as Facebook
began performing facial recognition and “Face ID” was developed as an option for
logging into smartphones. Facebook settled a lawsuit for $650 million for violating
BIPA; there is currently a similar ongoing case against TikTok (in TikTok’s case, the
lawsuit alleges that the app conducts a full facial scan so as to be able to display face
filters in real time video; TikTok’s lawyers say that the app does not capture any
biometric information) [251]. This law inspires interdisciplinary questions about the
definition of “biometric” and the purposes for which they should and should not be
used.
Facial recognition bans. Several city and state governments have banned law-
enforcement use of facial recognition. As summarized by the ACLU in 2021, these
include “San Francisco, Berkeley, and Oakland, California; Boston, Brookline, Cam-
bridge, Easthampton, Northampton, Springfield, and Somerville, Massachusetts; New
Orleans, Louisiana; Jackson, Mississippi; Portland, Maine; Minneapolis, Minnesota;
[and] Portland, Oregon” [9]. Similar bans exist at the state level for Virginia and
Vermont. California prohibited facial recognition specifically in police-worn body
cameras, and New York state prohibited facial recognition in schools [9]. Two key
issues arise with facial recognition: First, current facial recognition tools developed
in the US are famously less accurate on darker-skinned faces [66]; inaccuracy in facial
recognition has now led to at least one mistaken arrest (of a black man) [129]. Sec-
ond, even if facial recognition worked perfectly accurately on everyone regardless of
appearance, the thought of applying facial recognition and tracking to omnipresent
233
cameras inspires an Orwellian image of mass surveillance. Several factors are cur-
rently pushing the federal government to enact some kind of federal regulation for
facial recognition software; many are pushing for a full moratorium of government use
of facial recognition. This is likely to be an area with continuing need for research to
address a myriad of technical and legal questions for years to come.
5.2.3 Examples of gradual adaptation
This section describes proposed legislation which represents a gradual adaptation to
new technology – although they propose new changes and could therefore be consid-
ered innovations, the innovations are relatively small.
Student Know Before You Go Act. The “Student Know Before You Go Act,”
was originally proposed in 2012 by Senators Wyden and Rubio, and has been re-
introduced several times with new modifications, most recently in 2019 by Senators
Wyden, Rubio, and Warner. It is meant to allow potential college students to learn
information about various colleges’ graduates’ debt, future job situations, and so
on. The bill specifically requires that the students’ data be protected by “secure
multiparty computation technologies; or (2) may utilize technology other than secure
multiparty computation technologies if the other technology – (A) fully complies with
[security requirements given earlier in the bill]; and (B) delivers greater student pri-
vacy and security than secure multiparty computation” [323, 3(c)]. Of particular note
are the security requirements described: the system must “use[] technical protection
measures that reasonably ensure that – (A) a reporting entity’s raw data, including
personally identifiable information, shall not be accessible through the system to the
Department or any party other than the reporting entity; (B) no information about
the data components used in the system is revealed by the system to the Department
or any other party, except as incorporated into the outcome metrics described in Sec-
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tion 5; and (C) no data or information that can identify an individual is revealed by
the system to the Department or any other party” [323, 3(b)]. This proposed law
thus addresses a use case for cryptography that still remains underutilized in industry:
the ability for multiple data-holders to provide an obfuscated version of their data
to some central computing server, and receive some analysis of their data, without
revealing the data itself. The ability to state this goal in these terms is the fruit of
effective communication between cryptographers and policymakers.
Algorithmic Accountability Act. In a different technical regime, the “Algorith-
mic Accountability Act of 2019” proposed by Senators Wyden and Booker would have
required data-holding companies and organizations to conduct regular assessments of
automated decision-making systems, with extra requirements for “high-risk” systems
that pose significant risk of privacy or security violation, or discrimination [322]. The
list of what must be present in the assessment includes ideas that might already be
considered best practices for data-holders: performing data minimization, setting a
time period after which the data and results might be destroyed, determining how
much of the system is visible for public review, describing how to appeal results, and
who receives the results. This is a reasonable list of things to assess, but the bill still
begs the question of how to determine what “significant risk” means in the classifi-
cation of determining a “high-risk” system. In practice, this would likely either turn
to an existing technical standard, or create a new standard. Once again, setting this
standard requires an understanding of both the legal desiderata and the technical
capabilities of the systems analyzed.
EARN IT Act. The “Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive
Technologies Act of 2020” (or “EARN IT Act”), introduced by Senator Lindsey Gra-
ham and 16 cosponsors including Senator Dianne Feinstein, has a long and complex
235
history. In summary, it was meant to encourage online platforms to adopt practices
that would make it more difficult to send child sexual abuse material (CSAM) without
detection. Primarily it does this by amending Section 230 of the Communications De-
cency Act. Currently, Section 230 broadly grants online providers immunity against
civil and criminal lawsuits: they are not “treated as the publisher or speaker” of
information [125]. This creates a “safe harbor” for websites and other providers to be
shielded from liability for what their users post. There has been a lot of discussion
recently about amending Section 230, and EARN IT is a part of that discussion.
Essentially, the EARN IT act would specify “best practices” that would allow the
platforms to keep that liability shield. (The companies could do something other
than the best practices, but they would then be open to litigation and would have to
justify their choices to the court.) The best practices would include retaining CSAM
and associated location data [149, 4(3)(C)] and using content moderators to review
potential CSAM [149, 4(3)(F)]. While EARN IT was originally understood to be an
“anti-encryption bill,” in response to criticism [246] the most recent draft explicitly
carves out an exception for the use of end-to-end encryption, stating [149, 5(7)]:
(7) CYBERSECURITY PROTECTIONS DO NOT GIVE RISE TO
LIABILITY.–Notwithstanding paragraph (6), a provider of an interac-
tive computer service shall not be deemed to be in violation of section
2252 or 2252A of title 18, United States Code, for the purposes of sub-
paragraph (A) of such paragraph (6), and shall not otherwise be subject
to any charge in a criminal prosecution under State law under subpara-
graph (B) of such paragraph (6), or any claim in a civil action under State
law under subparagraph (C) of such paragraph (6), because the provider–
(A) utilizes full end-to-end encrypted messaging services, device encryp-
tion, or other encryption services;
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(B) does not possess the information necessary to decrypt a communica-
tion; or
(C) fails to take an action that would otherwise undermine the ability of
the provider to offer full end-to-end encrypted messaging services, device
encryption, or other encryption services.
Clearly, this is a law that must interact meaningfully with several different crypto-
graphic and privacy notions in order to determine what best practices to recommend,
what technologies to carve out as an exception, and other similar concerns.
5.2.4 Interdisciplinary research accelerates the process of improving the
law
In all of these specific laws and lawsuits, there is a certain need for interoperability
between technical and legal concepts. There is a clear public interest in ensuring that
proper technological safeguards are adopted and mandated in situations that warrant
(for example) privacy or accountability tools, and in banning technologies that pose
an unacceptable risk. To some extent this interoperability happens naturally: as a
technology becomes more widespread, the concepts become more approachable even
to non-experts.
However, waiting for that natural understanding is often not an option. Few law-
makers are experts in facial recognition technology or encryption, nor should they
need to be. Without research showing disproportionate inaccuracy of facial recogni-
tion on specific demographics [66], the benefits of facial recognition in law enforce-
ment use would likely have been recognized as more “legible” than the costs – which
have been determined to be so severe that several municipalities are banning the
technology outright. The original draft of the EARN IT Act would have heavily dis-
couraged end-to-end encryption (see §5.2.3), whereas the new draft specifically carves
out an exception for end-to-end encryption, in part due to widespread criticism from
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researchers in law, cryptography, and the intersection [246]. Arguments over the al-
gorithms used in the Census require an understanding of both the legal requirements
and the technical algorithm being deployed in order to determine the right path for-
ward; since an active lawsuit is occurring over the 2020 Census process, we cannot
wait for a natural understanding of the methods involved to percolate through society.
In all of these areas described above, interdisciplinary researchers are in the ideal
position to make timely recommendations for these systems.
5.3 A path forward
The stock criticism of interdisciplinary tech-law work is correct: the weakest link is
usually interface between the model and reality. Cryptographers will be familiar with
this concept already – a theoretical framework can have air-tight security yet still be
thwarted by side channels or incorrect assumptions. The same is true of the interface
between a legal concept and a technical modeling thereof. However, this is not to
say that the technical models have no use whatsoever. As the saying goes, all models
are broken, some models are useful. And, as another saying goes, if you’re doing
anything, you’re probably using a model, so we have a desire for high-quality models.
This is exactly the problem that this area of interdisciplinary tech-law research seeks
to address: making a stronger interface between the model and reality.
At the end of their paper describing common problems when seeking to perform
socio-technical research [117], Feigenbaum and Weitzner describe two areas where
they believe socio-technical research can be especially fruitful: First, clarifying in
what situations rules and principles are the main guide, often by amending the rules
so that they are either more in line with the principles, or have fewer gray areas in
which they must be abandoned for principles. They provide location privacy as an
example: the rules are few and are either old laws that were subsumed into apply-
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ing to new technology, or very strict constitutional limits; the called-upon principles
in the location privacy debate are conflicting as well, and are at times in conflict
with the rules. Second, socio-technical research also helps bring transparency and
accountability to decision-making processes that are governed by principles, in the
areas where rules do not reach. The authors describe surveillance policy as an ex-
ample; the authors recommend both research into the state of affairs (rather than
relying on conflicting reports from various agencies and advocacy organizations), as
well as ensuring that any technical intervention remain accountable.
We agree that these two areas of socio-technical research are excellent opportuni-
ties where technology can help inform new and existing rules and principles. However,
I would like to bring this further and describe a handful of other opportunities I see
in the field where cryptography can decrypt legal dilemmas. As described in the
last section, it is usually principles, and not cryptography, that will help guide you
to a choice between two dilemma options. However, cryptography can often help to
illustrate what the dilemma options are. It can inform you when two different goals
are compatible, and when they are not. It can illustrate gaps between the principles
and the rules. It can improve the benefits, or reduce the costs, of one or both options
in the dilemma. Sometimes, it can innovate a third option, or a different resolution.
And finally, interdisciplinary tech-law research can guide us to new principles and
rules. We conclude this section with a description of these research types in a little
more detail.
Illustrating the dilemma options and revealing gray areas. Probably the
most common form of interdisciplinary tech-law research has to do with clarifying
the state of what I have dubbed “legal dilemmas.” This research either analyzes
specific technologies, determining whether they meet various legal criteria, or they
formally model laws so as to be able to apply them in new situations in the absence
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of case law. As an example, Nissim et al. [239] formally model some privacy laws
for education in the U.S. Garg et al. [134] provide a simulation-based definition of
the right to be forgotten. In addition to modeling law, determining whether cer-
tain technologies adhere to legal criteria also falls under this category. For example,
in addition to formalizing one aspect of European privacy law into a security goal,
Cohen and Nissim [84] prove that differential privacy achieves this security goal but
k-anonymity does not. There are several works analyzing the use of multi-party
computation in various privacy law contexts, for example in Estonia [53] and under
GDPR generally [262]. We find this kind of work helpful; analogies of various cryp-
tographic technologies, like all analogies, inevitably fail at the edges. I see the main
portion of §2 as an example of this category. More broadly, most interdisciplinary
has some results in this category even if the main thrust of the work sought a dif-
ferent goal. All the statistical research in algorithmic fairness, for instance, helps
illustrate the fact that the problem is not merely “algorithmic” as mentioned earlier:
replacing algorithms with humans will not rely underlying statistical invariants. This
category also includes technical researchers communicating clearer information about
new technologies to legal and social scholars and resolve discrepancies where they
arise. This is especially important with technologies that are growing quickly and
have far-reaching consequences. This touches everything from internet governance in
the earlier days, to blockchain and autonomous weapon systems today.
Compatibility of different goals. Some technical research also yields impossi-
bility results. It is clear why this is helpful from a policy standpoint: if a policy
wants to achieve two different goals, it helps to know that they are both statistically
achievable. Our work in §3 addressed some questions of this ilk. Even if not a strict
impossibility, technical research can also reveal situations where different goals are at
odds with each other. The morass of work surrounding the exceptional access debate
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is a good example here, for example [1].
Improving opportunity cost of one choice or developing a third option.
Cryptography in particular has great potential for improving the benefits (or reducing
the costs) of a dilemma option itself. It can add accountability or enforceability
to existing rules. It may improve the privacy of individuals by replacing privacy-
invasive implementations of rule-enforcement with ones that limit the information
collected. Frankle et al [126] develop a method for ensuring that data requests by
government agencies adhere to formal policies, based on work by Goldwasser and Park
[147]. Some various attempts at creating exceptional access fall into this category,
attempting to preserve some level of privacy or defense against mass surveillance while
allowing a small number of encrypted devices to be decrypted by law enforcement
(e.g. [62,77,107,204,258,278]), though unsurprisingly these do not resolve the tension
in the principles themselves. We see a similar set of research beginning in the context
of moderation in end-to-end encrypted chat [205].
Zero-knowledge proofs in particular are valuable tools that open new doors for
accountability and privacy. They are natural choices for enforcing properties that
would have previously been checked non-cryptographically, improving accountability
and enforcement. They will also potentially improve privacy by using zero-knowledge
proofs where previously any non-privacy-preserving proof would have done. Our
work in §4 provides two zero-knowledge proofs that can be used in this manner.
However, it must be said that zero-knowledge proofs can be a double-edged sword.
In addition to adding privacy to existing surveillance mechanisms, they may also
enable surveillance opportunities that did not exist before. Information that was
previously unqueriable because it was tied to sensitive information might not reveal
the sensitive information anymore. The recent Supreme Court case Carpenter v.
U.S. [74] is illustrative: the warrantless collection of 127 days’ worth of Carpenter’s
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cell phone location information (12,898 individual location points) was deemed to be
a Fourth Amendment search. However, envision a world in which law enforcement
had been able to conduct a search query that revealed only one bit of information:
whether or not Carpenter’s cell phone was at each of the nine robbery locations (and
was the only cell phone that met this criterion). In this alternate world, it is not at
all clear whether or not this would still be regarded as a search subject to Fourth
Amendment protections.
Toward new principles and rules. Last, interdisciplinary research can help cre-
ate new principles and rules for emerging technologies. The very idea that “code” can
guide people’s behavior along with laws, norms, and markets [209] is a new principle,
or at least something more abstract than a rule. The idea of “statistical fairness” as
an overall goal takes on new importance and meaning with widespread homogeneous
decision-making systems deployed on tens or hundreds of millions of people, even if
those ideas had already been applied decades previously in the context of racial bias
in standardized tests [95]. Interdisciplinary research rarely yields these types of new
broad principles, and technical research even less so, but when they do, the results
take on great significance.
5.4 Key areas for future work in joint cryptography-law re-
search
I wish to conclude this thesis by describing several questions that I believe will be
of great importance in the near to medium-term future. In particular, I identify five
key areas of interdisciplinary research that I predict will require significant attention
and research over the next several years and decades.
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Election verifiability, integrity, and auditability Election security is a promi-
nent public issue due to both real and perceived concerns about the security of all
components of the vote counting and tallying process, which became an especially
hot issue in 2020 [45,46,99,233,241]. Two issues are outstanding that cryptographers
can help address and improve the state of affairs in 2022 and beyond: First, current
electronic voting systems remain vulnerable to known attacks [48–51]. Most security
researchers flatly recommend against adopting electronic voting due to these prob-
lems, including issues with specific proposed systems and difficulties verifying their
integrity (e.g. [12,48,233,242,242,272]). However, some of the proposed security and
verifiability notions for electronic voting can still apply to more easily verified paper
ballots. At the absolute least, we should widely implement the current best advice of
election security researchers, including voter-marked paper ballots and risk-limiting
audits [47], and move to end-to-end verifiable elections [233]. This end-to-end veri-
fiability guarantee brings cryptography-style formal guarantees of integrity, counting
accuracy, public verifiability, and transparency [132,233]. The second outstanding is-
sue is one of public trust. Regardless of what actually happened in the 2020 election,
it is clear that existing systems lack the ability to “convince” someone that the elec-
tion results were legitimate in the sense that a cryptographic proof “convinces” the
verifier that a statement is true. Cryptographically-verifiable voting would not solve
the entire problem – as always, the weakest link will be in connecting the real world
to whatever cryptographic object is used to verify – but any steps that can be made
in the direction of more public verifiability in the voting process and outcome will be
helpful. One silver lining in the wake of the 2020 election is that companies that build
election infrastructure are now interested in ways they can verify their results to the
public (e.g. [216]). Cryptographers should take advantage of this renewed interest to
improve the security and verifiability of these systems more generally, beyond merely
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addressing the current public disputes.
Weapons. Militaries have had no shortage of interest in cryptography since its
invention, and this is not likely to change. What will change, however, are the tech-
nologies and methods used to wage war, and these changes will impact the types of
cryptography that is of military interest. If autonomous weapons are not banned
by treaty, they will almost certainly be used extensively, and possibly this will be
the case even if they are banned by treaty. While autonomous (or mere unmanned)
weapons started out quite expensive, with improving drone technology they are now
becoming quite cheap: numerous small cheap machines are becoming the norm rather
than large expensive ones [161, 230, 310]. My own research into autonomous weapon
systems indicates several issues with the modern legal understanding of these tech-
nologies [259]. My past research focused on the artificial intelligence aspect of the
weapons, however this technology also raises a host of key management problems
and other cryptographic questions. In the military context, the question of a device
being captured and its keys being stolen is not an if, but a when, and how many.
Communications networks among many devices are likely to be varied and inter-
mittent, unlike the standard fully-connected graph assumed by most cryptographic
multi-party protocols: there will be a greater emphasis on unusual communication
topologies and topology-hiding multi-party computation [4,18,167,208]. Lightweight
hardware will require lightweight cryptography while maintaining the security against
the compromise of individual devices – this is also true in the burgeoning civilian drone
market [211, 279, 280]. These problems are reminiscent of problems posed by the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) paradigm, but unlike IoT, the military drone setting has more
incentive to address security issues. Military research is likely to advance the field of
cryptography in these areas; cryptographers ignore this at their peril.
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Responsible and verifiable corporate and government data use. In 2021,
there is no shortage of guidelines on how to use data responsibly. We discussed
various data regulations in §5.2, but even aside from official regulations, many major
companies have their own internal guidelines for ensuring that data use is private,
secure, and fair. These solutions remain tenable, if somewhat unsatisfying. However,
the data held by these entities over the years will only grow in both quantity and
type. Envision holding millions of 50-year longitudinal browsing histories, location
data, biometrics, genome data, email, chat history, health information, social media,
augmented reality, shopping habits, food ordered, books read and videos watched,
questions searched for, and people talked to. There is already public unease at the
breadth of this data held by both companies and government agencies, but this data
will only grow unless policy is drastically changed. Many of the important upcoming
changes in responsible data use will be in machine learning and algorithmic fairness.
However, cryptography also has an extremely important place at the table. This is
true not only for data-minimization and privacy purposes, but also for verifiability
and accountability purposes: With such a wealth of information at their disposal, it
seems that the least we can do is verify that they’re actually using the data in the way
they say they are. Zero knowledge proofs such as those described in §4 are among the
best tools to implement these methods. Moreover, since no company or government
agency is incentivized to so of its own accord, law must also play a part in requiring
such verifiable actions.
Anonymity, identity, and accountability. Long-simmering arguments about
anonymity are boiling hotter now. At the application layer especially, the Ameri-
can is debating the merits of anonymity online. This argument is intertwined with
arguments about content moderation also touched upon in §3. To summarize the
situation, two schools of thought stand in tension: On the one hand, by requiring
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identity to be revealed, there are benefits to social cohesion and a discouragement to
be antisocial; moreover it may be a legal requirement if the service involves some kind
of commerce or other transaction [140, 192, 226, 276]. On the other hand, anonymity
brings positive aspects such as the ability to ask advice about private affairs without
reputational impact, a wider ability to experiment with new ideas, the autonomy to
control your own information, and being freed from the “burden of social markers”
of various identity aspects such as race and gender [39, 58, 140, 290]. There are also
practical problems associated with enforcing people’s real names, such as issues with
stage names or lack of ID [158] or people who shield their identity due to domestic
abuse or stalking [140]. Both these schools of thought have some merit to them; we
are faced with a tradeoff between the benefits of anonymity and the accountability
that comes with identity. I have stated all these problems at the application layer,
but they can be extended down to the network layer – many use Tor for the bene-
fits of traffic anonymization [250, 287], but others point to the extent to which that
anonymity enables criminal activity (e.g. [180,315]).
We wish to improve the tradeoff between these two poles. We will need both
social and technical innovations to retain the benefits of anonymity while reducing
the costs [179]. A good step in this direction is Cloudflare’s Privacy Pass [103],
which improves the browsing experience of human Tor users by limiting the number
of CAPTCHA challenges they face, while still forcing bot users of Tor to go through
these CAPTCHAs. We should investigate other improvements, both technical and
social, that improve the Pareto frontier between the benefits of anonymity and the
accountability of identity.
Deniability. As discussed in §2, the crypto wars show no sign of letting up any-
time soon. Especially in the Fifth Amendment context, and also to a lesser extent
in the Fourth Amendment context, deniability is likely to become a key aspect of
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many upcoming cryptosystems. A deniable encryption scheme [71] allows a party to
maintain some security even if coerced to reveal some state after the communication
is complete. Depending on what direction the Supreme Court goes, it may become
the case that the only way to ensure information is hidden in an uncorruptible way
is to use deniable encryption. Indeed, this has already come up in a Circuit Court
case [175]. The technical state of deniability remains primarily focused on the prob-
lem of encryption, and there is good theoretical [72] and practical [309] background
for deniable encryption. Deniable authentication is already somewhat addressed in
the symmetric setting in the form of Message Authentication Codes. However, as
cryptography progresses, so too will attempts at bypassing it, and I foresee a world
in which the entire stack must be deniable. Also, on the legal side, a gap remains be-
tween the cryptographic notion of deniability and the ability to challenge evidence in
a courtroom. A better understanding of deniability from both the legal and technical
side will be key in the coming years.
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[164] Úrsula Hébert-Johnson, Michael P. Kim, Omer Reingold, and Guy N.
Rothblum. Multicalibration: Calibration for the (computationally-identifiable)
masses. In Jennifer G. Dy and Andreas Krause, editors, Proceedings of the
35th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2018,
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Sweden, 10–15 Jul 2018. PMLR.
[190] Marcel Keller, Valerio Pastro, and Dragos Rotaru. Overdrive: Making SPDZ
great again. In Jesper Buus Nielsen and Vincent Rijmen, editors, Advances in
Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2018, Part III, volume 10822 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 158–189. Springer, Heidelberg, April / May 2018.
[191] John A Kemp. The background of the fifth amendment in english law: A
study of its historical implications. William & Mary Law Review, 1:247, 1957.
266
[192] Helen Kennedy. Beyond anonymity, or future directions for internet identity
research. New media & society, 8(6):859–876, 2006.
[193] Orin S Kerr. Compelled decryption and the privilege against
self-incrimination. Texas Law Review, 97:767, 2018.
[194] Orin S Kerr, October 2020.
https://twitter.com/OrinKerr/status/1313224067214835713?s=20.
[195] Orin S Kerr. Decryption originalism: The lessons of Burr. Available at SSRN,
2020.
[196] Orin S Kerr, May 2021.
https://twitter.com/OrinKerr/status/1394285391973261315?s=20.
[197] Joe Kilian. A note on efficient zero-knowledge proofs and arguments
(extended abstract). In 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, pages 723–732. ACM Press, May 1992.
[198] Jeffrey Kiok. Missing the metaphor: Compulsory decryption and the fifth
amendment. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal, 24:53–80, 2015.
[199] James J Kirkpatrick. Testing and fair employment: Fairness and validity of
personnel tests for different ethnic groups. New York University Press;
University of London Press, 1968.
[200] Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan. Inherent
Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores. In Christos H.
Papadimitriou, editor, 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Conference (ITCS 2017), volume 67 of Leibniz International Proceedings in
Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 43:1–43:23, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2017. Schloss
Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
[201] Yashvanth Kondi and Arpita Patra. Privacy-free garbled circuits for formulas:
Size zero and information-theoretic. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham,
editors, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017, Part I, volume 10401 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 188–222. Springer, Heidelberg,
August 2017.
[202] Vassiliki Koufi, Flora Malamateniou, Aggeliki Tsohou, and George
Vassilacopoulos. A framework for privacy-preserving access to next-generation
ehrs. In e-Health–For Continuity of Care, pages 740–744. IOS Press, 2014.
[203] Stanton D Krauss. The life and times of boyd v united states (1886-1976).
Michigan Law Review, 76(1), 1977.
267
[204] Joshua A. Kroll, Edward W. Felten, and Dan Boneh. Secure protocols for
accountable warrant execution, 2014.
https://www.cs.princeton.edu/∼felten/warrant-paper.pdf.
[205] Anunay Kulshrestha and Jonathan Mayer. Identifying harmful media in
end-to-end encrypted communication: Efficient private membership
computation. In 30th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security
21), 2021.
[206] Kyllo v. United States, 533 US 27 - Supreme Court 2001.
[207] Rio LaVigne, Andrea Lincoln, and Virginia Vassilevska Williams. Public-key
cryptography in the fine-grained setting. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele
Micciancio, editors, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019, Part III,
volume 11694 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 605–635. Springer,
Heidelberg, August 2019.
[208] Rio LaVigne, Chen-Da Liu Zhang, Ueli Maurer, Tal Moran, Marta Mularczyk,
and Daniel Tschudi. Topology-hiding computation for networks with unknown
delays. In Aggelos Kiayias, Markulf Kohlweiss, Petros Wallden, and Vassilis
Zikas, editors, PKC 2020: 23rd International Conference on Theory and
Practice of Public Key Cryptography, Part II, volume 12111 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 215–245. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2020.
[209] Lawrence Lessig. The law of the horse: What cyberlaw might teach. Harvard
law review, 113(2):501–549, 1999.
[210] Leonard W. Levy. Origins of the Fifth Amendment: the right against
self-incrimination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
[211] Chao Lin, Debiao He, Neeraj Kumar, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Alexey
Vinel, and Xinyi Huang. Security and privacy for the internet of drones:
Challenges and solutions. IEEE Communications Magazine, 56(1):64–69, 2018.
[212] Yehuda Lindell. How to simulate it - A tutorial on the simulation proof
technique. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/046, 2016.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/046.
[213] Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas. An efficient protocol for secure two-party
computation in the presence of malicious adversaries. Journal of Cryptology,
28(2):312–350, April 2015.
[214] Helger Lipmaa. Succinct non-interactive zero knowledge arguments from span
programs and linear error-correcting codes. In Kazue Sako and Palash Sarkar,
editors, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2013, Part I, volume 8269 of
268
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 41–60. Springer, Heidelberg,
December 2013.
[215] Carsten Lund, Lance Fortnow, Howard J. Karloff, and Noam Nisan. Algebraic
methods for interactive proof systems. In 31st Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, pages 2–10. IEEE Computer Society Press,
October 1990.
[216] Maggie MacAlpine, 3:18 PM EST January 11, 2021.
https://twitter.com/MaggieMacAlpine/status/1348726036771590153.
[217] David Madras, Toniann Pitassi, and Richard S. Zemel. Predict responsibly:
Increasing fairness by learning to defer. In 6th International Conference on
Learning Representations, ICLR 2018, Vancouver, BC, Canada, April 30 -
May 3, 2018, Workshop Track Proceedings. OpenReview.net, 2018.
[218] Mary Maller, Sean Bowe, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Sarah Meiklejohn. Sonic:
Zero-knowledge SNARKs from linear-size universal and updatable structured
reference strings. In Lorenzo Cavallaro, Johannes Kinder, XiaoFeng Wang,
and Jonathan Katz, editors, ACM CCS 2019: 26th Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 2111–2128. ACM Press, November 2019.
[219] Simcha Mandelbaum. The privilege against self-incrimination in
Anglo-American and Jewish law. The American Journal of Comparative Law,
pages 115–119, 1956.
[220] Matter of Harris, 221 US 274 - Supreme Court 1911.
[221] Matter of Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 - Dist.
Court, ND California 2019.
[222] Nathan K. McGregor. The weak protection of strong encryption: Passwords,
privacy, and Fifth Amendment privilege. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment
& Technology Law, 12:581–609, 2010.
[223] Ralph C Merkle. Secure communications over insecure channels.
Communications of the ACM, 21(4):294–299, 1978.
[224] Microsoft Corporation. Picnic. https://microsoft.github.io/Picnic/.
[225] Ian Miers, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, and Aviel D. Rubin. Zerocoin:
Anonymous distributed E-cash from Bitcoin. In 2013 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 397–411. IEEE Computer Society Press, May
2013.
269
[226] David R Millen and John F Patterson. Identity disclosure and the creation of
social capital. In CHI’03 extended abstracts on Human factors in computing
systems, pages 720–721, 2003.
[227] Bhabendu Kumar Mohanta, Soumyashree S Panda, and Debasish Jena. An
overview of smart contract and use cases in blockchain technology. In 2018 9th
International Conference on Computing, Communication and Networking
Technologies (ICCCNT), pages 1–4. IEEE, 2018.
[228] Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US 103 - Supreme Court 1935.
[229] Andrew Morgan and Rafael Pass. Paradoxes in fair computer-aided decision
making. In Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics,
and Society, AIES ’19, page 85–90, New York, NY, USA, 2019. Association for
Computing Machinery.
[230] Zachary Morris. US drones: Smaller, less capable drones for the near future.
Military Review, 98(3):38, 2018.
[231] Muhammad Munir. Fundamental guarantees of the rights of the accused in
islamic criminal justice system. Hamdard Islamicus, 40:45–65, 2017.
[232] Moni Naor and Benny Pinkas. Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation.
In 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 245–254.
ACM Press, May 1999.
[233] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Securing the
Vote: Protecting American Democracy. The National Academies Press,
Washington, DC, 2018.
[234] National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Compelled decryption
primer, 2019. https://www.nacdl.org/Content/Compelled-Decryption-Primer.
[235] National Bureau of Standards. Cryptographic algorithms for protection of
computer data during transmission and dormant storage. Federal Register,
38(93):12723–12789, 1973.
[236] C. Andrew Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In
Michael K. Reiter and Pierangela Samarati, editors, ACM CCS 2001: 8th
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 116–125. ACM
Press, November 2001.
[237] Jesper Buus Nielsen, Peter Sebastian Nordholt, Claudio Orlandi, and
Sai Sheshank Burra. A new approach to practical active-secure two-party
computation. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran Canetti, editors, Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012, volume 7417 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 681–700. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2012.
270
[238] Jesper Buus Nielsen and Claudio Orlandi. LEGO for two-party secure
computation. In Omer Reingold, editor, TCC 2009: 6th Theory of
Cryptography Conference, volume 5444 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 368–386. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2009.
[239] Kobbi Nissim, Aaron Bembenek, Alexandra Wood, Mark Bun, Marco
Gaboardi, Urs Gasser, David R. O’Brien, and Salil Vadhan. Bridging the gap
between computer science and legal approaches to privacy. In Harvard Journal
of Law & Technology, volume 31, pages 687–780, 2016 2018.
[240] 13 U.S. Code §195 Use of sampling.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/13/195.
[241] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Assessing russian activities and
intentions in recent us elections, intelligence community assessment, January
2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA 2017 01.pdf.
[242] Kellie Ottoboni and Philip B Stark. Election integrity and electronic voting
machines in 2018 Georgia, USA. In International Joint Conference on
Electronic Voting, pages 166–182. Springer, 2019.
[243] Bryan Parno, Jon Howell, Craig Gentry, and Mariana Raykova. Pinocchio:
Nearly practical verifiable computation. In 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 238–252. IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2013.
[244] Juha Partala, Tri Hong Nguyen, and Susanna Pirttikangas. Non-interactive
zero-knowledge for blockchain: A survey. IEEE Access, 8:227945–227961, 2020.
[245] Nancy S Petersen and Melvin R Novick. An evaluation of some models for
culture-fair selection. Journal of Educational Measurement, pages 3–29, 1976.
[246] Riana Pfefferkorn. The earn it act: How to ban end-to-end encryption without
actually banning it, January 2020.
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/01/earn-it-act-how-ban-end-end-
encryption-without-actually-banning-it.
[247] Minerva Pinto. The future of the foregone conclusion doctrine and compelled
decryption in the age of cloud computing. Temple Political & Civil Rights Law
Review, 25:223, 2016.
[248] Geoff Pleiss, Manish Raghavan, Felix Wu, Jon Kleinberg, and Kilian Q
Weinberger. On fairness and calibration. In I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg,
S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, editors,
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, pages 5680–5689.
Curran Associates, Inc., 2017.
271
[249] Harsha S Gardiyawasam Pussewalage and Vladimir A Oleshchuk. Privacy
preserving mechanisms for enforcing security and privacy requirements in
e-health solutions. International Journal of Information Management,
36(6):1161–1173, 2016.
[250] Cooper Quintin. Tor is for everyone: why you should use Tor, 2014.
https://gizmodo.com/tor-is-for-everyone-why-you-should-use-tor-1591191905.




[252] Omer Reingold, Guy N. Rothblum, and Ron D. Rothblum. Constant-round
interactive proofs for delegating computation. In Daniel Wichs and Yishay
Mansour, editors, 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 49–62. ACM Press, June 2016.
[253] Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman. A method for
obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of
the Association for Computing Machinery, 21(2):120–126, 1978.
[254] Phillip Rogaway. The moral character of cryptographic work. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2015/1162, 2015. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1162.
[255] Bertrand Russell. Scientists appeal for abolition of war. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 11(7):236–237, 1955.
[256] Laurent Sacharoff. Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and
encrypted devices. Fordham Law Review, 87:203–251, 2018.
[257] Babak Salimi, Bill Howe, and Dan Suciu. Data management for causal
algorithmic fairness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.07924, 2019.
[258] Stefan Savage. Lawful device access without mass surveillance risk: A
technical design discussion. In David Lie, Mohammad Mannan, Michael
Backes, and XiaoFeng Wang, editors, ACM CCS 2018: 25th Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 1761–1774. ACM Press,
October 2018.
[259] Sarah Scheffler and Jacob Ostling. Dismantling false assumptions about
autonomous weapon systems. Unpublished manuscript (ACM CS-Law Student
Paper Competition), October 2019.
272
[260] Sarah Scheffler, Sean Smith, Yossi Gilad, and Sharon Goldberg. The
unintended consequences of email spam prevention. In International
Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement, pages 158–169.
Springer, 2018.
[261] Sarah Scheffler and Mayank Varia. Protecting cryptography against compelled
self-incrimination. USENIX Security 2021: 30th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2021.
[262] James Scheibner, Jean Louis Raisaro, Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza,
Marcello Ienca, Jacques Fellay, Effy Vayena, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux.
Revolutionizing medical data sharing using advanced privacy-enhancing
technologies: Technical, legal, and ethical synthesis. Journal of Medical
Internet Research, 23(2):e25120, 2021.
[263] Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 - Supreme Court 1966.
[264] Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Huang, No. CV 15-269, 2015 WL 5611644 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 23, 2015).
[265] Aaron Segal, Bryan Ford, and Joan Feigenbaum. Catching bandits and only
bandits: Privacy-preserving intersection warrants for lawful surveillance. In
4th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet.
USENIX Association, 2014.
[266] Seo v. State, 109 N.E.3d 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
[267] Srinath Setty. Spartan: Efficient and general-purpose zkSNARKs without
trusted setup. In Daniele Micciancio and Thomas Ristenpart, editors,
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020, Part III, volume 12172 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 704–737. Springer, Heidelberg, August
2020.
[268] Srinath Setty and Jonathan Lee. Quarks: Quadruple-efficient transparent
zkSNARKs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/1275, 2020.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1275.
[269] Shapiro v. United States, 335 US 1 - Supreme Court 1948.
[270] Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350 US 551 - Supreme
Court 1956.
[271] Matthew Smith and Matthew Green. A discussion of surveillance backdoors:
Effectiveness, collateral damage and ethics. In James Bindenagel, Matthias
Herdegen, and Karl Kaiser, editors, International Security in the 21st
Century: Germany’s International Responsibility, pages 131 – 142. Bonn
273
University Press, Göttingen, Germany, February 2017.
https://doi.org/10.14220/9783737007627.131.
[272] Michael A. Specter, James Koppel, and Daniel J. Weitzner. The ballot is
busted before the blockchain: A security analysis of voatz, the first internet
voting application used in U.S. federal elections. In Srdjan Capkun and
Franziska Roesner, editors, USENIX Security 2020: 29th USENIX Security
Symposium, pages 1535–1553. USENIX Association, August 2020.
[273] State v. Andrews, 197 A. 3d 200 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2018.
[274] State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
[275] Sol. Steinmetz and Robert K. Barnhart. The Barnhart dictionary of
etymology. H.W. Wilson Co., Bronx, N.Y., 1988.
[276] John Suler. The online disinhibition effect. Cyberpsychology & behavior,
7(3):321–326, 2004.
[277] Nick Szabo. Formalizing and securing relationships on public networks. First
Monday, 1997.
[278] Matt Tait. Going dark, crypto wars, and cryptographic safety valves. In
Encryption and Surveillance workshop, affiliated with Crypto 2018, August
2018. https://crypto.iacr.org/2018/affevents/legal/medias/Matt Tait.pptx.
[279] Muhammad Tanveer, Neeraj Kumar, Mohammad Mehedi Hassan, et al.
RAMP-IoD: A robust authenticated key management protocol for the internet
of drones. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2021.
[280] Muhammad Tanveer, Amjad Hussain Zahid, Musheer Ahmad, Abdullah Baz,
and Hosam Alhakami. Lake-iod: Lightweight authenticated key exchange
protocol for the internet of drone environment. IEEE Access,
8:155645–155659, 2020.
[281] Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 - Supreme Court 1968.
[282] Dan Terzian. The fifth amendment, encryption, and the forgotten state
interest. UCLA Law Review, 61:298–312, 2014.
[283] Dan Terzian. Forced decryption as a foregone conclusion. 6 California Law
Review Circuit 27, 2015.




[285] The State of Alabama et al. v. United States Department of Commerce et al.,
No. 3:2021cv00211.
[286] Robert L Thorndike. Concepts of culture-fairness. Journal of Educational
Measurement, 8(2):63–70, 1971.
[287] Tor Project. Tor FAQ, 2019.
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#
WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide.
[288] Trail of Bits. Reverie. https://github.com/trailofbits/reverie, 2021.
[289] Meltem Sönmez Turan, Elaine B Barker, William E Burr, and Lidong Chen.
Sp 800-132. recommendation for password-based key derivation: Part 1:
Storage applications, 2010. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-132.
[290] Sherry Turkle. Life on the Screen. Simon and Schuster, 2011.
[291] Nirvan Tyagi, Muhammad Haris Mughees, Thomas Ristenpart, and Ian Miers.
BurnBox: Self-revocable encryption in a world of compelled access. In William
Enck and Adrienne Porter Felt, editors, USENIX Security 2018: 27th USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 445–461. USENIX Association, August 2018.
[292] Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 - Supreme Court 1956.
[293] United States Census Bureau. Title 13, U.S. Code.
https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/privacy confidentiality/
title 13 us code.html.
[294] United States v. Doe, 465 US 605 - Supreme Court 1984.
[295] United States v. Hubbell, 530 US 27 - Supreme Court 2000.
[296] United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 - Eastern District of Michigan
2010.
[297] United States v. Miller, 425 US 435 - Supreme Court 1976.
[298] United States v. Spencer, No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018).
[299] United States v. White, 322 US 694 - Supreme Court 1944.
[300] U.S. Constitution Amendment V.
[301] U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV.
[302] US v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit
2017.
275
[303] US v. Burns, Dist. Court, MD North Carolina 2019.
[304] US v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 - Dist. Court, D. Colorado 2012.
[305] US v. Greenfield, 831 F. 3d 106 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2016.
[306] US v. Maffei, Dist. Court, ND California 2019.
[307] US v. Ponds, 454 F. 3d 313 - Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit
2006.
[308] Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam. personal communication,
September 2020.
[309] VeraCrypt. Plausible deniability.
https://veracrypt.fr/en/Plausible%20Deniability.html.
[310] Bas Vergouw, Huub Nagel, Geert Bondt, and Bart Custers. Drone technology:
Types, payloads, applications, frequency spectrum issues and future
developments. In The future of drone use, pages 21–45. Springer, 2016.
[311] Victor v. Nebraska, 511 US 1 - Supreme Court 1994.
[312] Riad S. Wahby, Ioanna Tzialla, abhi shelat, Justin Thaler, and Michael
Walfish. Doubly-efficient zkSNARKs without trusted setup. In 2018 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 926–943. IEEE Computer Society
Press, May 2018.
[313] Xiao Wang, Samuel Ranellucci, and Jonathan Katz. Authenticated garbling
and efficient maliciously secure two-party computation. In Bhavani M.
Thuraisingham, David Evans, Tal Malkin, and Dongyan Xu, editors, ACM
CCS 2017: 24th Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 21–37. ACM Press, October / November 2017.
[314] Xiao Wang, Samuel Ranellucci, and Jonathan Katz. Authenticated garbling
and efficient maliciously secure two party computation, 2017.
https://github.com/emp-toolkit/emp-ag2pc, last updated.
[315] Julia Weber and Edwin W Kruisbergen. Criminal markets: the dark web,
money laundering and counterstrategies-an overview of the 10th research
conference on organized crime. Trends in Organized Crime, 22(3):346–356,
2019.
[316] Chenkai Weng, Kang Yang, Jonathan Katz, and Xiao Wang. Wolverine: Fast,
scalable, and communication-efficient zero-knowledge proofs for boolean and
arithmetic circuits. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/925, 2020.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/925.
276
[317] Andrew T. Winkler. Password protection and self-incrimination: Applying the
Fifth Amendment privilege in the technological era. Rutgers Computer &
Technology Law Journal, 39:194–215, 2013.
[318] Timothy A Wiseman. Encryption, forced decryption, and the constitution.
ISJLP, 11:525, 2015.
[319] Charles V. Wright and Mayank Varia. Crypto crumple zones: Enabling
limited access without mass surveillance. In IEEE European Symposium on
Security and Privacy, EuroS&P, pages 288–306. IEEE, 2018.
[320] Charles V. Wright and Mayank Varia. A cryptographic airbag for metadata:
Protecting business records against unlimited search and seizure. In 8th
USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet.
USENIX Association, 2018.
[321] Howard Wu, Wenting Zheng, Alessandro Chiesa, Raluca Ada Popa, and Ion
Stoica. DIZK: A distributed zero knowledge proof system. In William Enck
and Adrienne Porter Felt, editors, USENIX Security 2018: 27th USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 675–692. USENIX Association, August 2018.
[322] Sen. Ron Wyden and Sen. Cory Booker. S.1108 - Algorithmic Accountability
Act of 2019, 2019.
[323] Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Marco Rubio, and Sen. Mark R. Warner. S.681 -
Student Right to Know Before You Go Act of 2019, 2019.
[324] Tiancheng Xie, Jiaheng Zhang, Yupeng Zhang, Charalampos Papamanthou,
and Dawn Song. Libra: Succinct zero-knowledge proofs with optimal prover
computation. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio, editors,
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019, Part III, volume 11694 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 733–764. Springer, Heidelberg, August
2019.
[325] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. How to generate and exchange secrets (extended
abstract). In 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
pages 162–167. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 1986.
[326] Samee Zahur, Mike Rosulek, and David Evans. Two halves make a whole -
reducing data transfer in garbled circuits using half gates. In Elisabeth
Oswald and Marc Fischlin, editors, Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2015, Part II, volume 9057 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 220–250. Springer, Heidelberg, April 2015.
277
[327] Meike Zehlike, Philipp Hacker, and Emil Wiedemann. Matching code and law:
achieving algorithmic fairness with optimal transport. Data Mining and
Knowledge Discovery, 34(1):163–200, 2020.
[328] Jiaheng Zhang, Tiancheng Xie, Yupeng Zhang, and Dawn Song. Transparent
polynomial delegation and its applications to zero knowledge proof. In 2020
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 859–876. IEEE Computer
Society Press, May 2020.
Curriculum Vitae
278
279
280
281
282
283
